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Abstract
Individuals in nature frequently face decision problems where the information available to
them is uncertain and their reproductive success depends on the outcome of their decisions.
In these cases natural selection should be expected to favour individuals whose behavioural
strategies yield the best reproductive payoffs. It is accepted that decision-makers in nature
should evolve to behave as if they were Bayesian learners when making decisions on
uncertain information (Marshall et al., 2013a,b; McNamara et al., 2006; McNamara and
Houston, 1980; Tenenbaum et al., 2006). In this thesis different decision problems from
nature are modelled in order to determine the optimal strategies that should be expected
to evolve in response to different parameters of the environment, under the assumption
that decision-makers should also evolve to make decisions as if they were Bayesian.
One model is proposed to determine the conditions under which inducible defences,
a type of phenotypic plasticity, should be expected to evolve as a defensive mechanism
against predators. The model is used to predict when plasticity is the evolutionarily
optimal strategy, given the decision-maker’s inherited uncertainty regarding predation risk.
The model assumes that this inherited uncertainty has been shaped by natural selection
in prior generations of the decision-maker’s species to reflect the uncertainty exhibited by
the predation risk in the environment. It is shown that when this inherited uncertainty is
high enough (and thus when the uncertainty exhibited by the predation risk is also high
enough) then plasticity is the optimal strategy.
A second model is presented in order to test the hypothesis that decision-makers evolve
their Bayesian priors in response to variation in the environment. The results confirm
the assumption made in the model described above that the decision-maker’s inherited
assessment and uncertainty of the predation risk can be shaped by natural selection.
Finally, a third model is presented to determine when decision-makers should be ex-
pected to evolve self-deception biases in situations of conflict over resources, such as food,
against other decision-makers. This model tests the theory proposed by Trivers (2011),
which states that the most evolutionarily successful deceivers are those who self-deceive
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first. This is because self-deceiving deceivers do not have to pay the physiological costs
paid by deceivers who are aware of their deception. In the model presented in this thesis
it is shown that self-deception is more likely to be the optimal strategy as the information
the decision-maker has access to becomes more uncertain and as the contested resource
becomes more valuable.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The evolution of behaviours as optimal solutions to decision-
making problems
By the process of natural selection certain traits become more or less common in a species
(Darwin, 1859). These traits can be morphological or behavioural, for instance. The
reproductive success of individuals in a species may depend on their solutions to decision-
making problems they encounter, given uncertain information from their environments.
In this case, natural selection is expected to favour behavioural mechanisms that find
the best solutions to these problems, on average (McNamara and Houston, 2009). A
behavioural mechanism refers to the set of internal processes (psychological, physiological,
molecular, etc) that lead to a behaviour (Fawcett et al., 2015). Optimal solutions may be
found analytically for these decision-making problems and individuals should be expected
to evolve the behavioural mechanisms that allow them to make decisions in response to
these problems as if aware of the analytical solutions. This is not to say that individuals
should be assumed capable of finding these analytical solutions but rather that their
evolved behaviours should simply approximate them, most likely through mechanisms,
such as “rules-of-thumb”, other than computing the solutions analytically (McNamara
et al., 2006; McNamara and Houston, 1980). Natural environments generally pose great
complexity, which makes it very difficult for a single evolved behaviour to be optimal in
all possible cases. Thus, behaviours favored by natural selection should be expected to be
optimal, on average, even if they are the result of behavioural mechanisms that are not
always optimal (McNamara and Houston, 2009).
In the study of evolutionarily-optimal animal behaviour, the solution to a decision-
making problem faced by an individual frequently depends on a variable of the environ-
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ment whose value is unknown to the individual. This variable is part of the state of the
environment and can be, for instance, the probability of finding food or encountering a
predator in a given location. Despite lacking knowledge about the state of the environ-
ment, the individual has access to cues which indicate the value of this variable with a
degree of uncertainty. The individual can reduce this uncertainty with repeated gathering
of these cues in order to estimate the variable and make an informed decision, thus the
evolutionary benefit of the decision depends on the quality of the estimate (Dall et al.,
2005). Analytically, it can be shown that using Bayes’ theorem, shown in Equation 1.1,
is the optimal method to produce these estimates from uncertain data (Marshall et al.,
2013b; McNamara et al., 2006; McNamara and Houston, 1980). Thus, it should be ex-
pected that individuals of a species evolve the behavioural mechanisms to make decisions
as if computing Bayesian estimates, which does not necessarily imply that individuals
evolve the means to compute these estimates (Marshall et al., 2013a; McNamara et al.,
2006; Tenenbaum et al., 2006). That is to say, the individual should evolve to act as
if having a prior estimate of the unknown variable of the environment and updating it
to a posterior estimate with each uncertain cue it gathers (McNamara et al., 2006). An
individual’s prior estimate represents the individual’s innate assessment of the environ-
ment variable. It has been hypothesised that this default ‘worldview’ of the individual is
shaped by natural selection and thus is a projection of the environment experienced by
the individual’s ancestors (McNamara et al., 2006). Often the variable of the environment
the individual must estimate is the probability of an event, A, such as the probability
of encountering a predator. Thus the individual should evolve to behave as if having a
prior estimate, denoted by P (A) in Equation 1.1, and updating it to a posterior esti-
mate, denoted by P (A|B), when the individual encounters new evidence in the form of
the observed occurence of a subsequent event B (e.g., a subsequent predator encounter or
non-encounter).
P (A|B) = P (B|A)P (A)
P (B)
(1.1)
Foraging in food patches of uncertain quality is an example of a decision problem
where a decision-maker should be expected to behave as Bayesian learner (McNamara,
1982). In this scenario the environment consists of a set of food patches. Each type of
patch yields an expected reward (i.e., an expected amount of food) when the individual
explores it but the individual does not know in advance the magnitude of this expected
reward. The individual can spend any amount of time exploring a patch and, when doing
so, it has two possible choices: to continue exploring or to give up the current patch
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and move on to a different one. The individual can explore a patch without knowing
for certain that food will be found there and must choose the appropriate time when to
move on and explore a different one in order to maximise its food gain and minimise the
time invested. The individual can use the information learned from exploring the current
patch in order to make its decision. It is assumed that natural selection will favour the
foraging strategy that overall maximises the decision-maker’s food gain (Krebs et al.,
1983; McNamara, 1985; Pyke, 1984; Pyke et al., 1977). McNamara (1982) modeled the
scenario faced by an individual in an environment composed of food patches, where the
individual updates a prior assessment of each patch to a Bayesian posterior estimate after
a number of repeated observations. McNamara (1982) showed that the optimal policy is
to change patches when the estimated reward rate at the current patch is below or equal
to the reward rate of the whole environment. This relates to the marginal value theorem,
which predicts that individuals should generally stay longer in the current patch when
the resource richness is relatively high and costs of travel to a different patch are high
(Charnov, 1976). Thus, this is the behavioural strategy that should be expected to be
favoured by natural selection. This is an example of how a mathematical model can be
used to determine what behavioural strategy should be expected to evolve in response to
a decision problem in a natural environment, given the assumption that decision-makers
should be driven by natural selection to behave as if they were Bayesian.
This thesis presents three models to investigate different decision problems in nature.
The first model is proposed to investigate when an individual should exhibit phenotypic
plasticity in the form of inducible defences. The second model is presented to show how
Bayesian priors can be shaped by natural selection, which is a hypothesis made in the
literature of the evolution of animal behaviour. The third aims to show when self-deception
in a situation of conflict should be expected to evolve. More general details of these models
as well as the motivation for each one of these appear below.
1.2 A model of the evolution of plasticity
Phenotypic plasticity is the ability of a genotype to be expressed by different phenotypes,
depending on stimuli from the environment (DeWitt and Scheiner, 2004; Price et al., 2003;
Whitman and Agrawal, 2009). This is opposed to fixed phenotypic specialisation where the
phenotype develops independently from environmental stimuli. Chapter 2 investigates in-
ducible defences, which constitute a type of phenotypic plasticity observed in some species,
such as Daphnia pulex (Agrawal et al., 1999; Hammill et al., 2008; Tollrian, 1993). These
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defences are costly but they improve survival when there is a predation risk. Efforts have
been made to predict when this type of plasticity should be expected to evolve instead of
specialisation, given the trade-off posed by these defences (Boeing et al., 2005; Hammill
et al., 2008; Riessen and Sprules, 1990). In Chapter 2 a model is presented to predict when
this type of plasticity should be expected to maximise an individual’s expectancy of reach-
ing adulthood when this trade-off is taken into account. The model simulates the lifetime
of an individual with inducible defences who must decide when to induce them, under
the assumption that the individual has evolved to estimate the predation risk through
repeated observations by behaving as a Bayesian learner in order to make its decision.
If the individual chooses induction before making any observation then the individual
is said to exhibit phenotypic specialisation, otherwise the individual is said to exhibit
phenotypic plasticity. The individual’s expectancy of reaching adulthood depends on
when the defences are induced since these entail physiological costs if induced when not
needed and failing to induce them when they are needed results in an increased death risk
by predation.
The model is used to predict, for each environment, whether the individual should
choose plasticity or specialisation in order to optimise its expectancy of reaching adult-
hood. It is shown that this choice depends on the standard deviation of the individual’s
prior. More specifically, it is shown that for any environment there is a threshold. If the
standard deviation of the individual’s prior is above or equal to this threshold then the
individual maximises its expectancy of reaching adulthood by exhibiting plasticity. Other-
wise the individual achieves this by exhibiting specialisation. The model assumes that the
individual’s prior is inherited and that its standard deviation has been previously shaped
by natural selection to reflect the uncertainty of the predation risk in the environment
(a hypothesis tested in Chapter 3). Given this assumption and the results obtained from
the model, it is concluded that inducible defences maximise the individual’s expectancy
of reaching adulthood only when the predation risk exhibits a level of uncertainty above
a certain minimum, which is consistent with the literature on plasticity. The model is
novel in that it takes into account the individual’s inherited prior in order to predict when
inducible defences should be expected to maximise the individual’s expectancy of reaching
adulthood.
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1.3 A model of the evolution of Bayesian priors
A model is presented in in Chapter 3 to investigate the hypothesis made in Chapter 2,
namely that Bayesian priors can be encoded genetically and shaped by natural selection.
In the model, which follows an approach similar to that followed by Hinton and Nowlan
(1987), each member of a population of Bayesian learners must make repeated obser-
vations from the environment in order to estimate the probability that an event occurs
(e.g., a predator encounter). This probability is referred to as the environment state and
each observation consists of a Bernoulli trial with a probability equal to the environment
state. Learners are born with a genetically-encoded prior estimate of the environment
state and use the evidence gained from each observation to update their prior estimate
to a Bayesian posterior estimate using Equation 1.1. The reproductive success of each
individual increases with the accuracy of the estimates made after a fixed number of
observations and learners pass on their encoded priors to their offspring but not the infor-
mation they have learned individually from the environment. The simulated evolution of
these individuals shows that their priors are shaped by the Baldwin effect (Baldwin, 1896)
to allow them to estimate accurately the environment state. Whenever the environment
state changes the population evolves priors that approximate the updated environment
state since these individuals are subject to a selective pressure to produce the most accu-
rate Bayesian posterior estimates. In addition to this, it is shown that individuals evolve
their priors to have high standard deviations when the distribution of environment states
also has a high standard deviation. The results obtained and presented in Chapter 3 sup-
port the hypothesis made in Chapter 2 that decision-makers can have their priors evolve
to have different means and standard deviations, and that the evolved standard deviations
reflect the uncertainty of the environment states.
1.4 A model of the evolution of self-deception
Self-deception is a tendency to ignore or deny truthful, objective information in order to
convince oneself of a false idea without any awareness of the deception. It is manifest in
the apparent biases in decision making observed in animals, including humans, in certain
situations. These seem to present an evolutionary puzzle, since one would expect deci-
sions based on biased (unrealistic) information to be suboptimal, unlike unbiased Bayesian
estimates. Despite this, self-deception biases are reported frequently in psychology liter-
ature (Alicke and Govorun, 2005; McCormick et al., 1986; Pallier et al., 2002; Sharot,
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2011a,b; Svenson, 1981) and Johnson and Fowler (2011) have proposed a model to explain
how these can evolve, which has received discussion and criticism (Johnson and Fowler,
2013; Marshall et al., 2013a,b). It has been proposed by Trivers (2011) that individuals
should evolve to self-deceive first in order to better deceive others. Although the the-
ory proposed by Trivers (2011) has been scrutinised extensively (Bandura, 2011) it has
not been formally modelled. Chapter 4 presents the first model designed to investigate
Trivers’ proposal and is an extension to the one proposed by Johnson and Fowler (2011).
In the model presented in Chapter 4 individuals make decisions by taking directly into
account the benefits and costs of each outcome and by choosing the course of action that
can be estimated as the best with the information available. It is shown that in certain
circumstances self-deceiving decision-makers are the most evolutionarily successful, even
when there is no deception between these. In a further extension of this model individ-
uals additionally exhibit deception biases and Trivers’ premise (that effective deception
is less physiologically costly with the aid of self-deception) is incorporated. It is shown
that under Trivers’ hypothesis natural selection favours individuals that self-deceive as
they deceive others. This model shows how a behavioural strategy can be evolutionarily
optimal despite being the result of a suboptimal behavioural mechanism (self-deception),
which is consistent with the literature on this topic (McNamara and Houston, 2009).
Finally, in Chapter 5 a concluding discussion of the results obtained is presented and
future directions to follow are proposed.
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Chapter 2
Optimal sampling-specialisation
balance in individuals with
inducible defences
2.1 Introduction
Some animals are able to induce changes in their phenotypes as a response to stimuli from
the environment. These changes can be morphological or behavioural and they result
from changes in the environment and not exclusively from the genetic code. Additionally,
these changes can be permanent or temporary. This ability to induce changes in pheno-
type in response to stimuli from the environment is called phenotypic plasticity (Price
et al., 2003; Scheiner, 1993) and is in contrast to fixed phenotypic specialisation, where
the phenotype develops independently from stimuli. Plasticity has been broadly defined
as “environment-dependent phenotype expression” (DeWitt and Scheiner, 2004) since dif-
ferent plastic individuals from the same species can exhibit different phenotypes if they
are exposed to different phenotype-inducing stimuli. If the environment exhibits varia-
tions that take place within the lifespan of an individual then these occur more frequently
that matching, optimal phenotypes can evolve and individuals face a selective pressure to
adjust their phenotypes to make them fit the current environment state (De Jong, 2005;
Forsman, 2014). When this occurs, it should be expected that a species evolves pheno-
typic plasticity, i.e., environment-dependent genotype expression. That is to say, when
there is enough instability in the environment, individuals who exhibit phenotypic plas-
ticity should have an evolutionary advantage over those who do not (Price et al., 2003).
Specialised strategies may evolve, depending on how environment changes occur. For in-
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stance, it has been shown that in spatially-variable environments non-plastic individuals
should evolve to ‘estimate’ favourable environments as more likely than they really are, a
form of ‘optimistic’ behaviour. On the other hand, in temporally-variable environments
non-plastic individuals should evolve to be ‘pessimistic’. That is to say, they should evolve
to ‘estimate’ favourable environments as less likely than they really are (McNamara et al.,
2011).
Phenotypic plasticity is commonly observed in nature, in animals and plants (Belsky
et al., 1991; Bradshaw, 1965; DeWitt and Scheiner, 2004; Ellis, 2004; Kuzawa, 2005; Nettle,
2011; Schlichting and Pigliucci, 1998; West-Eberhard, 2003). It is particularly beneficial
to plants given their motionless nature, unlike animals, who can more easily escape un-
hospitable environments (Schlichting, 1986; Sultan, 2000). In plants, phenotypic plasticity
commonly consists of changes in thickness and size of leaves and roots. For instance, in
soil with low concentration of nutrients roots grow to reach the most amount of nutrients
(Sultan, 2000). In animal species one example of phenotypic plasticity is that of inducible
defences. This is a type of plasticity that consists of morphologies that serve as defen-
sive mechanisms that are developed when a threat is detected. These are observed in
Daphnia pulex, a species of crustaceans commonly known as water fleas, whose phenotype
develops defences when environment cues indicate the presence of phantom midge larvae,
Chaoborus, who predate on the fleas (Agrawal et al., 1999; Hammill et al., 2008). Daphnia
pulex individuals detect the kairomone (i.e., a chemical substance) released by the larvae
and respond by developing neckteeth on their heads as a defensive mechanism (Parejko,
1991; Spitze, 1992; Tollrian, 1995), as illustrated in Figure 2.1. After being induced, the
defensive mechanism is kept until maturity, when the Daphnia pulex individual has grown
to the point that Chaoborus is no longer a threat (Walls and Ketola, 1989).
Plasticity has been studied in order to determine the specific conditions that must
be met for it to evolve in particular circumstances. Models have been proposed, where
plasticity is simulated as a process where a fixed-length period of time is invested by
each plastic individual in cue-gathering after which the phenotype develops accordingly
(Gabriel, 2006; Jablonka et al., 1995; Levins, 1968; Meyers and Bull, 2002; Moran, 1992;
Padilla and Adolph, 1996; Piersma and Drent, 2003) but it has also been modelled as an
incremental process in which phenotype development is cumulative, where the individual’s
development stage is composed of periods of specialisation and cue-detection (Frankenhuis
and Panchanathan, 2011). It has been shown how variables of the environment determine
the levels of plasticity and specialisation that evolve (Frankenhuis and Panchanathan,
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2011). One variable that has been observed to have an important impact in the evolvability
of plasticity or specialisation is the uncertainty with which the cues signal the environment
state, i.e., the reliability of these cues. It has been shown that an increase in the reliability
of environmental cues leads to individuals being more likely to evolve plasticity in order to
predict the environment state via cue-detection and adjust their phenotypes accordingly
(Frankenhuis and Panchanathan, 2011). If the cues are reliable then the plastic individual
becomes more evolutionarily successful because it manages to reduce the probability of
developing the wrong phenotype in the current environment (Nepomnaschy and Flinn,
2009). However, this environment-induced development normally requires time and other
resources, therefore a more evolutionarily stable strategy should be to have a phenotype
specialised for the local conditions of the environment before birth if these are unlikely
to change. There is a trade-off between having a specialised phenotype from an early
life stage and the risk of developing this early, specialised phenotype in a mismatching
environment, because this entails costs (Gluckman et al., 2005) that lead to decreased
fitness.
The development of inducible defences in Daphnia pulex results in a survival benefit
(Havel and Dodson, 1984; Krueger and Dodson, 1981; Parejko and Dodson, 1991) but
entails a demographic cost (i.e., a diminished reproductive rate due to a physiological cost)
to the species (Black and Dodson, 1990; Havel and Dodson, 1987; Riessen and Sprules,
1990; Walls et al., 1991; Walls and Ketola, 1989) , therefore they pose a trade-off (Riessen,
1992, 1999), and this creates a selective pressure on Daphnia pulex to refrain from inducing
the defences when they are not needed. If each Daphnia pulex individual could ‘know’ (no
conscious act being implied) in advance that predators are abundant in the environment
then this individual would maximise its survival by specialising as early as possible by
inducing its defences. On the other hand, if the individual could anticipate that predators
are absent, then it would maximise its survival by never inducing its defences and saving
physiological resources that could be invested in some other way. In nature, however, this
individual does not have this information in advance. The uncertainty in the information
the individual has access to in order to predict threats results in a trade-off between
learning from the environment (plasticity) and early specialisation.
The demographic benefits and costs of this type of defences have been measured by
Boeing et al. (2005) by comparing Daphnia pulex ’s population growth, denoted by r, when
these are exposed to different environments, with varying degrees of predator presence. In
their experiments, two Daphnia pulex clones are used. The first reacts to the presence of
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Chaoborus, by inducing its defences, and is referred to as ‘RC’. The other is non-reactive
and is referred to as ‘NRC’. These two clones are exposed to three environments. In the
first, denoted by ‘C’, no predators are present. In the second denoted by ‘P’, Chaoborus
swim freely and can predate on Daphnia. In the third, denoted by ‘K’, Chaoborus are
present but they are separated from Daphnia by a mesh tube; in this manner their presence
is known to Daphnia via Chaoborus’ kairomone but they do not represent a threat. The
demographic cost of Daphnia’s defences was measured as r(C,RC) − r(K,RC). That is to
say, as the difference in growth observed in populations of predator-responsive Daphnia
individuals when these do not have to induce their defences (i.e., when they live in a
predator-free environment) and when they do induce them without being affected by risk
of predation (i.e., when they live in an environment where the presence of predators
is manifest even though these pose no threats). The demographic benefit of Daphnia’s
defences was measured as r(P,RC) − r(P,NRC). That is to say, as the difference in growth
observed between a responsive population and and an unresponsive population when they
are exposed to environments with predation risk. In summarising their results, Boeing
et al. conclude that the cost paid by Daphnia for inducing its defences is manifest in a
decrease of 32.3% in population growth whereas the benefit is measured as an increase of
68.4% (Boeing et al., 2005). This is consistent with prior efforts to estimate these benefits
and costs (Riessen and Sprules, 1990) but no predictions are made about the level of
predation risk beyond which induction should be favoured by natural selection to occur
(Hammill et al., 2008).
Hammill et al. (2008) investigated how the benefits and costs of inducible defences
in Daphnia pulex individuals affects their fitness, in order to determine the threshold
predator risk at which an ‘undefended’ individual faces selection pressure to transition to
‘defended’. It should be expected that a defended individual’s fitness increases relative to
an undefended’s as the predation risk increases. The threshold for induction is given by the
point where the two fitness values intersect (Roff, 2002). Hammill et al. (2008) measured
an individual’s fitness as being directly proportional to the individual’s life expectancy and
lifetime reproductive success (LRS), which is measured as the overall number of offspring
of an individual. The individual’s life expectancy and LRS are increased and decreased by
induction of the defences, respectively. The life expectancy and LRS of two clones, Cyril
and Colin, were measured with and without defences. This was achieved by exposing
defended and undefended individuals of each clone to different levels of predation risk
and predation cues and measuring the resulting lifespan and number of offspring of each
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individual. These data were used to calculate the expected fitness of each individual,
defended and undefended, for different levels of predator risk. Using this theoretical
expected fitness, a theoretical (predator risk) threshold of induction was found for Cyril.
The theoretical induction threshold of Colin was found to be much higher than the predator
concentrations used experimentally. Hammill et al. (2008) explain that this is because,
in the case of Colin, the fitness of defended and undefended individuals is uniformly low
and the difference in fitness between the two is very small. Therefore the defences do not
offer a significant benefit in terms of fitness and Colin individuals should have evolved
low sensitivity to Chaoborus in order to avoid the costs incurred into when inducing the
defences. With their theoretical model, Hammill et al. (2008) are able to predict the level
of predator concentration that makes induction necessary to maximise fitness (in terms of
both survival and reproductive success). However this threshold is not in relation to any
individual’s inherited prior estimate of predation risk.
Frankenhuis and Panchanathan (2011) proposed an evolutionary model of the evolu-
tionary trade-off between plasticity and specialisation considering the individual’s prior.
In the model, a group of individuals live in an environment that can be in one of two per-
manent states: 0 or 1. An environment in state 1 can be thought of as one where predators
(which represent a death risk for the individuals modelled) are encountered with higher
probability than an environment in state 0. Similarly, the individuals’ phenotypes are
numerical and range between 0 and 1. The reproductive success of an individual depends
on how closely its phenotype matches the current environment state. At birth individuals
immediately fully disperse and settle, after which each individual is permanently located
in the same environment whereas the whole population can eventually become scattered
across different environments with different states. The lifetime of the individual is com-
posed of 20 discrete steps. In each step one of two mutually-exclusive actions is performed:
sampling or specialising. By choosing to specialise the individual shifts its phenotype in-
crementally towards the optimal phenotype that matches what the individual believes is
the environment state. Otherwise, by choosing to sample the individual receives a noisy
cue as to the environment state. The probability that a cue is truthful is called the cue
validity and is constant for all states. With each cue the individual updates its prior re-
garding the environment state using Bayes’ theorem. The individual has a prior estimate
of the environment state. The means of the priors considered in the model are 0.5, 0.1,
0.3, 0.7, and 0.9 (Frankenhuis and Panchanathan, 2011).
Frankenhuis and Panchanathan (2011) use dynamic programming to determine the
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optimal choice (either sample or specialise) an individual should make at every life step,
for different environment prior probabilities (i.e., the prior probability of the environment
being in one state or the other) and cue validities (i.e., the probability of receiving a correct
cue from the environment). The sequence of optimal choices at each life step comprises
the lifetime of an individual with the best fitness value and therefore this sequence is the
strategy that should be expected to be favoured by natural selection in an evolutionary
scenario. The results obtained show that plasticity generally decreases as one environment
becomes more likely than the other and increases with cue validity. Three categories of
cue validity are considered: low (0.55), intermediate (0.75), and high (0.95). Investment
on sampling is observed to be greatest when cue validity is intermediate (0.75) and it de-
creases as cue validity decreases and increases. This is because as cue validity increases, an
individual requires fewer observations to estimate correctly the environment state because
these are more reliable. On the other hand, when cues are less reliable an optimal indi-
vidual needs more sampling in order to produce an estimate of the same quality as with
reliable cues. However individuals who invest all their time sampling without specialising
do not increase their fitness. Results also show that reliance on sampling decreases as
one environment becomes increasingly more likely than the other. This is because if one
environment state is much more likely than the other then natural selection will simply
favour individuals who sample little or not at all and specialise early always matching the
environment state that is most probable.
When cue validity is low, individuals evolve to develop early, devote little time to
sampling and their belief (i.e., certainty) about the environment state is also low. In the
intermediate category, the most investment on sampling is observed. In addition to this,
increased learning paired with increased cue validity results in increased certainty about
the environment state. Finally, when cue validity is high, individuals spend less time
on sampling than with intermediate cue validities because then individuals require fewer
observations to estimate correctly the environment state before developing the optimal
phenotype. Certainty about the environment state is maximum when cue validity is high.
In the model proposed by Frankenhuis and Panchanathan (2011), phenotype devel-
opment is an incremental process and the results achieved coincide with other models of
adaptive development by concluding that the evolvability of phenotypic plasticity depends
mainly on two variables. The first one is the individuals’ priors. As these becomes less
informative (i.e., more uncertain or closer to 12) plasticity becomes more likely to evolve.
The second variable is the cues’ validity. The evolvability of plasticity occurs mainly when
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cue validity is intermediate.
In Section 2.2 a model is proposed to simulate the phenotypic development of an in-
dividual analogous to Daphnia pulex fleas. The individual possesses inducible defences
that improve its probability of survival against a predator but these imply costs to the
individual when these are induced when they are not needed. In this model these costs
are in terms of decreased survival. The individual’s lifetime consists of a sequence of
predator encounters and non-encounters and the probability of surviving each one of these
with and without defences is a parameter of the environment state. The individual accu-
mulates the information from past encounters and non-encounters in order to update its
prior estimate of predator risk to a Bayesian posterior, which is used by the individual in
order to decide whether to induce the defences or postpone them until more evidence is
collected. As in the model proposed by Frankenhuis and Panchanathan (2011), there is
no fixed period of time devoted to cue-gathering. Instead, the individual can accumulate
cues from the environment and induce its defences after it estimates that the predation
risk is high. The purpose of the model is to determine when the individual should opti-
mally choose to induce the defences, given the accumulated evidence of predation risk, in
order to maximise its expectancy of reaching adulthood. This is used to determine the
conditions under which the individual should be expected to exhibit plasticity or early
specialisation. A dynamic programming algorithm is provided along with the model, in
order to determine the optimal choice the individual must make at any given moment
of its lifetime, given the environment state, the evidence collected by the individual and
the individual’s prior. Repeated experimentation with this algorithm shows that there
are two types of thresholds. One is a threshold on the standard deviation of the individ-
ual’s prior that determines whether the individual should use plasticity or specialisation
in order to maximise expectancy of reaching adulthood. When plasticity yields the maxi-
mum survival expectancy then the algorithm finds the threshold evidence (i.e., number of
observed predator encounters and non-encounters) upon which the individual should opti-
mally choose to induce the defences. That is to say, the thresholds found by the algorithm
are not in terms of predator concentration, as in the model proposed by Hammill et al.
(2008), but in terms of the individual’s prior and the evidence (number of past predator
encounters and non-encounters) accumulated until a given moment. It is shown that in
realistic environments, the individual maximises its expectancy of reaching adulthood by
exhibiting plasticity when the standard deviation of its inherited prior is above or equal
to the threshold, which depends on the environment state. Otherwise, it is shown that
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(a) Without neckteeth (b) With neckteeth
Figure 2.1: Difference in head shape between undefended (2.1a) and defended (2.1b)
Daphnia pulex. Photos reproduced from Tollrian (1993).
the individual maximises its expectancy of reaching adulthood by specialising as early as
possible.
The model assumes that the individual’s prior has been inherited and shaped by nat-
ural selection in previous generations of the individual’s species to reflect the uncertainty
in the predation risk (a hypothesis tested in Chapter 3). Given this assumption and the
results obtained, it is concluded that inducible defences maximise the individual’s ex-
pectancy of reaching adulthood when the predation risk has been historically uncertain
(i.e., when the predation risk has not been constant but has exhibited great variability) in
the evolutionary history of the individual’s species. This is consistent with the literature
on phenotypic plasticity described earlier. However, the model is novel in that it predicts
when inducible defences maximise the individual’s expectancy of reaching adulthood by
taking into account the individual’s inherited prior in order to make these predictions.
2.2 The model
The model simulates a scenario similar to that faced by Daphnia pulex, described in
Section 2.1. Namely, the phenotypic development of an individual with inducible defences
who must decide when to induce them, depending on the individual’s estimated probability
of encountering a predator, given that these defences are costly if induced when they
are not needed. The individual’s lifetime consists of a sequence of independent, discrete
life steps. At any life step t one predator encounter occurs as a Bernoulli event. The
probability of such predator encounter is unknown to the individual and non-variable
over time. At each step the individual has the choice to induce the defences before the
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encounter or non-encounter has taken place. The individual holds a beta prior, encoded
with hyperparameters α and β, that represents its default estimate of the probability of
encountering a predator. The beta prior belongs to a type of distributions called conjugate
distributions.1 These have the property that application of Bayes’ theorem (given in
Equation 1.1) to update a conjugate prior results in a posterior of the same family of
distributions. That is to say, if the prior is beta-distributed the posterior will also be
a beta-distributed. Additionally the calculation will require little mathematical effort.
The mean of this prior is the individual’s prior estimate of predation risk, denoted by µ
and given by Equation 2.1. The individual updates it to a Bayesian posterior with each
observation (i.e., with each encounter or non-encounter). The mean of the posterior, after
s encounters and f non-encounters, is referred to as the posterior estimate of predation
risk and denoted by φs,f and given by Equation 2.2.
µ =
α
α+ β
(2.1)
φs,f =
s+ α
s+ f + α+ β
(2.2)
The individual’s prior is assumed to have been inherited and shaped by natural se-
lection in previous generations to allow members of the individual’s species to estimate
accurately the predation risk. This assumption is examined in more detail in Chapter 3.
As stated above, the individual’s default estimate of predation risk is denoted by µ and
given by the mean of the individual’s inherited prior. The uncertainty the individual has
on this default estimate increases as the standard deviation of the prior increases. This
uncertainty (the standard deviation of the individual’s inherited prior) is denoted by σ
and given by Equation 2.3, where α and β are the hyperparameters of the individual’s
prior.
σ =
√
αβ
(α+ β)2(α+ β + 1)
(2.3)
An individual’s prior with mean µ and a high standard deviation is assumed to have
evolved to reflect that in previous evolutionary generations the predation risk is, on aver-
age, µ with high variation. On the other hand, an individual’s prior with mean µ and a low
standard deviation is assumed to have evolved to reflect that in the previous evolutionary
history of the individual’s species the predation risk is, on average, µ with low variation.
It should be expected that the individual’s certainty on its own inherited prior estimate
1A prior distribution and its Bayesian posterior distribution are called conjugate distributions if they
belong to the same family. In this case the prior is known as a conjugate prior.
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Without defence With defence
No predator encountered p0,0 p0,1
Predator encountered p1,0 p1,1
Table 2.1: Payoff matrix listing the probability that an individual in the model survives
each life step, depending on whether a predator is encountered and whether the individual’s
phenotypic defences have already been developed.
of predation risk should have an influence on the decisions made by the individual. This
will be confirmed later in Section 2.4.
The probability that the individual survives at time t and makes it to t + 1 depends
on whether a predator is encountered and whether defences have been developed or not.
The notation pp,d is used to denote the probability that the individual survives each life
step t, where p (predator) and d (defences) are binary (0 or 1). The former indicates
whether a predator is encountered and the latter indicates whether the defences have
already been developed. By default, an individual has no defences and survives each t
with probability p0,0 if no predator is encountered, otherwise the individual survives with
probability p1,0. If the individual has developed defences prior to t then it survives with
probability p0,1 if a predator is not encountered, and with probability p1,1 otherwise. The
sequence of life steps continues indefinitely until the individual gets killed by a predator
or until it dies from other causes. That is to say, when encountering a predator on a given
life step, the individual dies with probability 1 − p1,0 if no defences have been induced
and with probability 1 − p1,1 otherwise. If a predator is not encountered at any life
step, the individual dies with probability 1− p0,0, if no defences have been induced, with
probability 1 − p0,1 otherwise. The four variables p0,0, p0,1, p1,0, p1,1 are referred to as
the survival probabilities. The environment state, denoted by S, is given by the 4-tuple
S = (p0,0, p0,1, p1,0, p1,1).
An environment state is considered to be realistic if it satisfies the following three
conditions. The first is that p1,1 > p1,0, because in the presence of a predator, survival
must be more probable when defences have been developed. The second is that p0,0 > p0,1,
because development of defences is costly and in the absence of threats it must become
a waste of resources that reduces survival. The third is that p0,0 > p1,0 because the
probability of survival without defences must be lower in the presence of predators than
in the absence of these. In other words, any environment state S = (p0,0, p0,1, p1,0, p1,1)
is considered to be realistic as long as p0,0, p0,1, p1,0, p1,1 ∈ (0, 1) and p0,0 > p1,0, p0,1 and
p1,1 > p1,0. The individual’s survival at any life step is given by the payoff matrix shown
in Table 2.1.
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The model assumes that the individual’s interest is to survive its early developmental
stages and to reach adulthood. The notation T is used to refer to the life step where the
individual reaches adulthood, hence the individual’s interest is to maximise its expectancy
of surviving until life step T . That is to say, the individual needs to maximise its expectancy
of reaching adulthood. Thus the optimal decision to be made at life step t, when s predator
encounters and f non-encounters have occurred in previous life steps (i.e., when t − 1 =
s+f), is the one that maximises the individual’s future expectancy of reaching adulthood
in environment state S, given s and f . The optimal strategy is comprised by the sequence of
optimal decisions given a sequence of observations (i.e., encounters and/or non-encounters)
made by the individual. The problem is to determine the optimal strategy to be followed
by an individual with a beta-distributed prior, encoded as two beta parameters α and β,
in an environment state S = (p0,0, p0,1, p1,0, p1,1). A solution is proposed in Section 2.3.
2.3 The optimal strategy as the solution to a one-armed
bandit problem
The problem of deciding the optimal strategy for an individual (i.e., when to induce
defences) in the model introduced in Section 2.2 can be formulated as a one-armed bandit
problem (Gittins et al., 2011) as follows. In each life step the choice of inducing defences
or postponing them is represented as ‘arms’ A1 and A0, respectively. Prior to any life step
t the individual has observed s predator encounters and f non-encounters, and therefore
t−1 = s+f . Then at time t, before making its decision, the individual’s updated posterior
estimated probability of encountering a predator is given by Equation 2.2.
At life step t, the individual chooses whether to induce its defences (by ‘pulling’ arm
A1) or not (by ‘pulling’ arm A0) and each choice yields a reward consisting of future
survival time. The individual’s future survival time after inducing the defences when s
predator encounters and f non-encounters have occurred is a random variable denoted by
Vs,f . Similarly, the future survival time after postponing the defences is denoted by Us,f .
The individual’s estimated survival probability after postponing the defences is denoted by
σUs,f and the estimated survival probability after inducing them is denoted by σVs,f . These
two estimated probabilities are given by Equation 2.4 and Equation 2.5, respectively.
σUs,f = (1− φs,f )p00 + φs,fp10 (2.4)
σVs,f = (1− φs,f ) p01 + φs,f p11 (2.5)
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The individual’s future survival time after induction of the defences, denoted by Vs,f , is
a negative-binomially distributed variable. Using Bernoulli terminology, Vs,f is the number
of ‘successes’ (i.e., the number of life steps the individual survives), each of which with
probability σVs,f , before one ‘failure’ occurs (i.e., before the life step where the individual
dies). That is to say, Vs,f ∼ NB(1, σVs,f ). 2 The individual’s expectancy of reaching
adulthood after inducing the defences is thus given by the mean value of Vs,f , shown in
Equation 2.6.
E[Vs,f ] =
σVs,f
1− σVs,f
(2.6)
The notation Rs,f is used to refer to the individual’s highest expectancy of reaching
adulthood at life step t, after s predator encounters and f non-encounters in previous steps
(with t− 1 = s+ f). Rs,f is given by Equation 2.7, where I[s, f ] denotes the individual’s
optimal decision, in such a way that I[s, f ] = 1 if the individual’s optimal decision is to
induce the defences at time t and I[s, f ] = 0 otherwise. If I[s, f ] = 1 then the highest
expectancy of reaching adulthood is given by E[Vs,f ]. If I[s, f ] = 0 then the highest
expectancy of reaching adulthood is given by σUs,f (1 + R
∗
t+1), where R
∗
t+1 denotes the
the highest expectancy of reaching adulthood in the next life step (t+ 1) and is given by
Equation 2.8.
Rs,f = I[s, f ] E[Vs,f ] + (1− I[s, f ]) σUs,f (1 +R∗t+1) (2.7)
R∗t+1 = φs,f Rs+1,f + (1− φs,f ) Rs,f+1 (2.8)
The individual’s optimal strategy is given by matrix I, where I[s, f ] denotes the indi-
vidual’s optimal decision when s predator encounters and f non-encounters have occurred,
as described above. Matrix I can be found with dynamic programming by calculating
first the highest expectancy of reaching adulthood at future life step T as the base case
of the recurrence depicted in Equation 2.7. This expectancy of reaching adulthood can
be approximated by assuming that in the base case the choice of not inducing defences is
permanent. That is to say, by assuming that if defences are not induced at T then they
cannot be induced in the future. Under this assumption, the individual’s future survival
time after postponing the defences at time T , after sT predator encounters and fT non-
encounters (with T−1 = sT +fT ), is a negative-binomially distributed variable denoted by
UsT ,fT . Using Bernoulli terminology, UsT ,fT is the number of ‘successes’ (i.e., the number
of life steps the individual survives), each of which with probability σUsT ,fT (defined in
2The notation X ∼ NB(r, p) is used to express that random variable X follows a negative binomial
distribution and represents the number of Bernoulli ‘successes’ that occur until r ‘failures’ have occurred,
when the probability of each ‘success’ is p.
18
Equation 2.4), before one ‘failure’ occurs (i.e., before the life step where the individual
dies). That is to say, UsT ,fT ∼ NB(1, σUsT ,fT ). The expectancy of reaching adulthood of
the individual after not inducing the defences at time T is thus given by the mean value
of UsT ,fT , shown in Equation 2.9.
E[UsT ,fT ] =
σUsT ,fT
1− σUsT ,fT
(2.9)
Since at time T either decision is permanent, this terminal time serves as a way to
model the time where the individual is no longer able to undergo phenotypic development,
i.e., the time where the individual reaches full maturity and is no longer able to induce
its defences. Thus T is the maximum possible developmental time of the individual in the
model. This limit is similar to that in the model of Frankenhuis and Panchanathan (2011),
where development takes place over the course of 20 life steps. In the model presented in
this chapter, different values of T can be used and thus different developmental periods
can be considered.
Algorithm 1 solves the multi-armed bandit problem described above and finds the
decision-maker’s optimal strategy, denoted by I. The algorithm receives the environment
state S = (p00, p01, p10, p11) and the individual’s prior estimate of predation risk as input
(as a beta prior with parameters α and β), which is assumed to have been inherited by
the individual and shaped by natural selection, a hypothesis examined in Chapter 3. The
algorithm also receives an integer T representing the time until the individual’s maturation
and after which the defences are assumed not to be able to be induced. This value is used
as the base case of the recurrence introduced in Equation 2.7. The highest expectancy of
reaching adulthood when defences are not induced in the base case is calculated as shown
in Equation 2.9.
The results returned by the algorithm were observed to vary understandably as a
function of its arguments. Since there are several of these, a formal prediction of the results
is difficult. However, important conclusions were reached after repeated experimentation
with different parameters to the algorithm. Algorithm 1 was used to determine the optimal
strategy of an individual in environment states S1 = (p00 = 0.99, p01 = 0.2, p10 = 0.1, p11 =
0.5), S2 = (p00 = 0.95, p01 = 0.2, p10 = 0.1, p11 = 0.7), S3 = (p00 = 0.99, p01 = 0.5, p10 =
0.1, p11 = 0.35), and S4 = (p00 = 0.95, p01 = 0.7, p10 = 0.1, p11 = 0.4). These environment
states comply with the restrictions between survival probabilities described in Section 2.2
and thus are realistic. Individuals with different prior estimates in the interval [0, 1]
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were tested. A terminal time T = 1, 000 was used. The results obtained are presented
in Section 2.4. Even though these results are restricted to experimentation with these
environments, it can be hypothesised that similar results should be obtained with other
realistic environments.
Algorithm 1
procedure FindOptimalStrategy(α, β, p00, p01, p10, p11, T )
I ← matrix-of-zeros[T, T ]
for each s, f ∈ Z+ ∪ {0} such that s+ f = T − 1 do
φs,f ← s+αs+f+α+β
σUsT ,fT ← (1− φs,f )p00 + φs,fp10
RU ←
σUsT ,fT
1−σUsT ,fT
σVs,f ← (1− φs,f )p01 + φs,fp11
RV ←
σVs,f
1−σVs,f
if RV > RU then
I[s, f ]← 1
Rs,f ← RV
else
I[s, f ]← 0
Rs,f ← RU
end if
end for
for t = T − 1→ 1 do
for each s, f ∈ Z+ ∪ {0} such that s+ f = t− 1 do
φs,f ← s+αs+f+α+β
σUs,f ← (1− φs,f )p00 + φs,fp10
RU ← σUs,f (1 + φs,fRs+1,f + (1− φs,f )Rs,f+1)
σVs,f ← (1− φs,f )p01 + φs,fp11
RV ←
σVs,f
1−σVs,f
if RV > RU then
I[s, f ]← 1
Rs,f ← RV
else
I[s, f ]← 0
Rs,f ← RU
end if
end for
end for
return I
end procedure
2.4 Results
Two broad types of optimal strategies were found. One is plasticity, i.e., postponing
induction of the defences until evidence of predation risk is found. The other is to induce
the defences at time t = 1, i.e., before any evidence is collected. This strategy can be
referred to as earliest specialisation and is opposed to plasticity, since it consists of ignoring
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all information from the environment and deciding to specialise as soon as possible.
Repeated experimentation with Algorithm 1 indicates that the optimal strategy de-
pends on the mean and standard deviation of the individual’s prior. In Section 2.2 it is
explained that the standard deviation of the individual’s inherited prior is a measure of
the individual’s uncertainty on its inherited default estimate of the predation risk. From
the experimental tests carried out with Algorithm 1 it was conjectured that for any prior
estimate µ (the mean of the individual’s inherited beta prior), plasticity is the optimal
strategy if and only if the standard deviation of the individual’s prior is above or equal to
a threshold that depends on the environment state. This threshold is referred to as the
inherited uncertainty threshold. The notation δSµ is used to refer to the inherited uncer-
tainty threshold in environment state S of an individual whose prior estimate of predation
risk is µ. The experiments show that the optimal strategy of any individual in an en-
vironment state S is plasticity if and only if σ ≥ δSµ , where µ and σ denote the mean
and standard deviation, respectively, of the individual’s inherited prior. This conjecture
was arrived at after a purely empirical method consisting of repeated experimentation
with Algorithm 1 (a method described further below) and a formal demonstration is diffi-
cult. The values of δSµ for different environment states S and individual priors were found
through repeated experimentation. However the predictions made have been observed to
be consistent throughout the experiments carried out, the results of which are described
as follows.
Experimentation with S1 has showed, for instance, that δ
S1
0.67 ≈ 0.104. Thus plasticity
is the optimal strategy in S1 of an individual whose prior estimate is µ = 0.67 if and only
if σ ≥ δS10.67, where σ is the standard deviation of the individual’s inherited prior. This is
illustrated in Figure 2.2a and Figure 2.2b which show graphically the optimal strategy of
two individuals whose prior estimates of predation risk are equal to 0.67.3 The optimal
decision, given any s (number of predator encounters) and f (number of non-encounters),
is given by the colour of the area where the (s, f) coordinate is located. Black means
that the optimal decision is to postpone inducing the defences and continue sampling.
Grey means the optimal decision is to induce them. Only the individual whose strategy is
depicted in Figure 2.2a satisfies the condition that makes plasticity the optimal strategy.
The two figures show the same general pattern except for the (0, 0) coordinate, and this
shows the optimal strategy depicted in Figure 2.2a is plasticity whereas the one depicted
in Figure 2.2b is specialisation.
3Details on how the plots in Figure 2.2 were produced appear in in Section B.2.
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In order to estimate empirically that δS10.67 ≈ 0.104 the following method was used.
Given S1 and µ = 0.67, individual priors with different beta hyperparameters α and β in
the interval [0.01, 1, 000] such that µ = αα+β were tested. Thus, in all of these priors it
holds that α = β if and only if µ = 0.5. Additionally it holds that α > β when µ > 0.5
and that α < β when µ < 0.5. Each combination of these hyperparameters results in
a different beta distribution with mean µ but with different standard deviation. It was
observed that plasticity was always the optimal strategy in the cases where this standard
deviation was above or equal to 0.104 (approximately) whereas earliest specialisation was
always the optimal strategy when this standard deviation was below 0.104. The two plots
shown in Figure 2.2 illustrate the results obtained with only two of the beta priors (with
mean µ = 0.67) considered. The reason for showing only these two is to illustrate the
existence of the inherited uncertainty threshold δS10.67 and how the standard deviation of
the individual’s prior determines the optimal strategy when the mean is µ = 0.67. This
empirical method was used with other values of µ in both S1 and S2.
Results analogous to the above are shown in Figure 2.3 where S2 is tested instead.
4
The two plots in Figure 2.3 illustrate that δS20.67 ≈ 0.342 and that therefore plasticity is the
optimal strategy in S2 of an individual whose prior estimate is µ = 0.67 if and only if the
standard deviation of the individual’s prior is above or equal to 0.342. The thresholds δS10.67
and δS20.67 differ even though they refer to the same prior mean (0.67) and this indicates they
depend on the environment state. Additional tests with different values of µ were carried
out and the results were consistent with the conjecture stated earlier that plasticity is the
optimal strategy only when the standard deviation of the individual’s prior is above the
inherited uncertainty threshold. Additional, analogous results can be found in Figure 2.45
and Figure 2.56 where S3 and S4 are tested, respectively.
The conjecture stated earlier indicates that a critical variable that determines whether
plasticity is the optimal strategy or not is the individual’s inherited uncertainty regarding
predation risk (i.e., the standard deviation of the individual’s prior). More specifically, the
results indicate that plasticity is more likely to be the optimal strategy when the individual
holds greater uncertainty regarding its inherited prior estimate of predation risk. On the
other hand, earliest specialisation is more likely to be the optimal strategy when the
individual holds lower uncertainty regarding its inherited prior estimate of predation risk.
As explained in Section 2.2, this model assumes that the individual’s prior is inherited
4Details on how the plots in Figure 2.3 were produced appear in in Section B.3.
5Details on how the plots in Figure 2.4 were produced appear in in Section B.4.
6Details on how the plots in Figure 2.5 were produced appear in in Section B.5.
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and has been shaped by natural selection in previous generations of the individual’s species,
an assumption that is explored in more detail in Chapter 3. It can be hypothesised that an
individual’s inherited prior has evolved to have a high standard deviation to reflect the fact
that in previous generations of the individual’s species the predation rate has exhibited
high variation and, thus, high uncertainty. Under this assumption (tested in Chapter 3),
the results described earlier indicate that plasticity should be more likely to the be the
optimal strategy when the predation risk has been historically uncertain. On the other
hand, when the predation risk has been historically certain (i.e., predictable and/or with
little variation) in previous generations of the individual’s species, the optimal strategy
should be more likely to be earliest specialisation. In other words, plasticity becomes
more likely to be the optimal strategy as the individual’s evolved prior reflects more
uncertainty (manifest in a high standard deviation), which in turn is hypothesised to occur
when predation risk has been highly uncertain in the previous evolutionary generations
of the individual’s species (this hypothesis is tested in Chapter 3). A formal prediction
of the uncertainty threshold is difficult, given the complexity of Algorithm 1. However
the empirical finding of this threshold is in agreement with the literature, which states
that plasticity should be beneficial (and favoured by natural selection) when there is high
variability in the environment (De Jong, 2005; DeWitt and Scheiner, 2004; Forsman, 2014;
Price et al., 2003; Scheiner, 1993). This is because an inherited (and evolved) prior with
a standard deviation high enough to be above the threshold should be indicative of an
environment with high variability (a hypothesis shown to be true in Chapter 3) and only
in such environment should plasticity be optimal, in agreement with the literature (De
Jong, 2005; DeWitt and Scheiner, 2004; Forsman, 2014; Price et al., 2003; Scheiner, 1993).
The conjecture stated earlier was tested with different individual prior means and en-
vironment states and the results were always consistent. These experimental tests showed
that δS1µ = 0 when µ < 0.67 and that δ
S1
µ = +∞ when µ > 0.94. In other words, when the
mean of the individual’s inherited prior is below 0.67 the optimal strategy in S1 is plastic-
ity, regardless of the standard deviation (which is always above zero in beta distributions).
Similarly, when the mean of the individual’s inherited prior estimate of predation risk is
above 0.94 the optimal strategy in S1 is earliest specialisation, independently of how low
or high the standard deviation is. That is to say, the interval [0.67, 0.94] is where the stan-
dard deviation of the individual’s prior has been observed experimentally to determine the
individual’s optimal strategy in environment state S1. This interval can be referred to as
the critical interval of the environment state. The notation ΛS is used to denote the crit-
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ical interval of environment state S. Therefore the experiments carried out indicate that
ΛS1 ≈ [0.67, 0.94]. In the same manner, the experiments with S2, S3, and S4 have shown
that ΛS2 ≈ [0.56, 0.81], ΛS3 ≈ [0.67, 0.96], and ΛS4 ≈ [0.46, 0.87], respectively. These find-
ings indicate that each critical interval is specific to each environment state. Thus it can
be hypothesised that tests on other environments should reveal different critical intervals.
Figure 2.6 plots the inherited uncertainty threshold for each µ in the critical interval of
each one of the four environments tested. That is to say, Figure 2.6a shows the values of
δS1µ for all values of µ in ΛS1 and the other three subplots in Figure 2.6 display analogous
information regarding environments S2, S3, and S4.
7 For each individual prior’s mean µ on
the horizontal axis, the values on the vertical axis above the curve (i.e., the values y in the
points (µ, y) above the curve) in Figure 2.6a are the individual prior’s standard deviations
with which plasticity is the optimal strategy in environment S1. The other three subplots
in Figure 2.6 show analogous information regarding the other three realistic environments
considered. The four curves shown in Figure 2.6 are noticeably different and this is most
likely because the four environments differ. The curve in Figure 2.6a is very similar to the
one depicted in Figure 2.6c, although the latter exhibits a faster decrease with values of µ
above 0.90. This difference is probably due to the fact that in S1 the survival probability
of an defended individual when predators are absent (i.e., p01) is higher than the survival
probability of a defended individual when predators are present (i.e., p11), whereas the
opposite happens in S3. That is to say, in environment S1 it holds that p01 < p11 whereas
in S3 it holds that p01 > p11. Then it can be hypothesised that the faster decrease of
the curve observed in Figure 2.6c occurs as the value of p01 increases relative to that of
p11. The same occurs with Figure 2.6b and Figure 2.6d. Both bear a resemblance but the
latter decreases faster as µ increases above 0.80, and in environment S2 the environment
probabilities are such that p01 < p11 whereas in S4 it holds that p01 > p11. Hence it can
be conjectured that the accelerated decrease of the curves in Figure 2.6c and Figure 2.6d
compared to the curves in Figure 2.6a and Figure 2.6b, respectively, occurs as p01 increases
relative to p11. This conjecture is purely experimental, but it could be addressed formally
in future work. Additionally, the curve in Figure 2.6a appears to decrease more steeply
than that in Figure 2.6b as µ increases. A reasoning similar to the one presented earlier
can be followed to reach a conjecture regarding the difference between these curves. The
survival probability in the absence of predators and defences (i.e., p00) is higher in S1
whereas the survival probability in the presence of predators when defences have been in-
7Details on how the four subplots in Figure 2.6 were produced appear in in Section B.6.
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(a) µ1 ≈ 0.67, σ1 ≈ 0.104 (b) µ2 ≈ 0.67, σ2 ≈ 0.103
Figure 2.2: Optimal decision I[s, f ] in an environment state S1 = (p00 = 0.99, p01 =
0.2, p10 = 0.1, p11 = 0.5) with two different individual priors. Figure 2.2a shows the
optimal decision when the individual’s prior has a mean µ1 and standard deviation σ1 and
Figure 2.2b shows the optimal decision when the individual’s prior has a mean µ2 and
standard deviation σ2. This optimal decision is given by the colour of the area where the
(s, f) coordinate is located. Black means that the optimal decision is to postpone inducing
the defences and continue sampling. Grey means the optimal decision is to induce them.
The priors have the same mean but in Figure 2.2a the standard deviation is higher than
in Figure 2.2b. Experimentally it has been determined that δS10.67 ≈ 0.104. Plasticity is
the optimal strategy in Figure 2.2a (as indicated by the black colour at coordinate (0, 0))
because σ1 ≥ δS10.67 and earliest specialisation is the optimal strategy in Figure 2.2b (as
indicated by the grey colour at coordinate (0, 0)) because σ2 < δ
S1
0.67. Details on how to
produce these plots appear in Section B.2.
duced (i.e., p11) is higher in S2. It could be hypothesised that a simultaneous decrease and
increase of p00 and p11, respectively (as in a transition from S1 to S2), should result in a
less rapidly decreasing curve. Figure 2.6c and Figure 2.6d exhibit a similar difference and
the same hypothesis applies to these figures. As stated earlier, a formal prediction of the
results obtained with Algorithm 1 is difficult and so is a formal proof of these conjectures.
However, these hypotheses could be explored in more detail in the future, to show how
tweaking these parameters could possibly change the size of the space of individual priors’
standard deviations with which plasticity is optimal, thus making this strategy more or
less likely to be optimal.
2.5 Conclusions
The model presented in Section 2.2 recreates the phenotypic development of an individual
similar to Daphnia pulex and Algorithm 1 determines when this individual should induce
its defences in order to maximise its expectancy of reaching adulthood. The time when
induction should optimally occur depends on the survival costs of inducing or not, given the
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(a) µ1 ≈ 0.67, σ1 ≈ 0.342 (b) µ2 ≈ 0.67, σ2 ≈ 0.329
Figure 2.3: Optimal decision I[s, f ] in an environment state S2 = (p00 = 0.95, p01 =
0.2, p10 = 0.1, p11 = 0.7) with two different individual priors. Figure 2.3a shows the
optimal decision when the individual’s prior has a mean µ1 and standard deviation σ1 and
Figure 2.3b shows the optimal decision when the individual’s prior has a mean µ2 and
standard deviation σ2. This optimal decision is given by the colour of the area where the
(s, f) coordinate is located. Black means that the optimal decision is to postpone inducing
the defences and continue sampling. Grey means the optimal decision is to induce them.
The priors have the same mean but in Figure 2.3a the standard deviation is higher than
in Figure 2.3b. Experimentally it has been determined that δS20.67 ≈ 0.342. Plasticity is
the optimal strategy in Figure 2.3a (as indicated by the black colour at coordinate (0, 0))
because σ1 ≥ δS20.67 and earliest specialisation is the optimal strategy in Figure 2.3b (as
indicated by the grey colour at coordinate (0, 0)) because σ2 < δ
S2
0.67. Details on how to
produce these plots appear in Section B.3.
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(a) µ1 ≈ 0.67, σ1 ≈ 0.115 (b) µ2 ≈ 0.67, σ2 ≈ 0.114
Figure 2.4: Optimal decision I[s, f ] in an environment state S3 = (p00 = 0.99, p01 =
0.5, p10 = 0.1, p11 = 0.35) with two different individual priors. Figure 2.4a shows the
optimal decision when the individual’s prior has a mean µ1 and standard deviation σ1 and
Figure 2.4b shows the optimal decision when the individual’s prior has a mean µ2 and
standard deviation σ2. This optimal decision is given by the colour of the area where the
(s, f) coordinate is located. Black means that the optimal decision is to postpone inducing
the defences and continue sampling. Grey means the optimal decision is to induce them.
The priors have the same mean but in Figure 2.4a the standard deviation is higher than
in Figure 2.4b. Experimentally it has been determined that δS30.67 ≈ 0.115. Plasticity is
the optimal strategy in Figure 2.4a (as indicated by the black colour at coordinate (0, 0))
because σ1 ≥ δS30.67 and earliest specialisation is the optimal strategy in Figure 2.4b (as
indicated by the grey colour at coordinate (0, 0)) because σ2 < δ
S3
0.67. Details on how to
produce these plots appear in Section B.4.
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(a) µ1 ≈ 0.67, σ1 ≈ 0.342 (b) µ2 ≈ 0.67, σ2 ≈ 0.299
Figure 2.5: Optimal decision I[s, f ] in an environment state S4 = (p00 = 0.95, p01 =
0.7, p10 = 0.1, p11 = 0.4) with two different individual priors. Figure 2.5a shows the
optimal decision when the individual’s prior has a mean µ1 and standard deviation σ1 and
Figure 2.5b shows the optimal decision when the individual’s prior has a mean µ2 and
standard deviation σ2. This optimal decision is given by the colour of the area where the
(s, f) coordinate is located. Black means that the optimal decision is to postpone inducing
the defences and continue sampling. Grey means the optimal decision is to induce them.
The priors have the same mean but in Figure 2.5a the standard deviation is higher than
in Figure 2.5b. Experimentally it has been determined that δS40.67 ≈ 0.342. Plasticity is
the optimal strategy in Figure 2.5a (as indicated by the black colour at coordinate (0, 0))
because σ1 ≥ δS40.67 and earliest specialisation is the optimal strategy in Figure 2.5b (as
indicated by the grey colour at coordinate (0, 0)) because σ2 < δ
S4
0.67. Details on how to
produce these plots appear in Section B.5.
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(d) δS4µ for all µ ∈ ΛS4
Figure 2.6: The inherited uncertainty threshold plotted against the individual prior’s mean
µ in the critical interval of environments S1, S2, S3, and S4. That is to say, Figure 2.6a
shows the values of δS1µ for all values of µ in ΛS1 and the other three subplots in Figure 2.6
display analogous information regarding environments S2, S3, and S4. Details on how to
produce these plots appear in Section B.6.
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environment state, and on the number of past predator encounters and non-encounters
experienced by the individual, which comprise the evidence accumulated up to a given
moment. The individual uses this evidence to update its prior estimate of predation
threat to a Bayesian posterior. The probability that an individual survives each predator
encounter or non-encounter with or without defences is given by the environment state.
For any given amount of evidence and environment state, the optimal decision (induce
the defences or postpone them) is the one that maximises the individual’s expectancy of
reaching adulthood. The optimal strategy is the sequence of optimal decisions to be made
in response to each piece of sequential evidence. Algorithm 1 uses dynamic programming
in order to find the optimal strategy for any environment state and individual prior. This
algorithm is used to find the optimal strategy of individuals with different priors in realistic
environment states, i.e., the optimal strategy under realistic assumptions about survival
probabilities.
The results presented in Section 2.4 show that the algorithm normally finds two types
of optimal strategies. The first is earliest specialisation, which consists of inducing the
defences before making any observations from the environment. The second is plasticity,
which consist of postponing induction of the defences until the predation risk assessed by
the individual makes induction adaptive.
The results obtained after repeated experimentation with Algorithm 1 indicate that
the standard deviation of the individual’s inherited prior plays an important role when
determining the optimal strategy. As described in Section 2.2, the standard deviation of
the individual’s inherited prior measures the individual’s inherited uncertainty regarding
predation risk. More specifically, it was determined that given any environment state S and
prior estimate of predation risk µ (which is the mean of the individual’s inherited prior),
the optimal strategy is plasticity if and only if the standard deviation of the inherited prior
is above or equal to a threshold that depends on S and µ, denoted by δS1µ and referred
to as the inherited uncertainty threshold. In other words, if the standard deviation of
the individual’s inherited prior is below the threshold, then the optimal strategy is earliest
specialisation, otherwise the optimal strategy is plasticity. In the latter case, the algorithm
shows the optimal decision to make at any point in the life history of the individual,
given the amount of accumulated evidence (i.e., number of past predator encounters and
non-encounters) until then. This is illustrated in Section 2.4 with repeated tests in two
realistic environment states. In each case, δS1µ is determined empirically and it is shown
that an individual whose prior estimate of predation risk is µ maximises its expectancy
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of reaching adulthood in environment state S by exhibiting plasticity if and only if the
standard deviation of its inherited prior is above or equal to δS1µ .
It is accepted that natural selection should favour individuals who behave as if com-
puting Bayesian estimates (Marshall et al., 2013b; McNamara et al., 2006; McNamara
and Houston, 1980) and therefore it should be expected that individuals evolve priors that
allow them to make these estimates more accurately. This is not to say that adapted
individuals in nature carry out Bayesian computations when processing uncertain data
but rather that the cognitive machinery they use should approximate the same behaviour
of an optimal Bayesian decision-maker (Marshall et al., 2013a; McNamara et al., 2006;
Tenenbaum et al., 2006). In Chapter 3 it is shown how these Bayesian priors can be inher-
ited and shaped by natural selection. It can be hypothesised that the fact that plasiticity
maximises the expectancy of reaching adulthood only when the standard deviation of
an individual’s inherited (and previously evolved) prior is above an inherited uncertainty
threshold indicates that plasticity is the optimal strategy only when the predation risk
has been subject to great uncertainty in the past evolutionary history of the individual’s
species. If the predation risk is uncertain and unpredictable, then it should be expected
that individuals evolve priors with high standard deviations in order to reflect the uncer-
tainty of the predation risk (a hypothesis examined in more detail in Chapter 3). When
this uncertainty is high enough and as a result the standard deviation of the evolved
prior exceeds the inherited uncertainty threshold, plasticity yields the best expectancy of
reaching adulthood. On the other hand, if the predation risk is certain and predictable,
then it should be expected that individuals evolve priors with low standard deviations in
order to reflect the low uncertainty of the predation risk (a hypothesis examined in more
detail in Chapter 3). When this uncertainty is low enough and as a result the standard
deviation of the evolved prior fails to exceed the inherited uncertainty threshold, earliest
specialisation yields the best expectancy of reaching adulthood. This observed correlation
between the uncertainty of the environment state and the survival benefit provided by the
inducible defences in the model is consistent with the literature on plasticity cited in Sec-
tion 2.1. One key assumption in this model, is that as the uncertainty in the environment
increases then the individual’s inherited prior should have a higher standard deviation, as
evolved by the individual’s ancestors to reflect the environmental uncertainty (an assump-
tion shown to be true in Chapter 3). Therefore the model shows analytically that as the
environment becomes uncertain then plasticity becomes more adaptive, as a consequence
of the individual’s inherited prior, shaped by natural selection in previous generations of
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the individual’s species to have a higher standard deviation. This result complements the
literature on plasticity cited in Section 2.1 and recent research on the prediction of plas-
ticity as a consequence of inherited priors (Frankenhuis and Panchanathan, 2011; Stamps
and Krishnan, 2014a,b).
One difference between the model presented in Section 2.2 and that of Frankenhuis
and Panchanathan (2011) is that in the former cues have maximum validity, i.e., they are
always truthful. In the model proposed by Frankenhuis and Panchanathan (2011), each
observation is an indicator of predator presence that can have varying degrees of certainty
(called ‘cue validity’) whereas in the model presented in Section 2.2 each observation con-
sists of an actual predator encounter or non-encounter that has a direct effect on the
individual’s survival, although an encounter does not necessarily result in the individual’s
death. Since the cues are valid in the model presented in Section 2.2 then individuals are
expected to rely on these in order to develop the phenotype that maximises their expected
survival; this in accordance to the predictions made by Frankenhuis and Panchanathan
(2011) and Nepomnaschy and Flinn (2009). In addition to this, in the model proposed
by Frankenhuis and Panchanathan (2011) the developmental stage of an individual is
modelled as 20 time periods, whereas in the model presented in Section 2.2 the develop-
mental history of the individual is limited by the terminal time T . Any terminal time
T can be used as a parameter to Algorithm 1, although in the experiments carried out
in Section 2.4 this parameter is set to 1, 000. The model presented in Section 2.2 differs
from that of Hammill et al. (2008) in what is optimised. The former is concerned with
optimising expectancy of reaching adulthood (which may not be the only fitness factor)
whereas the latter optimises fitness, which is directly proportional to both the individual’s
expectancy of reaching adulthood (which is increased by the defences) and the individ-
ual’s reproductive rate (which is decreased by the defences). In addition to this, Hammill
et al. (2008) determine an induction threshold in terms of predator concentration whereas
Algorithm 1 determines two thresholds. The first is a threshold on the standard deviation
of the individual’s inherited prior that depends directly on the environment state and
determines whether the optimal strategy is plasticity or earliest specialisation. Thus the
model presented in Section 2.2 associates the optimality of plasticity to the individual’s
prior, which can be inherited and shaped by natural selection, a hypothesis examined in
Chapter 3. When plasticity is found to be the optimal strategy, the second threshold is the
number of accumulated past predator encounters and non-encounters that make induction
the optimal decision.
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The results obtained in Section 2.4 are purely theoretical but provide an insight into
the conditions that must be met for plasticity to evolve in nature. In the model presented
in Section 2.3 these conditions are defined by the individual’s probability of surviving
each predator encounter or non-encounter, with and without defences. If the parallels of
these four survival probabilites in nature could be measured in a species with permanent,
inducible defences, (Daphnia pulex for instance) in a way similar to the work of Hammill
et al. (2008), then the threshold observed experimentally in this species should be con-
sistent with the results presented in Section 2.4. It would of of interest to examine this
hypothesis in the future using realistic information from nature.
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Chapter 3
Can natural selection encode
Bayesian priors?
3.1 Introduction
Animals normally exhibit behaviours that allow them to survive and reproduce. These
may entail a level of risk, given that the individuals can not always control or predict
the outcome of their actions. For instance, foraging may imply exposure to predators but
should nonetheless evolve if the benefit of finding food outweighs on average the long-term
cost of taking the risk (Frankenhuis and Del Giudice, 2012). Some behaviours are pheno-
typic expressions under purely genetic control, therefore they are inherited, not acquired,
and that is why they can evolve. These inherited behaviours evolve as adaptations that
overall should be expected to enhance the chances of survival and reproduction of the
individual (Williams, 1966). In addition to this, the evolutionary advantage provided by
an animal’s behaviour depends partially on the environment the animal occupies. In a hy-
pothetically unchanging environment, it should be expected that natural selection favours
individuals with behaviours that optimise their chances of survival in such a habitat. If
these behaviours are optimal only in a specific configuration of the environment and if this
configuration changes then new optimal behaviours are likely to evolve in order to reflect
this variation. If each one of these changes occurs more frequently than a new matching
optimal behaviour can evolve natural selection is likely to favour a learning ability that al-
lows individuals to infer the configuration of the environment and adjust their behaviours
accordingly instead of having these encoded genetically. The environment may provide
cues that indicate its current state and these may be accompanied by some degree of un-
certainty. An individual with this ability gathers these cues (Baldwin, 1896; Dall et al.,
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2005; DonaldsonMatasci et al., 2010; Levins, 1968; Meyers and Bull, 2002; Piersma and
Drent, 2003) in order to anticipate the conditions of the environment and implement a
strategy that maximises its chances of reaching a goal, such as finding food or avoiding a
predator, for instance. The individual reduces uncertainty by collecting more information
and the accuracy of the predictions made by the individual increases with the time spent
gathering data from the environment. With a learning ability the individual may be able
to infer the environment state but the information learned by the individual during its
lifetime is not communicated to the genotype. However the learning ability itself may be
passed on to offspring. In this case those who are more efficient at learning (i.e., those who
require less training to learn or those who do so more precisely) have an advantage and
should be favoured by natural selection. This phenomenon was originally known as the
Baldwin effect (Baldwin, 1896), which is a particular case of phenotypic plasticity (Brad-
shaw, 1965; DeWitt and Scheiner, 2004; Schlichting and Pigliucci, 1998; West-Eberhard,
2003), described in Chapter 2. The Baldwin effect occurs when an individual is able to
search locally the space of phenotypic strategies in order to find the one that yields the
best reproductive rate. Thus individuals with an inherited ability to perform this search
faster will have an evolutionary advantage (Dennett, 2003). As a result of this, the ability
to gain or learn information at the phenotypic level eventually has an evolutionary reper-
cussion at the genetic level even though information learned from the environment is not
transferred to the genetic code nor passed on to offspring through genetic inheritance. In
addition to this, a possible, though not necessary, consequence of the Baldwin effect is
that individuals later evolve the adaptations learned as fixed traits rather than acquiring
them through learning (Scheiner, 2014). Even though the Baldwin effect results in an
apparently advantageous phenotypic flexibility, it also implies costs because in order to
learn the individual must invest time and other resources that would otherwise be used to
satisfy other physiological requirements.
The Baldwin effect was modelled by Hinton and Nowlan (1987) in order to show how
selection for a learning ability allows evolution to reach a space of alternatives that would
not normally be reachable in practice by a traditional evolutionary search. The model
simulates the evolution within a group of learning individuals, each one of these with a
genome that encodes a neural network in such a way that each gene expresses whether
a connection in the network is present or not. In the initial population each genome is
initialised with a random genome of size 20 and alleles 0 (connection absent), 1 (connection
present), and ‘?’ (connection undecided). A set of connections is arbitrarily chosen as the
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‘correct’ one. Thereafter every individual undergoes a ‘learning’ process consisting of
replacing the ‘?’ genes by either 0 or 1 in random trials until the correct set of connections
is produced or until a limit of 1, 000 trials has been exceeded. An individual who never
manages to learn the correct network receives minimum fitness whereas another one who
does receives a fitness score that increases with the number of unused trials. The fittest
individuals are selected to reproduce through one-point crossover and the offspring of
these form a new population that replaces the previous one. After enough generations the
population becomes dominated by individuals who require the fewest trials to learn the
good network. Even though these individuals may not have inherited by chance the correct
set of connections their genomes are in enough proximity to the objective network so that
they can learn the remaining connections with little training. In similar simulations run
without learning, the evolutionary search cannot find the correct network.
It has been shown that learners should be optimised by natural selection to behave
as if they are computing Bayes-optimal estimates when trying to infer information from
uncertain data (Marshall et al., 2013b; McNamara et al., 2006; McNamara and Houston,
1980). Even though real animals are unlikely to perform Bayesian computations, natural
selection should favour individuals whose behaviour resembles that of Bayesian learners.
This refers to cases where an individual is frequently faced with a decision problem whose
solution depends on a variable of the environment unknown to the individual. This vari-
able can be, for instance, the predation risk and/or the probability of finding food in an
unfamiliar location. The individual faces a selective pressure to make the decision that
maximises its survival and reproductive rate (e.g., avoiding danger when the predation
risk is too high or foraging in a different place if the probability of finding food in the
currrent location is low). Despite lacking access to the actual state of the environment,
the individual may have access to noisy cues that reveal this variable with some degree
of error. Populations of individuals facing repeatedly these situations should evolve to
behave as if having a prior and updating it to a Bayesian posterior with each noisy cue
collected from the environment.
Trimmer et al. (2011) illustrate this by considering the scenario where an individual
must decide whether to perform an action or not. If the individual acts it can succeed
or fail. In the former case the individual receives a benefit, b, and in the latter it pays a
penalty cost, c. The benefit has a positive impact on the individual’s fitness by increasing
it whereas the cost decreases it. The event where the individual succeeds is denoted
by A and the success probability is pA = P (A). Trimmer et al. (2011) show formally
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that the individual maximises its gain in the long term by choosing to act if and only if
pA >
c
b+c . In other words, if the individual finds itself facing the same decision in repeated
ocassions, its overall payoff in the long term will be positive if and only if it chooses to
act only when the inequality holds true. It is assumed that the value of the benefit and
the cost involved are known to the individual at the moment of making the decision but
not pA. However, the individual can estimate this probability through repeated trials or
experimental observations of A. Two types of learners are considered: frequentists and
Bayesians. A frequentist learner estimates pA as
k
n after observing k occurrences of A
(i.e., k successes) during n trials. On the other hand a Bayesian learner starts off with
a default estimate of an underlying distribution of the possible values of pA = P (A),
called the prior estimate, before making any observation. The prior is the Bayesian
learner’s default belief about pA. When new evidence becomes available in the form of an
observation of an event B (e.g., a subsequent observation trial) then the Bayesian learner
updates its belief to a posterior estimate of pA given that B has occurred. By Bayes’
theorem this updated estimate is given by Equation 1.1. That is to say, at any moment
the current estimate is a distribution of the possible values of pA, and this estimate is
updated with each repeated observation. If the original prior is a uniform distribution
then it is called an uninformative prior, meaning that the Bayesian learner starts with an
unbiased default belief. The updated posterior becomes more accurate as the number of
observations increases.
Since decision makers are face a selective pressure to behave as Bayesians when esti-
mating an uncertain variable of the environment, a decision maker’s prior represents its
default belief regarding this variable. In other words, the individual’s prior represents its
default ‘worldview’ and it has been hypothesised that this prior is inherited and subject
to natural selection (McNamara et al., 2006). In other words, it has been hypothesised
that populations of decision makers should evolve different priors in response to different
environments. The main objective of this chapter is to show how priors can effectively
be inherited and shaped by natural selection. Section 3.2 introduces an evolutionary
model where a population of Bayesian learners face the scenario presented by Trimmer
et al. (2011). Every individual must estimate the probability pA of an event A and has
a genetically-encoded beta prior that serves as its default estimate of pA. Every learner
makes repeated independent observation trials in order to update its estimate of pA with
the evidence gained. Fitness is measured in terms of the ability to quickly produce an
estimate that approximates accurately the real probability, therefore accurate learners
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are selected for even though the information gained by them through observation trials
is not passed on to their offspring. Results show how Bayesian populations experience
the Baldwin effect as individuals whose priors are closer to pA are favoured by natural
selection and therefore the value of pA drives the evolution of these. With any change
in the value of pA the population’s priors change as natural selection favours individuals
who can learn and estimate the new value faster. When pA values are beta-distributed
with hyperparameters α and β, the Bayesian population is shown to evolve genomes that
reflect these parameters as if these were being estimated by Bayesian learners. The model
is extended in Section 3.8 to incorporate frequentist learners and have these compete with
Bayesians in order to determine the circumstances in which one group is more evolution-
arily successful than the other. Repeated competition between Bayesians and frequentists
shows that the former are favoured by natural selection when the environment poses the
most uncertainty whereas the latter are more evolutionarily successful when the environ-
ment poses the least, a result that is in agreement with previous literature on optimal
decision-making (Marshall et al., 2013b; McNamara et al., 2006; McNamara and Houston,
1980).
3.2 The Bayesian-Baldwin model
The model simulates the evolution of a population of 100 individuals who are required
to estimate the probability, pA, of an event A. The probability pA is a parameter of the
environment unknown to the population and is referred to as the environment state. Every
population member makes n repeated observations of a Bernoulli trial with probability
pA, denoted by ΘpA , in order to estimate the environment state based on the number
of occurences and non-occurences of A. Every individual has a beta-distributed prior
estimate of pA encoded as a binary genome [α, β]. The mean of the prior of any individual
with genome [α, β] is denoted by µα,β and given by Equation 3.1. The individual uses the
information accumulated from the repeated Bernoulli trials in order to update its prior
to a Bayesian posterior. The individual’s posterior estimate of pA is denoted by φα,β(pA)
and is given by Equation 3.2, where k is the number of observed occurrences of A after
the n repetitions of ΘpA . The number of observations n is also a parameter of the model
called the learning length and is constant for all individuals. The genes α and β are
always restricted to the semi-closed interval (0, 100] and in the initial population they are
normally-distributed with mean 1.0 and variance 0.01. This is done to ensure that all the
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individual’s priors are around 12 , by Equation 3.1, and therefore uninformative.
µα,β =
α
α+ β
(3.1)
φα,β(pA) =
k + α
n+ α+ β
(3.2)
The fitness of every individual is measured in terms of how accurately this indi-
vidual estimates a non-empty multiset of m beta-distributed environment states, S =
{p1, p2, p3, ..., pm}, called the environment. The beta distribution the m values in an
environment S originate from is called the environment distribution. The environment
hyperparameters are denoted by αS and βS . The fitness of an individual with genome
[α, β] in environment S is denoted by fS(α, β) and given by Equation 3.3.
fS(α, β) =
1
1 +
∑
pi∈S [pi − φα,β(pi)]2
(3.3)
A new population is created by performing 100 matings with arithmetic crossover
between members of the previous population. The parents in each mating are selected
randomly from the previous population and each parent’s probability of being selected is
proportional to its fitness. The offspring are mutated by adding Gaussian-noise, with mean
and variance equal to 0.00 and 0.01 respectively. The mutation rate is set to 0.01 in order
to facilitate convergence, given that the population size is 100. Higher rates were found to
produce less stability of the evolved genomes. The offspring make up a new population,
which in turn replaces the previous one. Evolution runs for 10, 000 generations. The
evolutionary model is briefly summarised in Figure 3.1.
Two types of evolutionary simulations are considered. In the first the environment
S is replaced every 1, 000 generations with a new one containing the same number of
beta-distributed environment states, with hyperparameters αS and βS . In the second,
environment changes occur every 2, 000 generations. It can be expected that if the en-
vironment changes periodically then it is harder for individuals to keep up with these
changes with evolved priors. An environment is more stable than another if the former
changes less frequently than the latter.
The model, as described above, simulates a situation in which an individual needs to
estimate the probability of an event before taking any action. For instance, A could refer
to the event a predator is nearby, and the indivividuals would need to determine (not
necessarily as a conscious act) how probable this event is in order to follow an appropriate
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A population of 100 individuals 
are initialised. Each one has 
a genome [α,β] that encodes 
a beta prior. 
The environment is set as 
S = {p1, p2, p3, ..., pm}. 
Every individual estimates 
every pi by running n trials 
of Θ. 
The ﬁtness of each individual 
is calculated in terms of the 
accuracy of the estimation 
of each pi. 
Completed 10,000 
generations? 
Individuals are selected for 
reproduction with a probability 
proportional to their ﬁtness. 
The oﬀspring of the 
selected individuals form 
a new population that 
replaces the previous one. 
The selected individuals 
reproduce through crossover 
and mutation with Gaussian 
noise. 
End. 
Yes No 
Figure 3.1: Summary of the Baldwinian evolution model of Bayesian learners.
course of action, such as developing defences (Agrawal et al., 1999; Hammill et al., 2008),
as discussed in Chapter 2. The individual is more likely to use its resources efficiently if it
makes the right decisions and this is more likely to occur with accurate estimates of pA.
A learner in nature would normally use the information gained from the environment in
order to make a decision or take an action, such as Daphnia pulex individuals developing
defences when chemical cues indicate the presence of predators, and this decision would
likely have a repercussion in the survival or reproductive success of the decision-maker. For
instance, if predators are frequent and a Daphnia pulex individual accurately deduces this
then it will grow the defences required and this investment will be beneficial. Otherwise,
if the individual fails to predict the presence of predators, its survival and reproduction
will be compromised. In the model described in this section, however, every individuals
assesses pA but the decision this individual would make using this information is not
simulated and neither are the consequences of the actions that would be taken by the
learner. Instead fitness is calculated directly in terms of the accuracy of the estimates
produced. This simplification is reasonable because in a real-world scenario it should be
expected that the survival and reproductive success of the decision-maker is associated
directly to the accuracy of its assessments.
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3.3 The learning length as a selective pressure
Given an environment S, the default error of an individual x, with genome [αx, βx], is
a measure of the discrepancy between x’s prior and the environment states in S. It is
denoted by δS(x) and given by Equation 3.4. On the other hand, x’s posterior error is
a measure of the inaccuracy of the estimations made by x. It is denoted by ∆S(x) and
given by Equation 3.5, where ki is the number of occurrences of A observed by x after n
repetitions of Θpi , for each pi ∈ S.
δS(x) =
1
m
∑
pi∈S
∣∣∣∣ αxαx + βx − pi
∣∣∣∣ (3.4)
∆S(x) =
1
m
∑
pi∈S
∣∣∣∣ ki + αxn+ αx + βx − pi
∣∣∣∣ (3.5)
The accuracy of an individual x when estimating S is inversely proportional to the
posterior error of x in this environment, therefore an individual with the minimum pos-
terior error in a population of Bayesians should have the maximum accuracy, relative to
that of other members of the population. Every time x runs an observation trial of Θpi
the discrepancy between pi and this individual’s updated posterior estimate is likely to be
reduced. For this reason the x’s accuracy should be expected to increase with the learn-
ing length (i.e., the number of allowed observation trials of Θpi per individual), which is
denoted by n. Therefore the fitness score of the learner should also increase with n, which
is to be expected since with each observation the individual reduces the uncertainty about
the environment state and its estimate approaches the correct value.
If an environment state is irrational then the minimum posterior error by any Bayesian
in the genetic pool is understandably limited by n and the individual’s estimate may
never match the actual objective value. For instance, if pi =
pi
10 then a Bayesian can
only approximate this value and the accuracy of such estimate will improve with higher
values of n without ever reaching the actual probability. But if the environment state
is rational then a Bayesian might be able to estimate it with perfect accuracy after n
observations of Θpi if this individual’s prior is close enough to pi. For instance, if pi = 0.3
then a Bayesian x with genome [αx = 27, βx = 63] could estimate this value with perfect
accuracy after n = 10 trials of Θpi during which k = 3 occurrences of A are observed. In
any case, the minimum posterior error achievable in the population is limited by n and
individuals who achieve it are the ones who receive the maximum fitness relative to others’
and should be the ones most likely to reproduce. As n increases, selective pressure over
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Bayesians is reduced because then more of these individuals are likely to estimate pi with
the maximum achievable accuracy. On the other hand, with lower values of n selective
pressure is stronger and it should be expected that an increasingly limited number of
Bayesians reproduce, whereas with higher values of n the selective presion is weaker and
individuals with greater posterior errors should also be able to reproduce and pass on
their genetically-encoded priors. In the evolutionary simulation presented in later sections
(Section 3.5, Section 3.6, and Section 3.7) the learning length is set to n = 2, for speed
and simplicity, in order to test a high selective pressure, and it can be predicted that a
higher value would result simply in less selective pressure and less exclusivity of the priors
evolved.
3.4 Types of environments
The uncertainty of the Bernoulli trial Θpi increases with its variance and is maximum
when pi = 0.5 because then Θpi is equivalent to the flipping of a fair coin. Similarly,
the certainty posed by an environment S increases with the standard deviation of the
environment distribution because then the environment states in S should be expected to
spread more evenly in [0, 1]. An environment whose values tend to be concentrated in a
small subinterval of [0, 1] is said to be less uncertain than another one whose values are
more evenly spread over this interval. Different choices of environment hyperparameters αS
and βS should result in certain values pi appearing more frequently in S than others from
interval [0, 1], thus different environment hyperparameters should result in environments
with varying degrees of uncertainty. Four types of environment distributions are considered
in the model and the probability density functions of these are plotted in Figure 3.2.
An environment S with beta hyperparameters αS and βS such that αS , βS > 1 can be
of one of three types, depending on the size of αS relative to βS . If αS > βS then S is said
to be of Type I. On the other hand, S is said to be of Type II if αS < βS . Otherwise, if
αS = βS , then S is said to be of Type III. The density functions of these three types of beta
distributions are plotted in Figure 3.2 in blue, black, and green, respectively. With any of
these three environment distributions, the fitness of any Bayesian learner x increases with
its inherited prior’s proximity to the mean of the environment distribution because then
its default and posterior errors decrease.
If the hyperparameters αS and β are such that αS , βS < 1 and αS = βS then the
environment distribution is said to be of Type IV and has a mean equal to 12 and two
modes, one equal to 0 and another one equal to 1, as illustrated in Figure 3.2 in red. Thus
42
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
2.
0
2.
5
3.
0
PD
F
(α, β) = (2, 4)
(α, β) = (4, 2)
(α, β) = (5, 5)
(α, β) = (0.75, 0.75)
Figure 3.2: Shape of the density functions of the four types of environment distributions
considered in the model. Each one of these is a beta distribution with hyperparameters
αS and βS . An environment S is said to be of Type I when αS , βS > 1 and αS > βS ; of
type II when αS , βS > 1 and αS < βS ; of type III when αS , βS > 0 and αS = βS ; and of
type IV when αS , βS < 1 and αS = βS .
environment states in S should be expected to be either very high (near 1.0) or low (near
0.0). Thus in the same environment S it should be expected that some environment states
pi make A occur very frequently and others make A occur very rarely. If a Bayesian learner
x has a prior near the mean of the environment distribution (i.e., near 0.5) its default
error will still tend to be large when estimating every pi. As the type IV hyperparameters
decrease the environment states in S should be expected to be closer to either 0.0 or 1.0.
On the other hand, as the type IV hyperparameters increase the environment states in S
become more uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1]. Given the above, the uncertainty
posed by an environments of type IV is greater than that any of the other three types and
it increases as αS and βS increase.
3.5 Evolutionary simulations to illustrate the selective pres-
sure to estimate the environment state
Four evolutionary simulations were run with a population of Bayesians in an environment
S of size 1 with hyperparameters αS = 50 and βS = 50 (i.e., an environment of type I) that
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changes every 2, 000 generations. The priors of the individuals as these evolve in the four
simulations are plotted in Figure 3.3 as red dots whereas horizontal lines display the single
environment state p1 ∈ S as it changes periodically.1 The plots show that the population
becomes rapidly dominated by learners whose priors are closer to the environment state
p1 (whose values are displayed as horizontal black lines) each generation. As evolution
progresses and S changes every 2, 000 generations, the priors of the population change
accordingly moving towards the current environment state becoming increasingly closer
to p1 in later generations. The Baldwin effect drives the evolution of the Bayesian learners
because natural selection favours those who have the ability to ‘learn’ the correct p1 by
updating their genetically-encoded priors to a posterior that approximates the environment
state with only n = 2 observations. Every individual’s ability to learn is directly associated
to its default error. Given any two individuals, x and y, if the former’s default error is
smaller than the latter’s then y requires more training (i.e., a greater learning length n)
in order to estimate p1 with the same accuracy as x.
The individuals that are favoured by natural selection in the simulations depicted in
Figure 3.3 are those whose priors are close enough to p1 in order for them to be able to
estimate this environment state with the best accuracy in the whole population with only
two observations of Θp1 . Even though these individuals eventually learn (i.e., estimate
approximately) the actual value of p1, this ‘knowledge’ is not communicated to their
offspring via genetic inheritance. In subsequent generations, these offspring must learn
the environment state by themselves but they will be likely to have inherited from their
parents the ability to learn and estimate the environment accurately with little training
(i.e., a prior that results in a default error that permits the estimation of p1 with only
two observations of Θp1) and they are likely to pass on this ability to their own offspring.
On the other hand, individuals whose priors are too far from the actual p1 require more
training in order to estimate the environment state and therefore are selected against until
becoming extinct. As n increases, the selective pressure becomes weaker and individuals
with priors further away from the environment state (i.e., individuals with higher default
errors) should be able to survive and reproduce.
1Technical details in Section C.3.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3.3: The learners’ evolved Bayesian priors plotted as red dots each generation in an
environment S of size 1 with hyperparameters αS = 50 and βS = 50, as the environment
state p1 ∈ S (horizontal black lines) changes periodically. Technical details in Section C.3.
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3.6 Evolutionary simulations to illustrate the selective pres-
sure to estimate the environment hyperparameters
Four evolutionary simulations were run with a Bayesian population in an environment S
of size 1 with hyperparameters αS = 25 and βS = 75 (i.e., an environment of type II)
that changes every 1, 000 generations. The αx and βx genes of every individual x in the
population are plotted in Figure 3.4 as red and blue dots, respectively.2 Each plot shows
that from early generations the population evolves in such a manner that every learner
x has a genome [αx, βx] such that the αx < βx. This shows that natural selection drives
the population to reflect the parameters of the environment distribution, which in this
case are αS = 25 and βS = 75. The genomes in the population do not necessarily match
accurately these parameters but they do reflect the inequality relationship between αS
and βS , i.e., natural selection drives the population to estimate that αS < βS . That is
to say, the evolutionary search is able to discover that the environment distribution is of
type II.
Analogous results are observed when equivalent sets of four simulations are run with
environment hyperparameters [αS = 95, βS = 15] (type I), and [αS = 75, βS = 75] (type
III), as shown in Figure 3.5, and Figure 3.6, respectively.3 The plots show that natural
selection favours individuals x whose genomes [αx, βx] exhibit the same equality or inequal-
ity relationship as the environment hyperparameters αS and βS . That is to say, when the
environment hyperparameters satisfy αS > βS natural selection favours individual x if its
genome is such that αx > βx. Analogously, the same relationship between environment
hyperparameters and evolved genomes is observed when αS < βS and when αS = βS .
The results described above occur because the expected value of any pi ∈ S is given
by pi =
αS
αS+βS
and the default error of any individual x with genome [αx, βx] tends to
decrease as βx approaches
(
1−pi
pi
)
αx because then the individual’s prior approaches pi
and the default error is smaller. More generally it can be predicted that:
1. When αSαS+βS > 0.5 (i.e., when the environment is of type I) natural selection should
favour every individual x whose genome [αx, βx] is such that αx > βx.
2. When αSαS+βS < 0.5 (i.e., when the environment is of type II) natural selection should
favour every individual x whose genome [αx, βx] is such that αx < βx.
2Technical details in Section C.4.
3Technical details to produce Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 appear in Section C.5 and Section C.6, respec-
tively.
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3. When αSαS+βS = 0.5 (i.e., when the environment is of type III) natural selection
should favour every individual x whose genome [αx, βx] is such that αx ≈ βx.
Four separate populations of Bayesians were evolved in a environment S of size 1
with hyperparameters αS = 0.001 and βS = 0.001 (i.e., an environment of type IV)
that changes every 1, 000 generations. The priors of the learners as these evolve are
plotted in Figure 3.7.4 Figure 3.8 plots the α and β genes of the population as red
and red blue, respectively.5 The genomes in the population reflect the changes in the
environment as they occur every 1, 000 generations. When the environment state p1 ∈ S
is temporarily near 1.0 then the population becomes dominated with genomes [αx, βx]
such that αx > βx whereas when the environment state is near 0.0 then the genomes of
most individuals are such that αx < βx. The individuals that are favoured by natural
selection are those whose default error allows them to estimate the environment state p1
with only two observations of Θp1 . When p1 changes from being near 1.0 to being near
0.0 and vice versa new individuals with appropriate priors and default errors are selected.
No single prior or genome type is observed to be prevalent over the course of the whole
simulation because of the instability of the environment. Individuals are evolutionarily
fit only for very specific and temporary environment states. In Section 3.7, evolutionary
simulations are run with type IV environments of size greater than 1. It is shown that
in these simulations natural selection favours individuals whose genomes reflect, to some
extent, the environment hyperparameters.
3.7 Evolutionary simulations to illustrate the selective pres-
sure to estimate the hyperparameters of a type IV en-
vironment
Four evolutionary simulations were run with a population of Bayesians in a type IV en-
vironment of size 10 with environment hyperparameters αS = 0.25 and βS = 0.25 that
changes every generation, i.e., the set of ten beta-distributed environment states each
learner must estimate is different every generation. This simulates a scenario where a
variable of the environment may exhibit some variability observed by an individual dur-
ing its lifetime, as it may occur in a natural scenario, e.g., foraging in different food
patches of variable quality (McNamara, 1982). Figure 3.9 shows the population genomes
4Technical details to produce Figure 3.7 appear in Section C.7.
5Technical details to produce Figure 3.8 appear in Section C.7
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3.4: Evolved α (red dots) and β (blue dots) genes of a population of N = 100
Bayesian learners evolving over the course of 10, 000 generations in an environment S of
size 1 with hyperparameter αS = 25 and βS = 75 when the environment state p1 ∈ S
changes once every 1, 000 generations. Details in Section C.4.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3.5: Evolved α (red dots) and β (blue dots) genes of a population of N = 100
Bayesian learners evolving over the course of 10, 000 generations in an environment S of
size 1 with hyperparameters αS = 95 and βS = 15 when the environment state p1 ∈ S
changes once every 1, 000 generations. Details in Section C.5.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3.6: Evolved α (red dots) and β (blue dots) genes of a population of N = 100
Bayesian learners evolving over the course of 10, 000 generations in an environment S of
size 1 with hyperparameters αS = 75 and βS = 75 when the environment state p1 ∈ S
changes once every 1, 000 generations. Details in Section C.6.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3.7: Evolved priors of a population of N = 100 Bayesian learners over the course
of 10, 000 generations in an environment S of size 1 with hyperparameters αS = 0.001
and βS = 0.001 when the environment state p1 ∈ S changes once every 1, 000 generations.
The environment state is displayed as black lines. Details in Section C.7.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3.8: Evolved α and β genes in the population for the same four runs of the experi-
ment displayed in Figure 3.7. These values appear to switch when p changes temporarily
from values near 0.0 to 1.0 and vice versa. Distribution of the α (red dots) and β (blue
dots) genes in the same four simulations displayed in Figure 3.7. Details in Section C.7.
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over the course of 10, 000 generations.6 Figure 3.10 and Figure 3.11 show analogous re-
sults from simulations with environment hyperparameters [αS = 0.25, βS = 0.75] and
[αS = 0.75, βS = 0.25], respectively.
7 The evolutionary history of Bayesians is not neces-
sarily the same in any two simulations with the same environment but a common pattern
can be identified. These results show experimentally that the components α and β of the
population’s genomes generally evolve to be below 1.0, or at least not far above 1.0. In
this regard the evolved Bayesian genomes agree with the parameters of the environment
distribution. The genes of the population do not necessarily match the actual parameters
of the environment distribution but they do not drift indefinitely toward values increas-
ingly greater than 1.0, as in the simulations run in the previous section with environments
of types other than IV. This is because the selective pressure imposed by the learning
length (n) makes individuals evolve genomes with the least default errors in the average
case. In addition to this, by evolving lower hyperparameters α and β, the individuals are
also evolving priors with higher standard deviations that match more closely the standard
deviation (i.e., the uncertainty) of the environment distribution, which is higher in type
IV environments. The results of the four evolutionary searches indicate that the minimal
default error in the average case is obtained by a Bayesian x if this individual’s genome
resembles the parameters of a type IV environment distribution. Therefore, through an
evolutionary search for individuals who are able to learn a set of objective environment
states, natural selection ends up favouring genomes that resemble the environment pa-
rameters, although with a degree of error.
The results described above occur because the standard deviation (and thus the un-
certainty) of an environment of type IV is higher than that of any of the other types of
environments considered in the model, as explained in Section 3.4. In the evolutionary sim-
ulations described above decision-makers evolve their beta hyperparameters to be below
1.0, and in many cases very near zero, because in this manner the resulting high standard
deviations of their evolved priors reflect more closely the high uncertainty (i.e., the high
standard deviation) of the type IV environment. The evolutionary simulations show that
by doing this the individuals are more capable to estimate accurately, on average, all the
environment states. This result supports the hypothesis made in Chapter 2, that Bayesian
decision-makers evolve their priors to have high standard deviations to match the uncer-
tainty or unpredictability of the environment, i.e., to match the high standard deviation
6Technical details in Section C.8.
7Technical details to produce Figure 3.10 and Figure 3.11 appear in Section C.9 and Section C.10,
respectively.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3.9: Evolved α (red dots) and β (blue dots) genes of a population of N = 100
Bayesian learners evolving over the course of 10, 000 generations in an environment S of
size 10 with hyperparameter αS = 0.25 and βS = 0.25 when the environment S changes
every generation. Technical details in Section C.8.
of the observations (predation risk in this case) these decision-makers must estimate.
3.8 The Bayesian-Baldwin model with Bayesian and fre-
quentist learners
In this section the model introduced in Section 3.2 is extended to include frequentist
learners. The fitness of every Bayesian x is evaluated as shown in Equation 3.3. On the
other hand, a frequentist y estimates each pi ∈ S as shown in Equation 3.6, where s is
the number of ocurrences of A observed by the frequentist after n repetitions of Θpi . Its
fitness is calculated as shown in Equation 3.7.
φy(pi) =
s
n
(3.6)
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3.10: Evolved α (red dots) and β (blue dots) genes of a population of N = 100
Bayesian learners evolving over the course of 10, 000 generations in an environment S of
size 10 with hyperparameter αS = 0.25 and βS = 0.75 when the environment S changes
every generation. Technical details in Section C.9.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3.11: Evolved α (red dots) and β (blue dots) genes of a population of N = 100
Bayesian learners evolving over the course of 10, 000 generations in an environment S of
size 10 with hyperparameter αS = 0.75 and βS = 0.25 when the environment S changes
every generation. Technical details in Section C.10.
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fS(y) =
1
1 +
∑
pi∈S [pi − φy(pi)]2
(3.7)
Selection, reproduction and other details of the evolutionary simulation are as described
in Section 3.2. In this version of the model, each individual carries a third gene indicating
whether the individual is Bayesian or frequentist. Thus, individuals of both types are
mixed at reproduction and, as a consequence of this, crossover and mutation can sometimes
result in Bayesian parents producing frequentist offspring and vice versa. A population is
said to be balanced if it contains even proportions of individuals belonging to each group,
Bayesians or frequentists. Otherwise it is said to be unbalanced.
Evolutionary simulations were run with different environment hyperparameters in or-
der to determine in which of these environments Bayesians peform better or worse than
frequentists. However, it was observed that in two or more evolutionary competitions run
independently with the same environment the populations may not evolve in the same
manner. For instance in two different runs it can occur that up to the 1, 000-th generation
the population is balanced whereas in other repetitions of the same simulation one group is
outnumbering the other. Therefore one single run of a simulation is insufficient evidence to
reach a decisive conclusion about the evolutionary advantage or disadvantage of Bayesians
against frequentists with a given environment. In order to gather enough statistics to reach
a compelling conjecture regarding the likelihood that the Bayesian group outperforms its
frequentist counterpart, each simulation with each environment was repeated a total of
R = 100 times in order to perform a statistical test. The average Bayesian population
in the r-th simulation run (1 ≤ r ≤ R) with environment S is denoted by br(S) and
calculated as shown in Equation 3.8, where bg(S) is the number of Bayesian individuals in
the population at the g-th generation with environment S and G = 1, 000 is the number
of generations per run.
br(S) =
1
G
G∑
g=1
bg(S) (3.8)
Bayesians are said to have dominated the r-th run with environment S if br(S) >
1
2N ,
where N = 100 is the population size. The value br(S) is an acceptable measure for
comparison of evolutionary success because the total population size is kept constant
at N = 100.8 After the R = 100 runs of the evolutionary competition are completed,
8Another possible statistic to take from each simulation would have been the final proportion of
Bayesians and frequentists at the 1, 000-th generation in each run. This idea was rejected because it
neglects Bayesian population figures that could have occurred in previous generations. In some cases, for
example, it was observed that even though one group had had the largest population most generations,
a sudden (perhaps temporary) change would take place towards the end of the simulation (relatively few
generations before the 1, 000-th) switching the relative amounts of both groups even by a small margin.
In such cases merely a measure of the final proportions would not have been very descriptive of the events
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the experimental Bayesian population with each environment S is denoted by BS and
calculated as shown in Equation 3.9.
BS =
1
R
R∑
r=1
br(S) (3.9)
Since the total population size is kept constant at N = 100 in every run then it follows
that BS ∈ [0, N ], for any environment S. The experimental Bayesian population BS serves
as a measure of performance of Bayesians against frequentist in any environment S. If BS
is observed to be near N then it can be concluded that Bayesians are more evolutionarily
successful than frequentists when both groups compete in environment S. On the other
hand, if BS is observed to be near zero then it can be concluded that Bayesians are at a
disadvantage against frequentists in environment S. Finally, if BS ≈ 12N then it can be
concluded that neither group outperforms the other in environment S.
Section 3.9 presents the evolutionary simulations with competition between Bayesians
and frequentists with different environments and the results show in which of these envi-
ronments Bayesians dominate.
3.9 Competition between frequentist and Bayesians in a
type IV environment
Repeated evolutionary competitions between Bayesians and frequentists were simulated
in type IV environments of size 10 that change every generation. Bayesians were observed
to have dominated in 74 of 100 runs with environment hyperparameters [αS = 0.99, βS =
0.99] and frequentists were observed to dominate in the remaining 26 runs. A binomial test
was used to assess the statistical significance of this result by first assuming no prevalence of
either Bayesians of frequentists as the default hypothesis, i.e., by assuming the probability
of each simulation resulting in Bayesian dominance is p0 =
1
2 . Tests were performed with
a significance level of 5%. Let X be the binomially-distributed variable representing the
number of simulations dominated by Bayesians after R = 100 runs in an environment S
of size 10 with hyperparameters [αS = 0.99, βS = 0.99], when S changes every generation.
The probability that X ≥ 74 after R = 100 simulations is given by P (X ≥ 74|p0 = 12) =
P (X ≤ 26|p0 = 12) = 8.33× 10−7. It can be concluded that there is strong evidence that
Bayesians exhibit an evolutionary advantage over frequentists in environment S because
8.33× 10−7 < 0.05.
that actually took place up to that point.
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More generally speaking, whenR = 100 simulations are run, the results are statistically-
significant at the 5% level if X ≥ 59 or X ≤ 41, given that P (X ≥ 59|p0 = 12) = P (X ≤
41|p0 = 12) ≈ 0.04. When simulation were repeated R = 100 times in environments
with hyperparameters [α = 0.90, β = 0.90], [α = 0.80, β = 0.80], [α = 0.70, β = 0.70] and
[α = 0.60, β = 0.60], Bayesian dominance in the G = 1, 000 generations was observed in 79,
70, 68 and 60 runs, respectively. Since these observations comply with the criteria for sta-
tistical significance mentioned above it can be concluded that there is strong evidence that
with these environments Bayesians are more likely to overpopulate than their frequentist
competitors. On the other hand, when simulations were run in environments with hyper-
parameters [αS = 0.30, βS = 0.30], [αS = 0.20, βS = 0.20], and [αS = 0.10, βS = 0.10] it
was observed that X < 41. Therefore it can be generally expected that Bayesians outnum-
ber frequentists when the environment is of type IV and the hyperparameters are above
0.60. On the other hand frequentists outnumber Bayesians when the hyperparameters are
below 0.30.
Figure 3.12 plots BS in repeated simulations run with different environment hyperpa-
rameters αS and βS in the interval (0, 1], when the environment is of size 10 and changes
every generation and every individual makes n = 2 observations when estimating each
environment state.9 The darker red areas in Figure 3.12 correspond to simulations where
the environment is most uncertain, as described in Section 3.4. It is precisely in these
environments where Bayesians are observed to have an advantage over frequentists as the
experimental Bayesian population is above half the total population size. On the other
side, the darker blue areas in Figure 3.12 correspond to simulations with environments
that exhibit the least uncertainty, as described in Section 3.4. It is in these environments
where frequentists are observed to have an advantage over Bayesians as the experimental
Bayesian population is below half the total population size.
Figure 3.13 shows analogous results when αS , βS ∈ [10, 100] (i.e., in environments
I, II, and III).10 The darker red areas in the plot pinpoint the regions where Bayesian
superiority is greatest and these coincide with environments that exhibit the greatest
uncertainty, as described in Section 3.4. On the other hand, the darker blue areas in
the plot indicate regions where frequentists are more successful and these coincide with
environments that exhibit the least uncertainty, as described in Section 3.4. This is in
agreement with the known result that Bayesian learners should be favoured by natural
selection when information is uncertain (Marshall et al., 2013b; McNamara et al., 2006;
9Technical details in Section C.11.
10Technical details in Section C.12.
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McNamara and Houston, 1980).
The advantage Bayesians have over frequentists, as shown in Figure 3.12 and Fig-
ure 3.13, is partially due to the limited number of observations (n = 2) each individual is
allowed to make when estimating each pi in the environment. Any frequentist would be
likely to infer each pi with better accuracy if it were allowed to make a high enough num-
ber of observations of Θpi . For instance, n = 1, 000 tosses of a coin should yield enough
information to make an approximate estimation of the probability of the coin landing
heads. But even in this case a Bayesian is likely to have the advantage if its prior is close
enough to pi (which is likely to occur if the prior approximates the expected value of the
environment distribution, when the environment is of type I, II, or III) because then the
default error of this individual will tend to be small and its estimate of every pi after the
same number of observations should generally be more accurate than that computed by
the frequentist. If natural selection favours accuracy in the estimates made by learners
then for any number of allowed observations it should be expected that at some point a
Bayesian would emerge (through mutation, for instance) with a prior close enough to pi
and who could compute pi with better accuracy than a frequentist would. This is likely
to occur with Bayesians whose priors are near the expected value of the environment
distribution and these would be favoured by natural selection over frequentists.
Figure 3.1411 and Figure 3.1512 plot BS in simulations with 10-sized environments S
where individuals make n = 5 observations of Θpi when estimating each pi ∈ S. Fig-
ure 3.14 and Figure 3.15 show a pattern of relative Bayesian dominance that resembles
that displayed in Figure 3.12 and Figure 3.13. That is to say, from both plots it can be
appreciated that Bayesians generally see their evolutionary performance increased as the
environment parameters approach each other and the environment becomes more uncer-
tain. Conversely, Bayesians display a relatively lower performance as the distance between
the environment parameters increases and the environment becomes less uncertain. How-
ever, the increased number of allowed observations reduces the selective pressure against
frequentists because then frequentist estimates approach Bayesian estimates, thus the evo-
lutionary search in the simulations depicted in Figure 3.14 and Figure 3.15 is unable to
find Bayesians with better accuracy than in the simulations depicted in Figure 3.12 and
Figure 3.13. This results in an increase in frequentist population figures between the two
simulations, even though both are run with the same environments. For this reason, the
experimental Bayesian populations (BS) observed in Figure 3.14 and Figure 3.15 are lower
11Technical details in Section C.13.
12Technical details in Section C.14.
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than those in Figure 3.12 and Figure 3.13. It can then be generally expected that a higher
number of allowed observations results in reduced selective pressure against frequentists
but also that the overall pattern remains, namely that Bayesians exhibit an increased
advantage as the parameters of the environment distribution increase and and approach
each other. This is further confirmed in Figure 3.1613 and Figure 3.1714, which plots BS
in simulations where individuals make n = 10 observations of Θpi when estimating each
pi ∈ S. In the two plots it can be observed that the experimental Bayesian populations are
lower than those in Figure 3.14 and Figure 3.15, even though the same pattern depicted
in the previous plots remains, namely that Bayesian population figures are higher in the
environments that pose the most uncertainty.
The performance of a Bayesian individual relative to that of a frequentist when esti-
mating an environment state pi depends on how far the former’s inherited prior estimate
is from pi. If the Bayesian’s prior estimate and pi are approximately equal or differ little
then this individual is likely to estimate pi accurately since the prior estimate acts as a
head start. In this case, the prior provides an advantage the frequentist individual lacks.
On the other hand, if the Bayesian’s prior estimate and pi differ greatly then the Bayesian
may not succeed in updating this prior estimate to a posterior estimate matching the
accuracy a frequentist would achieve in the same number of observations (n = 2). For
this reason, the accuracy of the Bayesian individual increases as the difference between
the prior estimate and pi decreases. Since greater fitness is awarded to individuals that
achieve greater accuracy then it should be expected that a Bayesian is at an advantage
over frequentist opponents if the environment states these individuals face tend to differ
little from the Bayesian’s prior estimate. More generally, it should be expected that the
fitness of a Bayesian individual increases relative to that of a frequentist opponent as the
difference between the Bayesian’s prior estimate and the expected value of the environment
distribution decreases.
Figure 3.12 and Figure 3.13 show that the evolutionary performance of Bayesians
against frequentists increases as the environment hyperparameters converge and decreases
as these diverge. It can be theorised that one contributing factor to this result is the
difference between the Bayesians’ prior estimates at the beginning of each simulation and
the mean of the environment distribution, since this results in decreased performance for
Bayesians, as explained above. At the beginning of each simulation, Bayesians are approx-
imately unbiased, i.e., their prior estimates are equal to or very near 0.5, since the priors
13Technical details in Section C.15.
14Technical details in Section C.16.
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are set to be uninformative. Greater convergence of the environment hyperparameters re-
sults in an environment distribution with a mean closer to 0.5 whereas greater divergence
results in an environment distribution with a mean farther from 0.5. Because of this and
the reasons explained above, at the beginning of each simulation Bayesians should be ex-
pected to perform worse when the environment hyperparameters diverge than when these
hyperparameters converge. It is likely that the initial Bayesian underperformance occurred
when hyperparameters diverge can create an early advantage to frequentists that persists
until the end of the simulation, which is what is observed in Figure 3.12 and Figure 3.13.
In addition to the above, a Bayesian individual x’s genome components are always
positive (i.e., αx, βx > 0) therefore x’s inherited prior estimate can never be zero or
one. This is because x’s prior estimate, given by αxαx+βx , is always restricted to the inter-
val (0, 1) when αx, βx > 0. Therefore, a Bayesian individual is likely to have a default
error when the environment states pi tend to be always very near zero or always very
near one, which occurs when there is great divergence between the environment hyperpa-
rameters. When there is great divergence between the environment hyperparameters, the
environment poses minimum uncertainty because the Bernoulli events Θpi observed by the
individuals are very predictable since they almost always result in Bernoulli ‘failures’ or
almost always result Bernoulli ‘successes’. A frequentist that observes only Bernoulli ‘fail-
ures’ or only Bernoulli ‘successes’ estimates pi as 0 and 1, respectively. On the other hand,
a Bayesian that observes only ‘failures’ or only ‘successes’ uses this information to steer
its non-zero and non-one prior towards a posterior that approximates 0 or 1, respectively,
while never matching any of these values. As the divergence between the environment
hyperparameters increases, pi should generally approach either 0 or 1 more closely and
in these cases a frequentist estimate equal to 0 or 1, respectively, becomes more accurate
than a Bayesian estimate. In other words, as the divergence between the environment hy-
perparameters increases, the precision of frequentist estimates should increase compared
to that of Bayesian estimates. It can be hypothesised that this phenomenon contributes to
the increase in the evolutionary performance of frequentists when there is great divergence
between the environment hyperparameters, in detriment of the performance of Bayesians,
as shown in Figure 3.12 and Figure 3.13. In general, the results obtained indicate that
two variables that impact the evolutionary dominance of Bayesians or frequentists are the
environment uncertainty (i.e., the unpredictability of environment states) and the learning
length (i.e., n, the number of observations made by each individual).
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Figure 3.12: Experimental Bayesian populations observed in evolutionary competitions
against frequentists in environments of size 10 with different hyperparameters αS , βS ∈
(0, 1] when the environment changes every generation. Every individual makes n = 2
observations when estimating each environment state. The axes indicate the environment
parameters αS and βS and the colour indicates the experimental Bayesian population, BS
(where R = 100 is the number of runs with each environment and G = 10, 000 is the
number of generations in each run), in evolutionary equlibrium in the environment with
hyperparameters αS and βS . The evolutionary advantage of Bayesians against frequentists
is expressed by the experimental Bayesian population in equlibrium. If this measure is
above half the population size then Bayesians are more evolutionarily successful. In envi-
ronments where this value is below Bayesians are outperformed by frequentists. Technical
details in Section C.11.
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Figure 3.13: Experimental Bayesian populations observed in evolutionary competitions
against frequentists in environments of size 10 with different hyperparameters αS , βS ∈
[10, 100] when the environment changes every generation. Every individual makes n = 2
observations when estimating each environment state. The axes indicate the environment
parameters αS and βS and the colour indicates the experimental Bayesian population, BS
(where R = 100 is the number of runs with each environment and G = 10, 000 is the
number of generations in each run), in evolutionary equlibrium in the environment with
hyperparameters αS and βS . The evolutionary advantage of Bayesians against frequentists
is expressed by the experimental Bayesian population in equlibrium. If this measure is
above half the population size then Bayesians are more evolutionarily successful. In envi-
ronments where this value is below, Bayesians are outperformed by frequentists. Details
in Section C.12.
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Figure 3.14: Experimental Bayesian populations observed in evolutionary competitions
against frequentists in environments of size 10 with different hyperparameters αS , βS ∈
(0, 1] when the environment changes every generation. Every individual makes n = 5
observations when estimating each environment state. The axes indicate the environment
parameters αS and βS and the colour indicates the experimental Bayesian population, BS
(where R = 100 is the number of runs with each environment and G = 10, 000 is the
number of generations in each run), in evolutionary equlibrium in the environment with
hyperparameters αS and βS . The evolutionary advantage of Bayesians against frequentists
is expressed by the experimental Bayesian population in equlibrium. If this measure is
above half the population size then Bayesians are more evolutionarily successful. In envi-
ronments where this value is below, Bayesians are outperformed by frequentists. Technical
details in Section C.13.
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Figure 3.15: Experimental Bayesian populations observed in evolutionary competitions
against frequentists in environments of size 10 with different hyperparameters αS , βS ∈
[10, 100] when the environment changes every generation. Every individual makes n = 5
observations when estimating each environment state. The axes indicate the environment
parameters αS and βS and the colour indicates the experimental Bayesian population, BS
(where R = 100 is the number of runs with each environment and G = 10, 000 is the
number of generations in each run), in evolutionary equlibrium in the environment with
hyperparameters αS and βS . The evolutionary advantage of Bayesians against frequentists
is expressed by the experimental Bayesian population in equlibrium. If this measure is
above half the population size then Bayesians are more evolutionarily successful. In envi-
ronments where this value is below, Bayesians are outperformed by frequentists. Details
in Section C.14.
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Figure 3.16: Experimental Bayesian populations observed in evolutionary competitions
against frequentists in environments of size 10 with different hyperparameters αS , βS ∈
(0, 1] when the environment changes every generation. Every individual makes n = 10
observations when estimating each environment state. The axes indicate the environment
parameters αS and βS and the colour indicates the experimental Bayesian population, BS
(where R = 100 is the number of runs with each environment and G = 10, 000 is the
number of generations in each run), in evolutionary equlibrium in the environment with
hyperparameters αS and βS . The evolutionary advantage of Bayesians against frequentists
is expressed by the experimental Bayesian population in equlibrium. If this measure is
above half the population size then Bayesians are more evolutionarily successful. In envi-
ronments where this value is below, Bayesians are outperformed by frequentists. Details
in Section C.15.
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Figure 3.17: Experimental Bayesian populations observed in evolutionary competitions
against frequentists in environments of size 10 with different hyperparameters αS , βS ∈
[10, 100] when the environment changes every generation. Every individual makes n = 10
observations when estimating each environment state. The axes indicate the environment
parameters αS and βS and the colour indicates the experimental Bayesian population, BS
(where R = 100 is the number of runs with each environment and G = 10, 000 is the
number of generations in each run), in evolutionary equlibrium in the environment with
hyperparameters αS and βS . The evolutionary advantage of Bayesians against frequentists
is expressed by the experimental Bayesian population in equlibrium. If this measure is
above half the population size then Bayesians are more evolutionarily successful. In envi-
ronments where this value is below, Bayesians are outperformed by frequentists. Details
in Section C.16.
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3.10 Distribution of Bayesian populations in evolutionary
equilibrium against frequentists
Evolutionary competitions between Bayesians and frequentists were repeated indepen-
dently with different environments S of size 10 that change every generation. Each in-
dividual makes n = 2 observations of each environment state. Different environment
hyperparameters αS and βS such that αS = βS were considered since these provide the
environments with the highest uncertainty, as explained in Section 3.4. That is to say,
environments with these hyperparameters should be expected to exhibit the greatest vari-
ability and thus should be less predictable by the individuals. With each pair of the
environment hyperparameters considered, a total of R = 50, 000 simulations were run
independently. Each run was set to last G = 10, 000 generations. The average Bayesian
population measured at the end of each run, denoted by br(S) (1 ≤ r ≤ R), was calcu-
lated and the frequency of each observation was plotted. Figure 3.18 shows the plotted
frequencies when environment hyperparameters are below 1.0 and Figure 3.19 shows these
data when the environment hyperparameters are above or equal to 1.0.
The subplots on Figure 3.18 and Figure 3.19 overall show that Bayesian dominance
increases with the environment hyperparameters when these are equal. That is to say, if
αS = βS then Bayesians become more evolutionarily successful than frequentists as αS and
βS increase. This means that in environments of maximum uncertainty, Bayesian dom-
inance increases as the uncertainty of the environment increases, i.e., Bayesians become
more evolutionarily successful than frequentists as the environment states become less
predictable. These results are in agreement to those presented in Section 3.9, specifically
those depicted in Figure 3.12. In Figure 3.18a most observations of the average Bayesian
population gather just above 40, which is the approximate value shown in Figure 3.12
when αS = βS = 0.25. The other subplots in Figure 3.18 and Figure 3.19 show that
this mode increases with higher environment parameters, which is in agreement with the
overall pattern observed in Figure 3.12 and Figure 3.13.
Evolutionary stability at the end of each simulation run was approximate only, since
oscillation in the number of evolved Bayesians and frequentists was still observed towards
the end of the G = 10, 000 generations. However, this oscillation did not affect the overall
dominance of one group over the other. This is shown graphically in Figure 3.2015 and
Figure 3.21.16 These figures plot the number of evolved Bayesians and frequentists over
15Technical details in Section C.19.
16Technical details in Section C.20.
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the course of G = 10, 000 generations with different environment paramaters αS and βS .
The number of Bayesian and frequentist individuals observed each generation are plot-
ted in red and blue, respectively. Each plot depicts the population figures observed in
only one run with each hyperparameter pair, but repeated runs exhibited similar results.
Figure 3.20 plots the results using the same environment hyperparameters used in Fig-
ure 3.18 and Figure 3.21 plots the results using the same environment hyperparameters
used in Figure 3.19.
Figure 3.20a shows that generally frequentists evolve to be more numerous than Bayesians
when αS = βS = 0.25. Oscillation is observed in the population figures of both individ-
uals, however, frequentist dominance is observable. From the subplot it can be seen that
Bayesian population figures oscillate around 40, which is in agreement with the results
presented in Figure 3.18a. The subsequent subplots in Figure 3.20 and in Figure 3.21
show that the number of Bayesians increases as higher environment hyperparameters are
used, despite the oscillation exhibited by these evolved population figures.
It was observed that this oscillation occurred even with longer simulation runs (i.e.,
with more than G = 10, 000 generations). The evolutionary stability of the Bayesian pop-
ulation after G = 10, 000 generations was measured as follows. During the last 2, 000 gen-
erations of each simulation with the hyperparameters used in Figure 3.18 and Figure 3.19
the number of evolved Bayesians was measured each generation in order to calculate the
average of these observations and their standard deviation.17 This process was repeated
ten times with each pair of environment hyperparameters. With each pair of environment
hyperparameters the average number of evolved Bayesians was found to be approximately
equal to the mode depicted graphically in the corresponding subplot in Figure 3.18 and
Figure 3.19. That is to say, when αS = βS = 0.25 the average Bayesian population during
the last 2, 000 generations of each simulation was around 45 and the minimum observed of
all the observations made. This average approximately agrees with the mode depicted in
Figure 3.18a. On the other hand, When αS = βS = 4 the average was around 72 and the
maximum observed. This average approximately agrees with the mode depicted in Fig-
ure 3.19d. The standard deviation of these observations was observed to decrease as the
environment hyperparameters increased. When αS = βS = 0.25 this standard deviation
was around 11 and the maximum observed. On the other hand, when αS = βS = 4 this
standard deviation was around 5 and the minimum observed. These measurements show
that even though oscillation in the number of evolved Bayesians always occurs, the over-
17Technical details in Section C.21.
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all pattern described earlier is always observed. Bayesian dominance increases with the
environment hyperparameters when these are equal. With smaller hyperparameters fre-
quentists gain advantage and the Bayesian population figures in the last 2, 000 generations
of each run exhibit less stability. With higher hyperparameters this stability increases and
Bayesians become increasingly more dominant. Since a pattern of dominance by one group
or the other was generally observable despite oscillating figures, the maximum number of
generations was set to G = 10, 000 in order to simplify the computation required to obtain
the results presented in Section 3.9, as well as those shown in Figure 3.18 and Figure 3.19.
These results complement those presented in Section 3.9, that evolutionary equilibrium
becomes more frequent with Bayesian dominance as the environment hyperparameters and
the uncertainty posed by the environment grow. The results are also in agreement with
the accepted proposal that natural selection should favour decision-makers that behave
as if they were using Bayesian inference when information is uncertain (Marshall et al.,
2013b; McNamara et al., 2006; McNamara and Houston, 1980).
3.11 Conclusions
The evolutionary model presented in Section 3.2 is proposed to show how Bayesian priors
can be shaped by natural selection. In the model, individuals with genetically-encoded
priors undergo a training process consisting of repeated Bernoulli observations in order to
estimate the probability of an event. This probability is called the environment state. Each
individual’s genome is binary and consists of the hyperparameters of a beta distribution
whose mean is the individual’s prior estimate of the environment state. Every individual
updates its prior to a posterior with each Bernoulli observation and fitness is measured
in terms of the accuracy of the individual’s posterior estimate after a limited number of
observations. Evolutionary simulations are run where individuals in the initial population
have unbiased priors and environment states are beta-distributed. These simulations show
that the individuals evolve to have priors that approximate the environment state. This
occurs because with these priors they can estimate the environment state with the best
accuracy in the number of observations allowed. The individuals achieve this by evolving
genomes whose two hyperparameters exhibit the same ratio as that of the environment
hyperparameters. The Baldwin effect (Baldwin, 1896) occurs when the priors evolve as
adaptations to the environment. The results presented in Section 3.5 and Section 3.6
support the hypothesis made in Chapter 2, that a decision-maker’s prior can be shaped
by natural selection to have any mean and standard deviation in response to the certainty
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(a) αS = 0.25, βS = 0.25
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(b) αS = 0.50, βS = 0.50
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(d) αS = 0.95, βS = 0.95
Figure 3.18: Frequency of observed values of the average Bayesian population, denoted
by br(S), with four pairs of environment hyperparameters αS and βS such that αS = βS
and 0 < αS , βS < 1. With each hyperparameter pair a total of R = 50, 000 evolutionary
competitions between Bayesians and frequentists are run independently. Each simulation
runs for G = 10, 000 generations. The environment S is of size 10 and changes every
generation. Each individual makes n = 2 observations of each environment state. In
each competition the total population size (including Bayesians and frequentists) is kept
constant at 100. The four subplots show that Bayesian dominance becomes more frequent
as the environment hyperparameters increase. Technical details appear in Section C.17.
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(a) αS = 1, βS = 1
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(c) αS = 3, βS = 3
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(d) αS = 4, βS = 4
Figure 3.19: Frequency of observed values of the average Bayesian population, denoted
by br(S), with four pairs of environment hyperparameters αS and βS such that αS = βS
and αS , βS ≥ 1. With each hyperparameter pair a total of R = 50, 000 evolutionary
competitions between Bayesians and frequentists are run independently. Each simulation
runs for G = 10, 000 generations. The environment S is of size 10 and changes every
generation. Each individual makes n = 2 observations of each environment state. In
each competition the total population size (including Bayesians and frequentists) is kept
constant at 100. The four subplots show that Bayesian dominance becomes more frequent
as the environment hyperparameters increase. Technical details appear in Section C.18.
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(a) αS = 0.25, βS = 0.25 (b) αS = 0.50, βS = 0.50
(c) αS = 0.80, βS = 0.80 (d) αS = 0.95, βS = 0.95
Figure 3.20: Number of Bayesians (red) and frequentists (blue) in evolutionary competi-
tions between the two groups with different environment parameters αS and βS such that
αS = βS and 0 < αS , βS < 1. Each simulation runs for G = 10, 000 generations. The
environment S is of size 10 and changes every generation. Each individual makes n = 2
observations of each environment state. In each competition the total population size
(including Bayesians and frequentists) is kept constant at 100. Technical details appear
in Section C.19.
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(a) αS = 1, βS = 1 (b) αS = 2, βS = 2
(c) αS = 3, βS = 3 (d) αS = 4, βS = 4
Figure 3.21: Number of Bayesians (red) and frequentists (blue) in evolutionary compe-
titions between the two groups with different environment parameters αS and βS such
that αS = βS and αS , βS ≥ 1. Each simulation runs for G = 10, 000 generations. The
environment S is of size 10 and changes every generation. Each individual makes n = 2
observations of each environment state. In each competition the total population size
(including Bayesians and frequentists) is kept constant at 100. Technical details appear
in Section C.20.
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of the environment.
The model presented in Section 3.8 extends the one introduced in Section 3.2 by
including frequentist learners in the population and allowing an evolutionary competition
between these and Bayesians learners when environment states are beta-distributed. For
any environment state pi, any Bayesian whose inherited prior is in close enough proximity
to pi may produce an estimate that is more accurate than the one a frequentist can produce
in the number of Bernoulli observations all individuals are allowed to make, whatever this
number is set to be. This close proximity between the prior and the objective pi serves
as a learning advantage that can be inherited because then the Bayesian will be able to
make an accurate enough estimate with limited training. The Bayesian individual will
therefore be more likely to reproduce than the frequentist and will also be likely to pass
on its successful prior to its offspring. Since frequentists lack this advantage, they should
tend to perform worse than Bayesians, especially if training is limited.
Evolutionary competitions between Bayesians and frequentists show that the former
indeed perform better on average when the number of Bernoulli observations is limited
and uncertainty is high, whereas the latter are more evolutionarily successful when uncer-
tainty is minimal. In Section 3.4 it is shown that the uncertainty posed by the environ-
ment is given by the beta distribution of the environment states and increases as these
become more evenly spread over the interval [0, 1]. Figure 3.12 and Figure 3.13 show that
Bayesians outnumber frequentists when uncertainty is highest. These figures also show
that frequentists are favoured by natural selection when uncertainty is minimal.
Scientific literature shows that decision-makers should evolve to behave in the same
manner as Bayesian decision-makers if information is uncertain (Marshall et al., 2013b;
McNamara et al., 2006; McNamara and Houston, 1980). This does not necessarily imply
that individuals favoured by natural selection in nature are truly computing Bayesian
estimates (Marshall et al., 2013a; McNamara et al., 2006; Tenenbaum et al., 2006) but
rather that their decision-making machinery should lead them to make the same decisions
as those made by a theoretical Bayesian. The results presented in this chapter provide
evidence supporting this literature. In the evolutionary simulations, each individual’s
default ‘worldview’ (McNamara et al., 2006) is given by its inherited prior, and thus
is a reflection of the environment experienced by its ancestors. The model shows how
estimating the environment simply by being (or by behaving as) a Bayesian (i.e., by
updating a prior to a posterior) may not be enough to be evolutionarily successful if there
is a selective pressure to produce accurate estimates efficiently (i.e., with little training).
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The model shows that in this case evolutionary success depends on how accurately the
Bayesian individual’s inherited ‘worldview’ reflects the environment. Competition between
Bayesians and frequentists shows how Bayesians can use their evolved priors to outperform
frequentists in an evolutionary race, as they are expected to when information is uncertain
(Marshall et al., 2013b; McNamara et al., 2006; McNamara and Houston, 1980). This
is evidence that the unpredictability of the environment should determine the decision-
making strategy of an individual in nature, since both animals and humans are sensitive
to the variability (i.e., the unpredictability) of each known choice when making decisions
(Hayden and Platt, 2009; Kacelnik and Bateson, 1996).
In the model, individuals estimate the environment state, however, the model does not
take into account what decision is made by the individual with the information learned,
nor its consequences, and only awards fitness in terms of the accuracy of the computed
estimate. However, in a natural scenario, an individual would normally make a choice
or an assumption based on this information and its survival and/or reproduction rate
would depend on the outcome of the choice/assumption made. For instance, successful
foraging in patches could depend on the individual being able to infer the quality of
the current patch (McNamara, 1982) and successful development into adulthood could
depend on the individual being able to estimate the predation risk (e.g., an individual
facing a scenario similar to that of Daphnia pulex, described in Chapter 2). The results
presented in this chapter show how a Bayesian individual should, in theory, evolve its
biases in these situations and it should be expected that in an identical natural scenario
decision-makers should evolve to make decisions as if they were using the same priors.
Nonetheless, the model could be extended in the future to make more realistic assumptions
by simulating full environment conditions and awarding fitness to individuals based on the
actual outcome of the decisions made using the information learned.
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Chapter 4
Self-deception can evolve under
appropriate costs
This chapter has been published on Current Zoology, issue 61(2), pages 382 – 396.
4.1 Introduction
Deception in animals (no conscious intention being implied) refers to the signaling of false
information from one individual to another and is normally beneficial to the signaller and
detrimental to the receiver (Semple and McComb, 1996). For this reason some animals
are observed to evolve strategies to deceive others, although natural selection is expected
to also favour individuals who are able to ‘see’ through the deception. In addition to
this, signaling may also be costly in order to be considered reliable, for example in mating
situations (Zahavi, 1975). Arms races may occur between deceivers (no conscious inten-
tion being implied) and deception-uncovering species, with each group under selection to
outsmart the other. Unlike deception, self-deception can be sensibly hypothesised not to
be evolutionarily stable by itself, because animals who make decisions on false information
seem more likely to make bad choices that could lead to negative consequences, such as
injury and death. Especially in situations where conflict is likely it is sensible to expect
that self-deceiving individuals tend to make suboptimal decisions, for instance risking in-
jury through fighting a stronger opponent, and that in the long term they end up being
less evolutionarily successful than others who use truthful information (Marshall et al.,
2013b). Despite this, self-deception biases are claimed to occur frequently. For instance,
animals and humans sometimes behave as if their subjective confidence in their skills in
a given moment is above the objective measure of such attributes (Alicke and Govorun,
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2005; McCormick et al., 1986; Pallier et al., 2002; Svenson, 1981). Surveys have shown
most drivers rate their own skills as above average (McCormick et al., 1986; Svenson,
1981) and most students regard themselves as above-average leaders (Alicke and Govorun,
2005). It has also been documented that people who are unskilled for a task often fail to
recognise their lack of competence, a phenomenon known as the Dunning—Kruger effect
(Kruger and Dunning, 1999). Psychological tests have also shown that people tend to
overestimate the probability of positive events (e.g., career success) and to underestimate
the probability of negative events (e.g., onset of a serious illness) (Sharot, 2011b). Addi-
tional studies have shown that these optimistic expectations are not necessarily deterred
by knowledge of past, realistic information. For instance, newly married couples tend
to overestimate the likelihood of having long marriages despite reported divorce rates of
around 50% (Sharot, 2011a). Some stroke patients, who are aware of their condition, have
been observed to deceive themselves into thinking that their paralysis is due to factors
other than their illness (Ramachandran, 1996). Similar studies have found that surveyed
students also rate others as above average (Klar and Giladi, 1997). These results appear
to show that individuals are generally unable to estimate correctly the average capability
in a group (Brooks and Swann, 2011; Chambers and Windschitl, 2004) and that they have
a tendency to overestimate the skills of others.
Self-deception has been defined as a misrepresentation of reality (Trivers, 2000). At its
simplest, this would correspond to using a biased estimate of the probability of an event
in decision-making. It generally comes in the form of a bias, which is a tendency to act
prejudicedly or behave in a way that apparently does not conform to rationality. Biases
can be of one of two types: cognitive biases, which are perceptual biases in the subjective
experience of an individual, and behavioural biases, which are manifest in behaviours that
depart from the optimal fitness-maximizing strategy (Marshall et al., 2013b). Behavioural
biases can be diagnosed ignoring the internal decision-making machinery of the individual
(McKay and Efferson, 2010). Cognitive biases, on the other hand, are generally hard
to diagnose, and attempts to classify or explain them are often controversial (Dougherty
et al., 1999; Marshall et al., 2013b). The apparent overconfidence exhibited by students
and drivers in the surveys mentioned above are usually diagnosed by psychologists as an
example of a cognitive bias (Alicke and Govorun, 2005; McCormick et al., 1986; Pallier
et al., 2002; Svenson, 1981). Even though a bias may result in seemingly unreasonable
behaviour it could evolve if, for instance, the bias is part or the by-product of a larger
behavioural trait that overall proves to be individually advantageous. Thus cognitive biases
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may evolve given appropriate decision machinery, whereas behavioural biases should be
expected not to.
It has been proposed by Trivers (Trivers, 2011; von Hippel and Trivers, 2011b) that the
most evolutionarily successful deceivers in nature are those that self-deceive first. That
is to say, unconscious deceivers (i.e., those who unwittingly ‘lie’ to themselves just as
they lie to others) are favoured by natural selection over conscious deceivers (i.e., those
who intentionally attempt to be deceitful while acting on truthful information). Trivers
hypothesises that this is because conscious deceivers have to pay a considerable cognitive
cost in order to avoid exhibiting involuntary responses that would allow others to see
through the deception. Studies have shown, for instance, that humans tend to decrease
their movement (in feet, legs, or hands) (Davis and Hadiks, 1995; DePaulo, 1992; Ekman,
1989; Ekman et al., 1991; Vrij, 1995) and to exhibit slow or confused speech as well as
a higher pitched voice (DePaulo et al., 1985; Zuckerman et al., 1981, 1985) when lying
consciously. Humans who act as conscious deceivers exhibit these involuntary responses,
however, studies have shown that in some cases it is the opposite reactions (e.g., increased
movement in hands) that are often perceived as signs of deception (Vrij and Semin, 1996;
Vrij et al., 1996). Trivers’ hypothesis is that unconscious deceivers do not exhibit the
same involuntary responses, since they believe the lie, and thus tend to be more successful
cheaters and do not have to pay the same cognitive cost as conscious deceivers. Deceivers
are likely to be penalised if their deception is discovered (Moller, 1987; Rohwer, 1977;
Rohwer and Rohwer, 1978; Trivers, 1991), thus deceivers who hide the involuntary signs
that reveal their deception should be more successful than those who do not. According
to Trivers’ theory a tendency towards self-deception evolves as a supportive by-product
of the ability to deceive others, and the cost of lying to oneself is outweighed by the
benefit brought by the ability to lie convincingly to adversaries. The theory proposed
by Trivers has received extensive discussion from different commentators (Bandura, 2011)
and Trivers has addressed these criticisms (von Hippel and Trivers, 2011a). One point that
has been raised is that in situations of conflict, a deceiver may succeed in discouraging
competitors from fighting (e.g., by feigning a strength higher than the actual one) but
it is likely that at some point the deception may be uncovered by others and that then
the deceiver will face serious consequences, such as injury or death, as pointed out earlier
(Frey and Voland, 2011; Funder, 2011; Marshall et al., 2013b). In such case the eventual
cost of being discovered may be higher than the advantage posed by deceiving others, and
self-deception should not evolve. This point has not been addressed by Trivers (Marshall
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et al., 2013b).
Section 4.2 introduces an extension to the model of the evolution of overconfidence
proposed by Johnson and Fowler (2011) in order to investigate the evolution of self-
deception given statistically-optimal behavioural machinery. With this it is shown an-
alytically and computationally that under certain circumstances overconfidence evolves
even when decision-makers use a theoretically optimal decision rule as suggested by Mar-
shall et al. (Marshall et al., 2013b). In this case overconfidence or underconfidence are
cognitive biases assuming a particular decision machinery, since they lead to optimal be-
haviour, rather than a sub-optimal behavioural bias (Marshall et al., 2013b). The new
model is extended in Section 4.3 to incorporate deception biases in order to test Trivers’
theory (Trivers, 2011) by showing that deception is favoured by natural selection when
self-deception reduces cognitive or other costs. These self-deception biases are shown to
be evolutionarily stable in a situation of conflict, one scenario not addressed by Trivers
when replying to their critics (Marshall et al., 2013b; von Hippel and Trivers, 2011a).
In the model presented in Section 4.2 individuals do not attempt to deceive others
because the purpose is to compare the self-deception biases with (model in Section 4.3)
and without (model in Section 4.2) deception between individuals. Analysis and results
of the models introduced in Section 4.2 and Section 4.3 are presented in Section 4.4 and
Section 4.5, respectively. Supplementary information is presented in Appendix A.
4.2 A simplified owner-challenger model with internal bi-
ases
This section introduces an extension to Johnson and Fowler (J&F)’s model (Johnson and
Fowler, 2011) of the evolution of overconfidence. In the extension, individuals self-deceive
but do not deceive others. This extension, called the simplified owner-challenger model, is
further extended in Section 4.3 to allow individuals to both self-deceive and deceive. The
purpose of having the two models is to compare the level of self-deception that evolves
in the absence of selective pressure to deceive others (in the simplified model presented
in this section), and compare it with the level of self-deception that evolves when this
selective pressure is present (in the generalised model presented in Section 4.3).
The definition of the simplified owner-challenger model is similar to that proposed
by Johnson and Fowler (2011) and can be formulated as follows. Each individual has a
fighting capability, denoted by θ. Given any two individuals, i and j, with capabilities
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θi and θj respectively, the former would defeat the latter if θi > θj should a conflict
between them occur. The capability advantage i has over j is defined as A = θi − θj
and i defeats j if A > 0. As in the model originally proposed by Johnson and Fowler
(2011), A is modelled as a standard normal random variable (i.e., A ∼ N (0, 1)). This
is achieved by making individual capabilities (θi and θj) normally distributed with mean
zero and standard deviation
√
1
2 .
1 The marginal probability that i defeats j is given by
pW = P (A > 0) =
1
2 .
Every individual i also has an internal bias (i.e., a self-deception bias), denoted by ki,
that distorts its perception of its own capability in such a manner that i always acts as
if its capability is θi + ki. In addition to this, i’s perception of j’s capability, denoted by
θ̂j , is normally-distributed with mean θj and standard deviation σ (i.e., θ̂j ∼ N (θj , σ)).
The perception error size, σ, is a non-negative parameter of the model. In this manner
the model simulates perception errors as they occur in nature, which are due in part
to environmental factors beyond the control of each individual, as well as being due to
sensory noise. In this manner the advantage i perceives it has over an opponent j is given
by Â = θi + ki − θ̂j .
A conflict between two individuals over a resource occurs in an owner-challenger en-
counter as shown in Figure 4.1, where r is the value of the contested resource and c is a
cost both individuals pay if they fight. The encounter involves the owner of the resource,
who arrives at it first, and a challenger, who arrives subsequently and decides whether
to claim the resource. If the challenger claims the owner decides whether to fight for the
resource or abandon it to the challenger. Both r and c are constant and positive, and each
individual decides in sequence whether to fight or not.
In a more realistic scenario, r, c, and σ would likely vary from individual to individual
and from encounter to encounter. For instance, an individual who has collected many
resources will value a newly encountered resource less than an individual who has collected
none. Similarly, the cost of a fight will probably be higher for an individual who has been
injured badly from previously lost fights than for an individual who has lost none. In
addition to this, in a natural scenario perceptual capabilities as well as conditions of the
local environment (e.g., low visibility that affects the ability to visualise the opponent)
would be likely to vary from encounter to encounter, resulting in different perception errors
between individuals. However, r, c, and σ have been kept constant among all individuals
for simplicity because in this manner the formal analysis of the model (Section 4.3) and
1If X and Y are normally distributed random variables, i.e., X ∼ N (µX , σX) and Y ∼ N (µY , σY ),
then Z = X + Y is also normally distributed with mean µX + µY and standard deviation
√
σX2 + σY 2.
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a further extension (Section 4.4) of it are much more manageable and by doing so it is
easier to identify the minimal conditions that are sufficient for the evolution of the biases
of interest.
There are two differences between the owner-challenger model and the one proposed
by J&F (Johnson and Fowler, 2011). The first is that in J&F’s model the two competing
individuals decide synchronously whether to fight or not whereas in the owner-challenger
model the two decisions are made asynchronously and in sequence. The second is that in
J&F’s model individuals make their decisions based only on their perceived advantage over
their respective opponents while ignoring the benefits (r) and costs (c) of each decision,
whereas in the owner-challenger model these variables are taken into account by each
individual. In this manner, the owner-challenger model addresses two main criticisms
of J&F’s (Johnson and Fowler, 2013; Marshall et al., 2013a,b). The first one is that
since in J&F’s model contests over resources are synchronous they can lead to valuable
resources remaining unclaimed if no individual chooses to contest them, while the second
is that in J&F’s model individuals use an arbitrary and unrealistic decision rule in deciding
whether to contest (Marshall et al., 2013a,b). The first criticism is addressed by allowing
individuals to use whether they arrived at a resource first or second to determine their
strategy, thereby creating a uncorrelated asymmetry (Maynard Smith, 1982) and allowing
low value resources to be claimed by one individual. The second criticism is addressed by
enabling individuals to use the estimated payoffs associated with different outcomes, and
an estimate of the probability of winning, to determine whether to contest a resource.
A realistic scenario in the owner-challenger model is that where both individuals use
all the relevant information when making their respective decisions. However the mathe-
matical analysis of the model becomes difficult when both decision-makers behave in this
manner. For this reason a simplified version of the model is analysed first, where the
decision of the challenger j is always to claim the resource and fight whereas the owner i
makes its decision (after having been challenged by j) by using the following reasoning;
first i estimates its own probability of winning as p̂W = P (θ̂j < θi + ki). Then i estimates
its expected payoff from the hypothetical fight as F̂ = p̂W (r−c)+(1− p̂W )(−c) = p̂W r−c.
This individual then decides to defend the resource if and only if this estimated payoff is
higher than zero. This in turn occurs if and only if p̂W >
c
r (Marshall et al., 2013b). This
decision rule is rational from the perspective of an owner because it uses all the relevant
information available to estimate the expected payoff from a fight and the final decision
is made if and only if the evidence suggests that this estimate is positive. In the long run
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An individual is the 'owner' 
of a resource of value r and 
a 'challenger' wants the resource. 
The 'challenger' 
claims the resource? 
The 'owner' keeps r. 
The 'challenger' receives zero. 
The 'owner' defends 
the resource? 
The 'owner' receives zero. 
The 'challenger' receives r. The 'owner' defeats the 'challenger'? 
The 'owner' receives -c. 
The 'challenger' receives r-c. 
The 'owner' receives r-c. 
The 'challenger' receives -c. 
Yes No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Figure 4.1: An owner-challenger encounter occurs when one individual is the owner of a
resource and then a challenger arrives with the intention of claiming the resource. Both
parties decide asynchronously whether to fight over the resource or surrender it to the other
individual. If both fight then both pay a cost −c but the winner additionally receives the
resource value r. The strongest individual wins the fight. If both have the same capability
then the winner is decided randomly with each individual having equal probability of
winning.
this rule should yield a positive payoff to an owner on average after repeated encounters
with random challengers.
The estimate F̂ does not include the weighted payoff received by an individual when
the opponent withdraws from conflict, therefore every owner works under the assumption
that the opponent is always intent to fight. This assumption is clearly correct from the
perspective of the owner because its decision-making takes place only after having been
challenged. However a rational challenger should not always claim, since this ignores the
probability that the owner will defend the resource rather than abandon it uncontested.
Therefore a challenger that always claims should be expected to perform worse in the
long term (i.e., after repeated encounters against random owners) than an owner. The
simplified model is proposed in this manner, with always-aggressive challengers, in order to
determine analytically what values of r, c, and σ make internal biases necessary for owners
to receive the highest long-term payoffs, even when these individuals use the rational
decision rule stated above and when no deception between individuals is present. The
analysis of this model and the results are presented in Section 4.4.
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4.3 The generalised owner-challenger model with role-dependent
internal and external biases
This section introduces a generalised version of the simplified model presented in Sec-
tion 4.2 in order to simulate the scenario where every decision-maker additionally has an
external bias (i.e., a deception bias) that alters the capability this individual signals to
any opponent. The larger the external bias the greater the baseline capability signalled
to competitors. Given any two individuals, x and y, what x perceives is y’s projected
capability, distorted first by y’s external bias and then by x’s own perception error. The
actual attribute remains unchanged but y may be able to deceive x into thinking that y’s
capability is greater (or lower) than it actually is, thus making x less (or more) willing to
fight. The model aims to test the theory proposed by Trivers (2011). By incorporating the
premises of the theory (namely costs paid for conscious deception of others) computational
simulations are run to determine in what circumstances, if any, self-deception evolves in
order to facilitate the deception of opponents.
An individual with a non-zero external bias exerts a form of deception, or dishonest
signaling. The use of a positive external bias is similar to deimatic behaviour, in which an
animal, feeling in danger, makes a physical display, possibly involving changes in shape,
position, and/or colour, in order to appear threatening (probably more than the animal
actually is) and to dissuade an opponent from attacking. Examples of deimatic individ-
uals include some species of frog, who, in the presence of a threat, inflate themselves
with air and raise their hind legs in order to appear larger (Martins, 1989). The dishon-
est signal sent by an individual with a positive external bias could also be compared to
Batesian mimicry, where a harmless individual imitates the signals of a harmful one, in
order to discourage attacks from predators. Examples of Batesian species include Lampro-
peltis elapsoides, a nonvenomous snake who exhibits the colour pattern of the venomous
Micrurus fulvius (Kikuchi and Pfennig, 2010).
In the generalised model each decision-maker has two types of bias. An internal bias,
denoted by k, that influences the perception the individual has of itself (as in the simplified
model of the previous section), and an external bias, denoted by s, that distorts the
capability it displays to opponents. Both biases comprise together a deception pair denoted
by [k, s]. Any individual x with internal bias kx and external bias sx believes that its own
capability is θx + kx and attempts to deceive any potential opponent y into believing that
x’s capability is θx + sx. Then what y perceives is a normal deviate of the projected
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capability with standard deviation σ, the perception error size.
Each decision-maker in the model holds two deception pairs, [ko, so] and [kc, sc]. The
first one of these is expressed when the individual is playing the role of an owner and
the second one when the individual is a challenger. The first pair can be referred to as
the individual’s owner biases and the latter as the challenger biases. Alternatively the
first pair can be referred to as the owner strategy of the individual while the second pair
is the challenger strategy. A strategy is symmetrically biased if its internal and external
biases are equal otherwise it is asymmetrically biased. Asymmetrically-biased individuals
represent organisms in nature that exercise ‘conscious’ deception because they attempt to
project an image of themselves that differs from their true self-perception. On the other
hand, symmetrically-biased individuals represent organisms that do not deceive or deceive
‘unconsciously’, because if they spread false information it is only because they ‘believe’
it as well.
In each encounter every individual expresses only the pair of biases that match the
role (owner or challenger) the individual is playing at that moment. Given an owner x
and a challenger y, x estimates its probability of winning as p̂W,x = P (θ̂y < θx + ko,x),
where θ̂y ∼ N (θy + sc,y, σ), given that in the encounter this individual estimates its
capability as θx + ko,x (with x’s internal owner bias) and that of y as a normal deviate
of θy + sc,y (with y’s external challenger bias) with perception error size σ. On the
other hand, y estimates its probability of winning as p̂W,y = P (θ̂x < θy + kc,y), where
θ̂x ∼ N (θx + so,x, σ), given that in the encounter this individual estimates its capability
as θy+kc,y (with y’s internal challenger bias) and that of x as a normal deviate of θx+so,x
(with x’s external owner bias) with perception error size σ. The owner x estimates its
expected payoff as F̂x = p̂W,x(r − c) + (1 − p̂W,x)(−c) = p̂W,xr − c and fights if and only
if this estimate is positive. Similarly, the challenger y estimates its expected payoff as
F̂y = p̂W,yr− c and decides to fight if and only if F̂y > 0. As explained in Section 4.2, this
decision rule (i.e., fighting if and only if the estimated payoff is positive) is rational from
the perspective of an owner but not necessarily so from the perspective of a challenger.
This is because for the challenger a rationally estimated payoff would necessarily include
an estimate of the probability of the owner contesting the resource. However the model
becomes difficult to analyse if the challenger is set to estimate this probability. For this
reason the model considers the simplified scenario where both challengers and owners use
the same rule because the former can be realistically assumed to be conservative when
forced to work with imperfect information. In this manner the challenger only challenges
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when it estimates that it can win the resource even if the owner fights back. Despite not
being rigourously rational this challenger behaviour is sensible and realistic.
Trivers’ premise that deception is more costly in the absence of self-deception (Trivers,
2011) is incorporated into the model by having each individual pay a conscious deception
cost that penalizes asymmetrical strategies, regardless of whether a fight actually takes
place or not. The cost paid by an individual is proportional to the discrepancy between
the internal and the external biases in the strategy exercised by this individual in the
encounter, with a proportionality constant λ ∈ [0, 1]. That is to say, the cost paid by the
owner x increases with the difference between this individual’s owner biases and is given
by λ|ko,x − so,x|, whereas the cost paid by the challenger y increases with the difference
between this individual’s challenger biases and is given by λ|kc,y − sc,y|.
Dishonest signaling may serve as a way to avoid the cost derived from a physical
conflict by discouraging an opponent from fighting (an individual with a high external
bias may dissuade an opponent from fighting); however, in nature such signaling is also
costly, even though the cost paid in exchange for the ability to cheat opponents (e.g.,
through having to invest in ornamentation) may be less than the one paid for taking
part in a fight (e.g., through sustaining an injury) (Backwell et al., 2000; Zahavi, 1975).
This premise is incorporated into the model by having each individual pay a dishonest
signaling cost proportional to the square of the external bias in the strategy played by the
individual in an encounter against an opponent. The proportionality constant is denoted
ω ∈ [0, 1] and the cost paid by an owner x is thus given by ωso,x2 whereas the cost paid a
challenger y is given by ωsc,y
2. The conscious deception cost and the dishonest signaling
cost paid by an individual are subtracted from the payoff received by this decision-maker
from the encounter. For instance, if an owner x wins a fight against a challenger y then
x’s final payoff is Fx = r − c − λ|ko,x − so,x| − ωso,x2 whereas y’s is Fy = −c − λ|kc,y −
sc,y| − ωsc,y2. Clearly positive factors λ and ω together impose a selective pressure on
decision-makers driving them towards becoming less deceptive and more symmetrically
biased. It can be hypothesised that without the former parameter individuals should
evolve to be asymmetrically biased whereas without the latter individuals should evolve
to be maximally deceptive. Given any two individuals, x and y, y’s internal bias can
evolve so that y disregards the uninformative signal originated from x’s external bias. In
the absence of the dishonest signaling cost this would escalate. For this reason, this cost
was set to be proportional to the square of the external bias in order to prevent signallers’
external biases and receivers’ internal biases from increasing indefinitely in an evolutionary
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arms race.
A set of evolutionary simulations were run with the role-dependent owner-challenger
model under Triver’s premise (i.e., with large enough values of λ and ω) as follows. Firstly
a population of decision-makers is initialised randomly with standard normal biases, then
each generation every individual x is paired at random with exactly one adversary y in the
population. The fitness of x is calculated as the average of its payoff when playing owner
and challenger against y, and it increases with the resources (each one of these with value r)
x manages to protect (as an owner) and/or usurp from y (as a challenger) and decreases
with the number of fights x involves itself in (because each fight comes with a cost c).
The fitness of x depends on the decisions this individual makes and how advantageously
it influences the decisions of y, who is also trying to maximise its own gain. Fitness
proportional selection (Baker, 1987) is used to determine which individuals reproduce,
with normally-distributed mutations. Evolution runs until no considerable changes are
observed and the population is assumed to be in equilibrium. Full details of the model
are presented in Section A.3. Results from the model are presented in Section 4.5.
4.4 Results with the simplified owner-challenger model with
internal biases
The expected payoff F (k) of an owner with internal bias k depends on the value of the
resources contested (i.e., r), the cost of each fight (i.e., c), and the error made when
estimating the capability of an opponent (i.e., σ). This is approximated with a numerical
method described in Section A.1. The expected payoffs for different values of rc and k
when σ = 1 are plotted in Figure 4.2a. The plot shows that the highest payoff is obtained
by owners with biases near zero when rc = 2. But as this ratio increases it is owners
with negative biases who receive the highest expected payoffs. Therefore owners that
underestimate their own strength are the ones that in the long term perform the best
against always-aggressive challengers when σ = 1 and the value of the contested resource
(r) outweighs the cost of a confrontation (c). In Section A.2 it is formally shown that
when rc ∈ (0, 1] owners never retaliate against always-aggressive challengers and end up
receiving the same payoff (zero), regardless of owners’ bias; this is because the value of the
resource is offset by the cost of the inevitable fight. Therefore it can be concluded that as
long as rc ≤ 1 no owner should perform better than the other and no bias can be considered
optimal. On the other hand, the biases that maximise F (k) when rc ∈ (1,+∞) were found
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Figure 4.2: Figure 4.2a shows the owner’s expected payoff (F ) in the simplified model
against random always-aggressive challengers as a function of confidence biases (k) and
benefit cost ratios ( rc ) when σ = 1. Figure 4.2b shows the self-deception biases (k)
that yield the highest payoffs to an owner in the long term when facing random always-
aggressive challengers along different benefit/cost ratios ( rc ) and perception error sizes
(σ). Details on how to produce these plots appear in Section D.2.
numerically and plotted in Figure 4.2b.2 In Section A.2 it is shown that any owner i’s
fighting probability is given by pF = P (A > z − ki), where z is an advantage threshold
for conflict that depends on rc and σ. It is also shown that if i is an optimal-decision
maker then pF =
1
2 . Therefore after a large enough number of repeated encounters with
random challengers an optimal owner should fight back in half of these encounters, because
P (A > 0) = 12 . This means that given any
r
c and σ, only owners with biases equal to
z may be optimal decision-makers because only these have fighting probabilities equal to
1
2 . This is confirmed by the numerical results displayed in Figure 4.2b. If σ = 0 then
z = 0 (Technical details in Section A.2) and the highest payoffs are received by owners
with approximately zero bias. Unbiased individuals also get the best payoffs when σ > 0
and rc = 2 because then z = 0. If σ > 0 then z decreases below zero as
r
c increases above 2
and therefore negative owner biases yield the highest payoffs. Additionally if σ > 0 then
z increases above zero as rc decreases below 2 and owners achieve the maximum gain with
positive biases. It can be concluded that owners require biases to optimise their payoffs if
and only if the perception error is present (i.e., if σ > 0). That is to say, internal biases
serve as a means to compensate for information noise, given the assumed decision rule.
2Details on how to produce the plots in Figure 4.2 appear in Section D.2.
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4.5 Results with the generalised owner-challenger model
with role-dependent biases
The difference between deception and self-deception biases were measured when popula-
tions were in evolutionary equilibrium in different simulations with different values of rc
and σ. If these biases tend to evolve to have the same value when it is costly to have
them differ, then this would support the theory proposed by Trivers (Trivers, 2011). Fig-
ure 4.3 shows the average owner bias differences (|ko − so|) and the average challenger bias
differences (|kc − sc|) when the population is in evolutionary equilibrium in simulations
run with parameters rc ∈ [1, 5], σ ∈ [0, 4], λ ∈ {0, 0.5, 1} and ω = 1.3 That is to say, Fig-
ure 4.3 shows the level of symmetry of owner and challenger strategies in equilibrium with
(λ = 0.5 and λ = 1) and without (λ = 0) Trivers’ premise that deception is more costly
to the deceiver when it is unconscious. The plots show that when λ > 0 the symmetry in
owner and challenger strategies generally increases as rc and σ increase together. With
high enough values of these two parameters the internal and external biases evolve to be
approximately equal, which is consistent with Trivers’ theory because as the parameters
increase, natural selection increasingly favours individuals that self-deceive just as much
as they deceive others because they avoid the cognitive cost of conscious deception, and
the effects of acting based on false information are more than offset by the effects of ma-
nipulating others’ perceptions. Figure 4.3 also shows that asymmetry can be stable as the
perception error decreases and rc increases. That is to say, as higher costs are paid for
the ability of being consciously deceitful, it pays off more to be an unconscious deceiver,
unless the perception errors are low (allowing the owner to make decisions on more certain
information) and the value of the contested resource greatly outweighs the costs of a fight.
Figure 4.3a shows that if λ = 0 then owner bias differences are generally lowest when
r
c ∈ [2, 2.5] and they increase as rc increases and decreases away from this interval. That
is to say, if rc ∈ [2, 2.5] then evolutionary equilibrium generally occurs when the pop-
ulation exercise owner strategies that are symmetrically biased (i.e., when owners are
unconscious deceivers), otherwise equilibrium generally occurs when the population ex-
ercise owner strategies that are symmetrically unbiased (i.e., when owners are conscious
deceivers). The figure also shows that owner bias differences increase and decrease with
σ. This means that as the information available becomes noisier then it pays off more
to be an asymmetrically-biased owner (i.e., a consciously-deceiving owner). A similar
3Details on how to produce these plots appear in Section D.3.
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pattern occurs in challenger strategies, as shown in Figure 4.3b, although the bias dif-
ferences observed in these strategies when the population is in evolutionary equilibrium
are generally higher. That is to say, differences in challenger strategies increase with σ
and as rc increases and decreases away from [2, 3.5]. All the above is similar to what is
observed in Figure 4.2b where the magnitude of optimal internal bias exhibit a similar
relationship with rc and σ, i.e., higher magnitudes as
r
c increases and decreases from 2
and as σ increases. It is reasonable to assume that this similarity is due to the same
causes (i.e., information noise) although a formal demonstration of this (such as the one
provided for the simplified model in Section 4.4) is difficult in the generalised model with
role-dependent biases.
Additional evolutionary simulations were run with the same parameters with external
biases absent. The purpose of this was to compare the evolved internal biases in owner
and challenger strategies in the absence and presence of external biases. The difference
in magnitude of internal biases in equilibrium when these evolve in the presence and ab-
sence of external biases was measured by running separate evolutionary simulations with
(so, sc 6= 0) and then without (so, sc = 0) deception biases. Individuals pay a conscious
deception cost (λ = 1) and a dishonest signaling cost (ω = 1) only in simulations where
external biases are present. The average internal bias in owner strategies when the pop-
ulation is in evolutionary equilibrium in simulations with external biases is denoted by
kdo |λ=1 and the average internal bias in challenger strategies is denoted by kdc |λ=1. The
average internal bias in owner strategies when individuals are in evolutionary equilibrium
in simulations without external biases is denoted by kndo |λ=0 and the average internal bias
in challenger strategies is denoted by kndc |λ=0. The difference between evolved internal
biases with and without external biases (kdo |λ=1 − kndo |λ=0 and kdc |λ=1 − kndc |λ=0) for each
choice of rc and σ are plotted in Figure 4.4.
4 The two plots show that there are values
of rc and σ for which these differences are generally positive and that these differences
tend to increase as rc and σ increase. This implies that with high enough values of
r
c
and σ the magnitude of the evolved internal biases increases in the presence of external
biases, which means that the ability to deceive others requires an increase in self-deception
in order to be evolutionarily stable. It can be hypothesised that the internal biases that
evolve without external biases do so for a reason similar to the one explained in Section 4.4
for the simplified model with always-aggressive challengers (i.e., noise in the information
available), although a formal demonstration of this is harder in the generalised model with
4Details on how to produce these plots appear in Section D.4.
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role-dependent biases.
In evolutionary simulations with both internal and external biases where individuals are
forced to pay a cost for the ability of conscious deception (i.e., for exercising asymmetrical
strategies) there is a difference in the magnitude of the internal biases that evolve compared
to the internal biases evolved in the absence of this cost, as shown in Figure 4.5.5 The
average internal bias in the equilibrium population is measured when individuals evolve
with (λ = 1) and without (λ = 0) paying a cost for conscious deception and then the
differences between these averages is calculated for each choice of rc and σ. The two plots
in Figure 4.5 show that these differences tend to increase with rc and σ and that they
are generally above zero with high enough values of these two parameters. This implies
that the magnitude of the self-deception that evolves under the influence of the conscious-
deception cost tends to become larger than the self-deception that evolves without this cost
as rc and σ increase. That is to say, with high enough values of
r
c and σ, self-deception
is effectively higher under Trivers’ premise that conscious deception is costly (Trivers,
2011). In addition to this, self-deception evolved under Trivers’ premise increases as the
information decision-makers use becomes noisier (i.e., as σ increases) and as the value of
the contested resource grows relative to the cost of a fight (i.e., as rc increases).
4.6 Conclusions
The owner-challenger model extends the one proposed by Johnson and Fowler (2011) and
offers two improvements over the original model. The first is that resources are never
left unclaimed and the second is that individuals use a rational decision rule by taking
into account the costs and benefits of each decision. Two versions of the model are
considered: (1) the model with internal biases, introduced in Section 4.2, and (2) the
model with role-dependent internal and external biases, introduced in Section 4.3. The
model with internal biases aims to determine the evolvability of self-deceptive cognitive
biases, given that decision-makers use a rational decision rule. The model with role-
dependent internal and external biases introduces dishonest signaling and aims to test the
theory proposed by Trivers, which states that self-deception should evolve if individuals
face a selective pressure to deceive each other and that self-deceiving deceivers have an
evolutionary advantage over other deceitful individuals because the former do not have to
pay the cognitive costs of concealing a lie consciously.
The baseline results with the owner-challenger model with internal biases introduced
5Details on how to produce these plots appear in Section D.5.
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(a) |ko − so|, λ = 0.
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(b) |kc − sc|, λ = 0.
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(c) |ko − so|, λ = 0.5.
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(d) |kc − sc|, λ = 0.5.
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(e) |ko − so|, λ = 1.
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(f) |kc − sc|, λ = 1.
Figure 4.3: Differences between internal (self-deception) and external (deception) biases
evolved with different benefit/cost ratios ( rc ), perception errors (σ), with fixed conscious
deception costs (λ) and a fixed dishonest signaling cost (ω = 1). With each combination
of these parameters, evolutionary simulations are run with populations composed of in-
dividuals with role-dependent biases. When equilibrium is reached the average difference
of owner biases (|ko − so|) and the average difference of challenger biases (|kc − sc|) in the
population are calculated and plotted. These plots show values of rc and σ with which
symmetrical (darker blue) and asymmetrical (darker red) strategies are stable. As con-
scious deception costs increase differences between internal and external biases tend to
decrease towards zero. Details on how to produce these plots appear in Section D.3.
93
1 2 3 4 50
1
2
3
4  
r/c
 
σ
ε
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
(a) kdo |λ=1 − kndo |λ=0
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(b) kdc |λ=1 − kndc |λ=0
Figure 4.4: Difference between internal (self-deception) biases evolved in the presence and
absence of external biases. When external biases are present, individuals pay a conscious
deception cost (λ = 1) and a dishonest signaling cost (ω = 1). The notations kndo |λ=0 and
kndc |λ=0 are used to refer to the average internal bias in owner and challenger strategies,
respectively, in populations in evolutionary equilibrium when individuals evolve with no
external biases (i.e., when so,x, sc,x = 0 for every individual x). The notations kdo |λ=1
and kdc |λ=1 are used to refer to the average internal bias in owner and challenger strate-
gies, respectively, in populations in evolutionary equilibrium when individuals evolve with
external biases. Figure 4.4a shows the owner difference kdo |λ=1− kndo |λ=0 for different ben-
efit/cost ratios ( rc ) and perception errors (σ), whereas Figure 4.4b shows the challenger
difference kdc |λ=1 − kndc |λ=0. The plots show that these differences tend to increase with
r
c and σ. This implies that as these parameters increase, an increase in the ability to
deceive others (from zero external bias to nonzero external bias) requires an increase in
the magnitude of self-deception in order to be stable. Details on how to produce these
plots appear in Section D.4.
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(a) kdo |λ=1 − kdo |λ=0
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(b) kdc |λ=1 − kdc |λ=0
Figure 4.5: Differences in the magnitude of internal biases evolved with (λ = 1) and
without (λ = 0) conscious deception costs. In both plots the dishonest signaling cost is
ω = 1. The average owner internal bias evolved in the presence of external biases when
λ = 1 is denoted by kdo |λ=1 and the same average when λ = 0 is denoted by kdo |λ=0. The
average challenger internal bias evolved in the presence of external biases when λ = 1 is
denoted by kdc |λ=1 and the same average when λ = 0 is denoted by kdc |λ=0. The plots show
that the differences kdo |λ=1−kdo |λ=0 and kdc |λ=1−kdc |λ=0 are generally nonzero and that they
increase with rc and σ. This implies that internal biases evolved with conscious deception
costs (i.e., with λ = 1) tend to become larger than internal biases evolved without this
assumption (i.e., when λ = 0) as rc and σ increase. Details on how to produce these plots
appear in Section D.5.
94
in Section 4.2 show that, given an assumed optimal decision rule taking proper account
of probabilities costs and benefits of outcomes, suggested by Marshall et al. (Marshall
et al., 2013b), biases provide a way for owners in the model to compensate for perception
errors when their opponents are certain to fight. This is illustrated in Figure 4.2b, where
it is shown that if there are perception errors (σ > 0) then optimal behaviour requires
non-zero biases, the sole exception being when rc = 2. If errors are not present (σ = 0)
then owners do not require any biases to behave optimally. But if errors are present then
self-deception biases are required to gain the best payoffs in the long term. These results
provided a baseline optimal level of self-deception to compare the extended model against.
The extended owner-challenger model with role-dependent internal and external biases
was introduced in Section 4.3 with the purpose of examining the evolution of self-deception
as a supporting mechanism of deception. Symmetrically-biased individuals are those who
self-deceive just as much as they attempt to deceive others, and can be considered to be
‘unconscious’ deceivers. On the other hand asymmetrically-biased individuals are those
who project an image of themselves that differs from their self-perception, and are anal-
ogous to ‘conscious’ deceivers. The premise of Trivers’ theory was incorporated into the
model by having each decision-maker pay a dishonest signaling cost (for having the ability
to deceive others through external biases) and a conscious deception cost (for exercising
asymmetrically-biased strategies, i.e., for being consciously deceitful), emulating the phys-
iological costs that deceivers in nature have to pay, according to Trivers’ proposal (Trivers,
2011). Evolutionary simulations with the model show that when these costs are present
then symmetrically-biased, self-deceiving individuals are more evolutionarily successful
than those who attempt to deceive others while attempting to act on truthful informa-
tion, when the benefit/cost ratio and the perception error are high enough (Figure 4.3). In
other words, self-deceiving deceivers are more likely to evolve as the benefit/cost ratio and
the perception error increase, when the conscious deception and dishonest signaling costs
are present. The internal biases evolved when individuals attempt to deceive others gen-
erally exceed those that are evolved when individuals cannot deceive others (Figure 4.4),
as information becomes noisier (i.e., as σ increases) and the benefit/cost ratio becomes
larger. That is to say, in order to be evolutionarily stable, an increase in deceitful be-
haviour requires an increase in self-deceiving behaviour when there are physiological costs
for exercising deception and for doing so consciously. Further simulations show that in-
ternal biases are also generally higher when there is a conscious deception cost (i.e., when
λ = 1) than when this cost is absent (i.e., when λ = 0), and also that the difference
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between the internal biases evolved with and without this cost generally increases with rc
and σ (Figure 4.5). From these numerical experiments it can be concluded that Trivers’
theory generally holds true in situations of conflict if two conditions are met. First, the
value of the contested resource must sufficiently exceed the cost of the fight required to
claim the resource. Second, there must be a high enough degree of uncertainty in the
information the decision-maker uses to assess its chances of winning the fight. As the
value of the resource and the uncertainty increase, from the perspective of an individual
it tends to payoff more in the long term to self-deceive as much as to attempt to deceive
others, when conscious deception and dishonest signaling are physiologically costly. Then
it should be expected that when these conditions are met, self-deceiving fighters evolve,
as predicted by Trivers’ theory (Marshall et al., 2013b; von Hippel and Trivers, 2011a).
The theory by Trivers has received considerable discussion, and it is possible that
it will continue to be debated whether this theory correctly explains the apparent self-
deception biases observed in humans, such as the ones presented in Section 4.1. The
model presented in this article aims to test this theory in the particular case of a situation
of conflict. The motivation for proposing this model is the point raised by commentators
that the risk of injury faced by a self-deceiving, deceitful fighter is likely to be higher
than the benefit received from discouraging an opponent from fighting by means of a
deceitful exhibition of strength, and that therefore self-deceiving deceivers should not
evolve. The model presented in this article simulates a situation of conflict where it is
shown that, under the premises of the theory, self-deceiving, deceitful fighters do evolve.
Given this, the generalised model proposed in this chapter serves as a first attempt to
formally address the evolution of self-deception in situations of conflict, and the results
obtained complement Trivers’ proposal (Marshall et al., 2013b; von Hippel and Trivers,
2011a). The model could be extended in the future. For instance, it would be of interest
to examine how biases evolve when the two opponents share the contested resource if both
estimate that their capabilities are approximately equal. It would also be interesting to
determine the impact of more biologically-realistic assumptions on the results presented
in this chapter, such as population variation in perception errors, costs of conflict and so
on.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
This thesis presents different mathematical models that recreate decision problems in
natural scenarios in order to determine the behavioural strategy that should be expected to
evolve in response to these problems. These models are based on the accepted hypothesis
that decision-makers in nature are compelled by natural selection to exhibit the same
behaviour that should be expected to be displayed by Bayesian decision-makers when
facing the same problem with uncertain information (Marshall et al., 2013b; McNamara
et al., 2006; McNamara and Houston, 1980). In each model the optimal behavioural
strategy is found analytically or using evolutionary simulations. The model presented in
Chapter 2 investigates when individuals in nature should display phenotypic plasticity in
the form of inducible defences and Chapter 4 investigates when individuals should self-
deceive in situations of conflict. In the model presented in Chapter 2 it is assumed that
decision-makers can evolve the machinery to behave as if having priors of different means
and standard deviations. This assumption is tested in Chapter 3 and found to be true.
The results obtained with these models can be summarised as follows.
The model presented in Chapter 2 simulates the developmental history of an individual
with inducible defences. These pose a trade-off to the individual since they are costly
and only beneficial when there is a predation risk. During its lifetime the individual
measures the predation risk by making repeated observations of the environment, each
time updating its inherited prior estimate of the predation risk to a Bayesian posterior
estimate, using Bayes’ theorem, given in Equation 1.1. In each observation, a predator
encounter occurs as a Bernoulli trial. The environment state consists of the probability
that the individual survives each predator encounter or non-encounter with and without
defences. The individual may induce the defences at any point, when any amount of
evidence of predation risk has been collected.
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Given any amount of evidence, the optimal decision (induce or postpone) is the one
that should be expected to maximise the individual’s future expectancy of reaching adult-
hood. The optimal strategy is the sequence of optimal decisions to make in response to
a sequence of observations. A dynamic programming algorithm is used to determine the
optimal decision the individual should make, given the individual’s prior, the amount of
accumulated evidence of predation risk and the environment state. Realistic environments
were tested and two types of optimal strategies were found. The first is earliest special-
isation, which consists of inducing the defences prior to making any observation, thus
discarding any evidence of predation risk that may be collected. The second is plastic-
ity, which consists of inducing the defences only after accumulating evidence of predation
risk. The results obtained and described in Chapter 2 show that there is a threshold on
the standard deviation of the individual’s prior that determines the individual’s optimal
strategy. The optimal strategy is earliest specialisation when the standard deviation of
the individual’s prior is below this threshold whereas plasticity is the optimal strategy
when the individual’s prior is above or equal. When plasticity is the optimal strategy, the
algorithm determines the amount of accumulated evidence (i.e., number of past predator
encounters and non-encounters) that makes induction the optimal decision. It should be
expected that the the standard deviation of the individual’s inherited prior evolves to
reflect the uncertainty of the predation risk (a hypothesis confirmed in Chapter 3), thus a
high standard deviation should be indicative of high uncertainty. Therefore an individual
in the model maximises its expectancy of reaching adulthood by exhibiting plasticity only
when the predation risk in the environment exhibits great uncertainty. This is in agree-
ment with previous literature that states that plasticity should be expected to provide an
evolutionary benefit only when the environment poses a high enough instability (Fischer
et al., 2014; Ord et al., 2010; Price et al., 2003; Scheiner, 1993; Stephens, 1991). The
model presented in Chapter 2 provides an analytical demonstration of this, taking into
account the individual’s inherited prior in order to predict when plasticity maximises the
individual’s expectancy of reaching adulthood.
Given the above, the model presented in Chapter 2 serves as a theoretical complement
to the work of Hammill et al. (2008), which has been carried out with a similar purpose.
However the predictions made by the model presented in Chapter 2 are made in terms of
the individual’s prior and refer to the individual’s expectancy of reaching adulthood, not
to its fitness as in the model of Hammill et al. (2008). The model could be improved in
the future by modelling the individual’s reproductive rate in order to estimate its fitness.
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This could be done in order to predict properly the conditions (e.g., environment state,
individual’s prior, etc) that must be met for inducible defences to be favoured by natural
selection. This would offer a full theoretical complement to the work of Hammill et al.
(2008). With survival probabilities (described in Chapter 2) measured experimentally this
theoretical model should return results in agreement with the predictions made by Hammill
et al. (2008). In addition to this, it may be possible to demonstrate formally the empirical
conclusions achieved with the model in Chapter 2. This chapter was chronologically the
last one of this thesis to be written and, due to time restrictions, attempts to produce
a more formal explanation of the experimental observations described in Section 2.4 can
only be suggested as future work.
Chapter 3 introduces a model to show how Bayesian priors can be encoded genetically
and shaped by natural selection. This is in support of the assumption made in the model
introduced in Chapter 2, that individuals can inherit different priors and that depending
on these the individual should maximise its expectancy of reaching adulthood by exhibit-
ing plasticity or specialisation. The model presented in Chapter 3 simulates a group of
individuals whose evolutionary fitness depends on their ability to estimate accurately the
probability of an event, referred to as the environment state. Each individual achieves this
by making repeated Bernoulli trials that occur with a probability equal to the environment
state. The individual has an inherited beta prior and updates it to a Bayesian posterior
with each Bernoulli observation. The mean of the posterior after a certain number of
observations is the individual’s estimate of the environment state. Individuals that pro-
duce the most accurate estimates are the most likely to reproduce. During reproduction
individuals pass on their inherited priors, with mutation, to their offspring but not the
information learned from the observations made.
Evolutionary simulations are run where the environment state changes periodically
and it is shown that the individuals’ priors evolve to be within a range of each updated
environment state after enough generations. That is to say, individuals evolve their priors
to approximate the current environment state, whatever this may be. It is also shown that
when the environment states are beta-distributed, the individuals evolve the hyperparam-
eters of their priors to resemble the hyperparameters of the environment beta distribution.
By doing this the Bayesian individuals evolve their priors to reflect the standard deviation
of the environment distribution and thus the uncertainty of the environment.
The model is extended to include frequentist individuals, i.e., those who use frequentist
inference when estimating the environment state. Evolutionary simulations with competi-
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tion between Bayesians and frequentists are run. The results show that Bayesians become
more evolutionarily stable than frequentists as the environment states become more un-
certain. This is consistent with the accepted proposal that natural selection should favour
individuals that behave as if Bayesian learners when processing uncertain information
(Marshall et al., 2013b; McNamara et al., 2006; McNamara and Houston, 1980). Thus
the results show that Bayesian individuals evolve their priors in order to be able to esti-
mate the environment state accurately and that they outperform frequentists, as they are
expected to, when both types of learners are faced with uncertain information.
Chapter 4 addresses the theory of the evolution of self-deception proposed by Trivers
(2011) and aims to test it in the particular case of a situation of conflict, a scenario raised
by commentators of the proposal (Frey and Voland, 2011; Funder, 2011; Marshall et al.,
2013b) and not addressed by Trivers (Marshall et al., 2013b). In order to do this, a situa-
tion of conflict for resources between two individuals is modelled. Each individual faces a
selective pressure to maximise its gains, in terms of collected resources, and minimise its
losses, derived from engaging in fights. In order to achieve this, each individual is able to
measure the fighting capability of the opponent in order to decide whether or not to fight.
Each individual may ‘deceive’ its opponent (by feigning greater or lower capability than
the actual one) and ‘self-deceive’ (by over- or underestimating its capability advantage
over the opponent). The individual pays a cost proportional to the difference between the
level of deception and self-deception it exercises. This is done in order to incorporate the
hypothesis stated by Trivers (2011) that deception is more costly to the deceiver if this
individual is aware of the deception. The results show that self-deception does evolve in
situations of conflict under the premises of Trivers (2011) when two conditions are met.
The first is that the cost of each fight must be sufficiently exceeded by the value of the
resource in contest. The second is that each individual must face a high enough level of
uncertainty when assessing its own capability and that of the opponent. The results show
that, given the conditions stated, a suboptimal behavioural mechanism (self-deception)
can lead to an evolutionarily optimal behaviour, which is consistent with the literature
(McNamara and Houston, 2009). These results support the theory proposed by Trivers
(2011) by showing how the predictions made by the proposal apply in situations of con-
flict. The model presented in Chapter 4 is the first to achieve this and address the point
raised by commentators of the proposal that self-deception should not evolve in situations
of conflict (Bandura, 2011). For simplicity, numerous assumptions are made in model.
Improvements can be made by replacing these assumptions with more realistic ones. This
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could be achieved by having each individual assess the value of the contested resouce
and the cost of the potential fight depending on their individual previous histories. For
instance, given any two individuals, the same resource should appear more appealing to
the one individual who has previously gained the least amount of resources. Similarly,
the individual who has recently lost the most fights should be more inclined to avoid a
conflict in order to prevent further injury. In addition to this, perception errors could vary
from individual to individual and, possibly, from encounter to encounter, depending on
environmental conditions.
In general, individuals in nature should reasonably be hypothesised to evolve the ma-
chinery to process optimally the information they use when making crucial decisions (e.g.,
when deciding whether or not to compete over a valuable resource, as in the model pre-
sented in Chapter 4). In this regard, the existence of biases may appear counterintuitive
for this purpose, since these simply distort this information processing. For instance,
even though the literature indicates that individuals should behave as Bayesians (Mar-
shall et al., 2013a,b; McNamara et al., 2006; McNamara and Houston, 1980; Tenenbaum
et al., 2006), people are reported to be overconfident regarding the outcome of future
events despite known evidence to the contrary (Sharot, 2011a,b). However, the theory
proposed by Trivers and the results presented in Chapter 4 show that a bias can be part
of a behavioral mechanism that overall is beneficial, even though in other circumstances
the bias alone could lead to detrimental behaviour. Then it could be sensibly hypothesised
that the biases reported in the literature (Alicke and Govorun, 2005; McCormick et al.,
1986; Pallier et al., 2002; Sharot, 2011a,b; Svenson, 1981) could potentially have similar
explanations.
The models presented in this thesis and summarised above are purely theoretical and
make no use of experimental data collected from nature. However the variables that are
taken into account are realistic and thus the predictions made by the models should be
consistent with equivalent scenarios in nature. This is exemplified, for instance, in the
model introduced in Chapter 3 where Bayesian learners are shown to win an evolutionary
race against frequentists exactly as they should be expected to in nature. The models pre-
sented in this thesis make some assumptions in order to make each problem more tractable.
However, it is reasonable to hypothesise that these assumptions do not compromise greatly
the generality of the results obtained. Nonetheless the models could be improved in the
future by incorporating more realistic assumptions, such as variable resource values and
perception errors in the model introduced in Chapter 4 and experimental data in the
101
model introduced in Chapter 2.
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Appendix A
Supplementary information for
Chapter 4
A.1 Expected payoff of an owner in the simplified model
presented in Section 4.2
The expected payoff of any owner with internal bias k is calculated as a function of k, as
shown in Equation A.1.
F (k) =
∑
A∈SA
P (A)I[p̂W (A, k) >
c
r
][I(A > 0)r − c] (A.1)
This function approximates the owner’s payoff as a summation of the weighted partial
payoffs the owner receives in simulated encounters with challengers in a set SA of uniformly
sampled values of A. The weighting factor is the probability of each A, denoted by P (A).
Each partial payoff in the summation is expressed in terms of an auxiliary identity function
of the form I(Cx), which returns unity if the condition represented by Cx holds true and
zero otherwise. The expression p̂W (A, k) denotes the individual’s estimated probability of
winning, given A and k.1 Partial payoffs are added in the calculation of expected payoff if
and only if p̂W (A, k) >
r
c , i.e., if the owner decides to fight back. The partial payoff is r−c
if the owner is stronger than its opponent in the simulated owner-challenger encounter and
−c otherwise.
1The estimate p̂W (A, k) is given by P (θ̂j < θi + k) = P (θ̂j − θi − k < 0). Since θ̂j is normally
distributed with mean θj and standard deviation σ then the sum θ̂j − θi − k is normally distributed with
mean θj − θi − k and standard deviation σ. Therefore P (θ̂j − θi − k < 0) can be restated as P (Θ < 0),
where Θ ∼ N (−A− k, σ).
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A.2 Optimal owner behaviour in the simplified model pre-
sented in Section 4.2
In the model introduced in Section 4.2 it holds that if an owner i accepts an opponent j’s
challenge then the marginal probability that i defeats j is given by pW = P (θi > θj) =
P (A > 0) = 12 and therefore an owner’s expected payoff from a single fight is
1
2r − c. An
unsophisticated owner that ignores relevant information and fights randomly each time
with fighting probability pF is then expected to receive a mean payoff Fmin = pF (
1
2r − c)
after repeated encounters with random challengers. Owners in this model, however, choose
to fight only when their estimated expected payoff is positive, therefore their payoffs in
the long term should be higher than Fmin. Theorem A.1 shows that an owner may fight
only if rc is in the interval (1,∞). In addition to this, Theorem A.2 shows that for each rc
there is a capability superiority threshold for conflict, denoted by z, and that every owner
i decides to repel a challenger if and only if A > z − ki. Thus the fighting probability of
an owner with bias ki is given by pF = P (A > z−ki) and it increases as rc and ki increase
and as z and cr decrease.
Theorem A.1
When rc ∈ (0, 1] an owner never fights back.
Proof: If rc ∈ (0, 1] then cr ∈ [1,∞) and p̂W can never be above cr . Therefore the owner’s
decision rule (i.e., “fight back if and only if p̂W >
c
r”) is never satisfied.
Theorem A.2
Every owner i fights j if and only if θi + ki > θj + z where z, the capability superiority
threshold for conflict, is the solution to the equation
∫ z
−∞Φ
′(x)dx = cr and Φ
′(x) is the
density function of a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation σ.
Proof: From the fact that p̂W = P (θ̂j < θi + ki) and θ̂j ∼ N (θj , σ) it follows that
p̂W =
∫ θi+ki
−∞ Φ(x)dx, where Φ(x) is the density function of the normally-distributed θ̂j .
Let v be the solution to equation
∫ v
−∞Φ(x)dx =
c
r and let z = v − θj . Therefore p̂W > cr
(i.e., the owner fights back) if and only if θi+ki > v = θj+z, where z satisfies the equation
c
r =
∫ v
−∞Φ(x)dx =
∫ θj+z
−∞ Φ(x)dx =
∫ z
−∞Φ
′(x)dx and Φ′(x) is the density function of a
normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation σ.
Marshall et al. (2013b) show that an optimally-behaving individual in the model pro-
posed by Johnson and Fowler (2011) whose opponent is known to fight necessarily retal-
iates if its marginal probability of winning satisfies the inequality pW >
c
r . An optimal
owner in the owner-challenger model presented in Section 4.2 should exhibit exactly the
same behaviour because its decision is made only in the knowledge that its opponent is
determined to fight. If every owner had access to perfect information it would be able to
compute accurately its probability of winning and follow the decision rule “fight if and
only if pW >
c
r” (Marshall et al., 2013b). However, each owner only has access to its own
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estimated probability of winning (p̂W ), which is likely to deviate from the actual value
(pW ) due to the individual’s perception error (σ) and internal bias (k). The individual
uses this information to make a rational decision but due to the uncertainty present it is
possible that at some point the individual makes the wrong choice.
Given any randomly selected owner i and challenger j, then by definition i’s marginal
probability of winning is pW = P (A > 0) =
1
2 and this means i is objectively expected
to be stronger than half the opponents it encounters. Therefore an optimal owner i that
hypothetically takes part in repeated encounters with random challengers should decide to
fight in approximately half of those encounters, otherwise i would be missing opportunities
to defeat and increase its fitness; or it would risk itself in fights that are bound to be lost,
which would in turn have a detrimental effect on its long term fitness. Then it can be
predicted that the owners with the highest long-term payoffs must have internal biases that
make pF equal to
1
2 . That is to say, optimal behaviour is a sufficient (but not necessary)
condition for pF =
1
2 . Similarly, a fighting probability pF =
1
2 is a necessary (but not
sufficient) condition of optimality.
A.3 Details of the evolutionary model presented in Sec-
tion 4.3
The evolutionary model used in Section 4.3 is as follows. A population of 500 individuals
with role-dependent biases is initialized with random standard normal biases. Every gen-
eration the population is assorted in such a way that every individual x is paired at random
with exactly one adversary y in the population. The capability difference between x and
y (denoted by A) is a randomly-chosen standard normal value. Two encounters between
x and y are simulated. In the first encounter x plays owner and y plays challenger. In the
second encounter the roles are inverted. In each encounter each individual expresses only
the biases corresponding to the role played by the individual. That is to say, when x plays
the role of an owner it estimates its own capability as θx + ko,x and attempts to deceive y
into believing that x’s capability is θx + so,x. On the other hand, when x plays the role of
a challenger it estimates its own capability as θx + kc,x and attempts to project onto y a
capability equal to θx + sc,x. The biases of y are expressed analogously. The fitness of x is
calculated as the average of the payoff received by this individual in the two encounters.
The fitness of y is calculated in the same manner.
One half of the population are selected through stochastic universal sampling (Baker,
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1987). A new population is formed consisting of the selected individuals. Those that
fail to be selected are replaced by randomly-chosen copies of the selected ones to com-
plete the new population. Approximately 1% of the new population members have their
genetically-encoded biases mutated with Gaussian noise. Evolution runs until the 5, 000-
th generation, when no considerable changes are observed and the population is assumed
to be in equilibrium.
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Appendix B
Technical details of the model in
Chapter 2
B.1 Source files
The source code that implements the model presented in Chapter 2 can be found in the
compressed file Chapter2.zip downloadable from http://goo.gl/fdRBy5. These sources
were written in C++ (compiled with g++ version 4.9.1) and Matlab (version 8.1.0.604).
The operating system used was Scientific Linux release 6.5 (Carbon).
The C++ sources must be compiled using the makefile provided.
B.2 Figure 2.2
The subplots in Figure 2.2 are generated by compiling all the C++ sources, as described in
Section B.1, and then running script Run1.sh.
B.3 Figure 2.3
The subplots in Figure 2.3 are generated by compiling all the C++ sources, as described in
Section B.1, and then running script Run2.sh.
B.4 Figure 2.4
The subplots in Figure 2.4 are generated by compiling all the C++ sources, as described in
Section B.1, and then running script Run3.sh.
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B.5 Figure 2.5
The subplots in Figure 2.5 are generated by compiling all the C++ sources, as described in
Section B.1, and then running script Run4.sh.
B.6 Figure 2.6
The subplots in Figure 2.6 are generated by compiling all the C++ sources, as described in
Section B.1, and then running script Run5.sh.
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Appendix C
Technical details of the model in
Chapter 3
C.1 Source files
The source code that implements the model presented in Chapter 3 can be found in
folder Chapter3/Sources inside the compressed file Chapter3.zip downloadable from
http://goo.gl/usFGkO. These sources were written in C++ (compiled with g++ version
4.9.1), R (version 3.0.2) and Matlab (version 8.1.0.604). The operating system used
was Scientific Linux release 6.5 (Carbon).
Folder Chapter3/Data inside the compressed file Chapter3.zip contains the data pro-
duced with the source code and can be reused to generate the plots in Chapter 3 without
having to rerun the code, since some of the programs may take a long time to finish.
Details on how to reuse these data appear further below.
C.2 C++ sources
The C++ sources must be compiled using the makefile provided. The source code uses
libraries Boost (Version 1.53.0) and GAlib (Version 2.4.7). In order to compile the
C++ sources these libraries must be downloaded and installed by following their respec-
tive sets of instructions. Once installed, the variables BOOST DIR and GALIB DIR in the
makefile must be updated to point to the installation folders of the Boost and GAlib
libraries. After doing this, compilation of all the C++ sources is done by calling the make
command in Linux.
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C.3 Figure 3.3
Each subplot in Figure 3.3 is generated by compiling all the C++ sources, as described in
Section C.2, and then running script Run1.sh. Doing this will run four new evolutionary
simulations with the same parameters as those illustrated in Figure 3.3. Different runs are
likely to result in different evolutionary histories thus the newly generated subplots will
probably be different from the ones depicted in the current figure.
C.4 Figure 3.4
Each subplot in Figure 3.4 is generated by compiling all the C++ sources, as described in
Section C.2, and then running script Run2.sh. Doing this will run four new evolutionary
simulations with the same parameters as those illustrated in Figure 3.4. Different runs are
likely to result in different evolutionary histories thus the newly generated subplots will
probably be different from the ones depicted in the current figure.
C.5 Figure 3.5
Each subplot in Figure 3.5 is generated by compiling all the C++ sources, as described in
Section C.2, and then running script Run3.sh. Doing this will run four new evolutionary
simulations with the same parameters as those illustrated in Figure 3.5. Different runs are
likely to result in different evolutionary histories thus the newly generated subplots will
probably be different from the ones depicted in the current figure.
C.6 Figure 3.6
Each subplot in Figure 3.6 is generated by compiling all the C++ sources, as described in
Section C.2, and then running script Run4.sh. Doing this will run four new evolutionary
simulations with the same parameters as those illustrated in Figure 3.6. Different runs are
likely to result in different evolutionary histories thus the newly generated subplots will
probably be different from the ones depicted in the current figure.
C.7 Figure 3.7
Each subplot in Figure 3.7, and its corresponding subfigure in Figure 3.8, is generated by
compiling all the C++ sources, as described in Section C.2, and then running script Run5.sh.
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Doing this will run four new evolutionary simulations with the same parameters as those
illustrated in Figure 3.7. Different runs are likely to result in different evolutionary histories
thus the newly generated subplots will probably be different from the ones depicted in the
current figure.
C.8 Figure 3.9
Each subplot in Figure 3.9 is generated by compiling all the C++ sources, as described in
Section C.2, and then running script Run7.sh. Doing this will run four new evolutionary
simulations with the same parameters as those illustrated in Figure 3.9. Different runs are
likely to result in different evolutionary histories thus the newly generated subplots will
probably be different from the ones depicted in the current figure.
C.9 Figure 3.10
Each subplot in Figure 3.10 is generated by compiling all the C++ sources, as described in
Section C.2, and then running script Run8.sh. Doing this will run four new evolutionary
simulations with the same parameters as those illustrated in Figure 3.10. Different runs
are likely to result in different evolutionary histories thus the newly generated subplots
will probably be different from the ones depicted in the current figure.
C.10 Figure 3.11
Each subplot in Figure 3.11 is generated by compiling all the C++ sources, as described in
Section C.2, and then running script Run9.sh. Doing this will run four new evolutionary
simulations with the same parameters as those illustrated in Figure 3.11. Different runs
are likely to result in different evolutionary histories thus the newly generated subplots
will probably be different from the ones depicted in the current figure.
C.11 Figure 3.12
Figure 3.12 is generated by compiling the C++ code, as described in Section C.2, and
then running Run11.sh. This script calls a C++ program to simulate the evolutionary
computation between Bayesians and frequentists with each combination of environment
hyperparameters. The average number of Bayesians is output to a .CSV file. Then the
script calls a Matlab program to read the .CSV file and plot the data.
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The evolutionary simulations can take long. The .CSV file generated by Run11.sh is
stored in compressed file Run11.zip. This file can be used to generate the plot more easily
by calling only the Matlab program.
C.12 Figure 3.13
Figure 3.13 is generated by compiling the C++ code, as described in Section C.2, and
then running Run12.sh. This script calls a C++ program to simulate the evolutionary
computation between Bayesians and frequentists with each combination of environment
hyperparameters. The average number of Bayesians is output to a .CSV file. Then the
script calls a Matlab program to read the .CSV file and plot the data.
The evolutionary simulations can take long. The .CSV file generated by Run12.sh is
stored in compressed file Run12.zip. This file can be used to generate the plot more easily
by calling only the Matlab program.
C.13 Figure 3.14
Figure 3.14 is generated by compiling the C++ code, as described in Section C.2, and
then running Run21.sh. This script calls a C++ program to simulate the evolutionary
computation between Bayesians and frequentists with each combination of environment
hyperparameters. The average number of Bayesians is output to a .CSV file. Then the
script calls a Matlab program to read the .CSV file and plot the data.
The evolutionary simulations can take long. The .CSV file generated by Run21.sh is
stored in compressed file Run21.zip. This file can be used to generate the plot more easily
by calling only the Matlab program.
C.14 Figure 3.15
Figure 3.15 is generated by compiling the C++ code, as described in Section C.2, and
then running Run22.sh. This script calls a C++ program to simulate the evolutionary
computation between Bayesians and frequentists with each combination of environment
hyperparameters. The average number of Bayesians is output to a .CSV file. Then the
script calls a Matlab program to read the .CSV file and plot the data.
The evolutionary simulations can take long. The .CSV file generated by Run22.sh is
stored in compressed file Run22.zip. This file can be used to generate the plot more easily
by calling only the Matlab program.
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C.15 Figure 3.16
Figure 3.16 is generated by compiling the C++ code, as described in Section C.2, and
then running Run23.sh. This script calls a C++ program to simulate the evolutionary
computation between Bayesians and frequentists with each combination of environment
hyperparameters. The average number of Bayesians is output to a .CSV file. Then the
script calls a Matlab program to read the .CSV file and plot the data.
The evolutionary simulations can take long. The .CSV file generated by Run23.sh is
stored in compressed file Run23.zip. This file can be used to generate the plot more easily
by calling only the Matlab program.
C.16 Figure 3.17
Figure 3.17 is generated by compiling the C++ code, as described in Section C.2, and
then running Run24.sh. This script calls a C++ program to simulate the evolutionary
computation between Bayesians and frequentists with each combination of environment
hyperparameters. The average number of Bayesians is output to a .CSV file. Then the
script calls a Matlab program to read the .CSV file and plot the data.
The evolutionary simulations can take long. The .CSV file generated by Run24.sh is
stored in compressed file Run24.zip. This file can be used to generate the plot more easily
by calling only the Matlab program.
C.17 Figure 3.18
In order to generate the four subplots in Figure 3.18 the C++ code must be compiled first,
as described in Section C.2.
Figure 3.18a is generated by running Run13.sh. This script calls a C++ program to
simulate the evolutionary computation between Bayesians and frequentists with each com-
bination of environment hyperparameters and generate two .CSV files with the Bayesian
population numbers per environment. Then the script calls a Matlab program to read the
.CSV files and plot the data.
The evolutionary simulations can take long. The .CSV files generated by Run13.sh
are stored in compressed file Run13.zip. These files can be used to generate each subplot
more easily by calling only the Matlab program using the instruction in Run13.sh.
Figure 3.18b is generated by running Run14.sh. This script calls a C++ program to
simulate the evolutionary computation between Bayesians and frequentists with each com-
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bination of environment hyperparameters and generate two .CSV files with the Bayesian
population numbers per environment. Then the script calls a Matlab program to read the
.CSV files and plot the data.
The evolutionary simulations can take long. The .CSV files generated by Run14.sh
are stored in compressed file Run14.zip. These files can be used to generate each subplot
more easily by calling only the Matlab program using the instruction in Run14.sh.
Figure 3.18c is generated by running Run15.sh. This script calls a C++ program to
simulate the evolutionary computation between Bayesians and frequentists with each com-
bination of environment hyperparameters and generate two .CSV files with the Bayesian
population numbers per environment. Then the script calls a Matlab program to read the
.CSV files and plot the data.
The evolutionary simulations can take long. The .CSV files generated by Run15.sh
are stored in compressed file Run15.zip. These files can be used to generate each subplot
more easily by calling only the Matlab program using the instruction in Run15.sh.
Figure 3.18d is generated by running Run16.sh. This script calls a C++ program to
simulate the evolutionary computation between Bayesians and frequentists with each com-
bination of environment hyperparameters and generate two .CSV files with the Bayesian
population numbers per environment. Then the script calls a Matlab program to read the
.CSV files and plot the data.
The evolutionary simulations can take long. The .CSV files generated by Run16.sh
are stored in compressed file Run16.zip. These files can be used to generate each subplot
more easily by calling only the Matlab program using the instruction in Run16.sh.
C.18 Figure 3.19
In order to generate the four subplots in Figure 3.19 the C++ code must be compiled first,
as described in Section C.2.
Figure 3.19a is generated by running Run17.sh. This script calls a C++ program to
simulate the evolutionary computation between Bayesians and frequentists with each com-
bination of environment hyperparameters and generate two .CSV files with the Bayesian
population numbers per environment. Then the script calls a Matlab program to read the
.CSV files and plot the data.
The evolutionary simulations can take long. The .CSV files generated by Run17.sh
are stored in compressed file Run17.zip. These files can be used to generate each subplot
more easily by calling only the Matlab program using the instruction in Run17.sh.
124
Figure 3.19b is generated by running Run18.sh. This script calls a C++ program to
simulate the evolutionary computation between Bayesians and frequentists with each com-
bination of environment hyperparameters and generate two .CSV files with the Bayesian
population numbers per environment. Then the script calls a Matlab program to read the
.CSV files and plot the data.
The evolutionary simulations can take long. The .CSV files generated by Run18.sh
are stored in compressed file Run18.zip. These files can be used to generate each subplot
more easily by calling only the Matlab program using the instruction in Run18.sh.
Figure 3.19c is generated by running Run19.sh. This script calls a C++ program to
simulate the evolutionary computation between Bayesians and frequentists with each com-
bination of environment hyperparameters and generate two .CSV files with the Bayesian
population numbers per environment. Then the script calls a Matlab program to read the
.CSV files and plot the data.
The evolutionary simulations can take long. The .CSV files generated by Run19.sh
are stored in compressed file Run19.zip. These files can be used to generate each subplot
more easily by calling only the Matlab program using the instruction in Run19.sh.
Figure 3.19d is generated by running Run20.sh. This script calls a C++ program to
simulate the evolutionary computation between Bayesians and frequentists with each com-
bination of environment hyperparameters and generate two .CSV files with the Bayesian
population numbers per environment. Then the script calls a Matlab program to read the
.CSV files and plot the data.
The evolutionary simulations can take long. The .CSV files generated by Run20.sh
are stored in compressed file Run20.zip. These files can be used to generate each subplot
more easily by calling only the Matlab program using the instruction in Run20.sh.
C.19 Figure 3.20
In order to generate the four subplots in Figure 3.20 the C++ code must be compiled first,
as described in Section C.2. Then the figures are produced by running Run25.sh.
C.20 Figure 3.21
In order to generate the four subplots in Figure 3.21 the C++ code must be compiled first,
as described in Section C.2. Then the figures are produced by running Run26.sh.
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C.21 Tests of evolutionary stability
The tests of evolutionary stability used in Section 3.10 are run by compiling the C++ code
first, as described in Section C.2, and then by running Run27.sh.
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Appendix D
Technical details of the model in
Chapter 4
D.1 Source files
The source code that implements the model presented in Section 4.2 and the generalized
model presented in Section 4.3 can be found in the compressed file Chapter4.zip down-
loadable from http://goo.gl/vkyy3U. These sources were written in the R programming
language (version 3.0.2) and Matlab (version 8.1.0.604). The operating system used
was Scientific Linux release 6.5 (Carbon).
The simplified model with only internal biases and always-aggressive challengers de-
scribed in Section 4.2 and the numerical analysis described in Section 4.4 are implemented
in source file Model 1.R whereas the generalized model with role-dependent internal and
external biases described in Section 4.3 and the simulations and numerical analyses de-
scribed in Section 4.5 are implemented in source file Model 2.R. These sources are adap-
tations from the R code by Johnson and Fowler (2011).
The Matlab source files SurfacePlot.m, SurfacePlot2.m and SurfacePlot3.m are
used for producing Figures 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 from data generated by the R source code.
The instructions for doing this appear in the following sections.
D.2 Figure 4.2
Figure 4.2a is produced following the steps below.
1. Executing function Model 1 1() in the R source file Model 1.R, which outputs the
data file Expected payoffs.csv.
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2. Executing function SurfacePlot() in Matlab source file SurfacePlot.m in the same
directory as Expected payoffs.csv. The plot is output in the same directory as a
file named Expected payoffs.pdf.
Figure 4.2b is produced by running function Model 1 2() in the R source file Model 1.R.
The plot is output in the same directory as a file named optimal owner biases.pdf.
D.3 Figure 4.3
Figure 4.3a and Figure 4.3b are produced following the steps below.
1. Running Model 2 1() in the R source file Model 2.R, which outputs a folder named
Model 2 1 containing two .csv files named 1 owners.csv and 2 challengers.csv.
In order to generate these two files, the program needs to output several auxiliary
files into this folder first. While the program is running the size of the folder can reach
over 300 MB, but these auxiliary files are deleted by the program upon completion.
2. Running the Matlab source file SurfacePlot2.m in the same directory as 1 owners.csv
and 2 challengers.csv (these two files can copied from folder Model 2 1). This
program reads the two .csv files and produces the plots. The plots are output in the
same directory as two files named owners sf plot.pdf and challengers sf plot.pdf.
Figure 4.3c and Figure 4.3d are produced following the steps below.
1. Running Model 2 2() in the R source file Model 2.R, which outputs a folder named
Model 2 2 containing two .csv files named 1 owners.csv and 2 challengers.csv.
In order to generate these two files, the program needs to output several auxiliary
files into this folder first. While the program is running the size of the folder can reach
over 100 MB, but these auxiliary files are deleted by the program upon completion.
2. Running the Matlab source file SurfacePlot2.m in the same directory as 1 owners.csv
and 2 challengers.csv (these two files can copied from folder Model 2 2). This
program reads the two .csv files and produces the plots. The plots are output in the
same directory as two files named owners sf plot.pdf and challengers sf plot.pdf.
Figure 4.3e and Figure 4.3f are produced following the steps below.
1. Running Model 2 3() in the R source file Model 2.R, which outputs a folder named
Model 2 3 containing two .csv files named 1 owners.csv and 2 challengers.csv.
In order to generate these two files, the program needs to output several auxiliary
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files into this folder first. While the program is running the size of the folder can reach
over 100 MB, but these auxiliary files are deleted by the program upon completion.
2. Running the Matlab source file SurfacePlot2.m in the same directory as 1 owners.csv
and 2 challengers.csv (these two files can copied from folder Model 2 3). This
program reads the two .csv files and produces the plots. The plots are output in the
same directory as two files named owners sf plot.pdf and challengers sf plot.pdf.
D.4 Figure 4.4
Figure 4.4a and Figure 4.4b are produced following the steps below.
1. Running Model 2 4() in the R source file Model 2.R, which outputs a folder named
Model 2 4 containing two .csv files named 1 owners.csv and 2 challengers.csv.
2. Running the Matlab source file SurfacePlot3.m in the same directory as 1 owners.csv
and 2 challengers.csv. This program reads the two .csv files and produces the
plots. The plots are output in the same directory as two files named owners sf plot.pdf
and challengers sf plot.pdf.
D.5 Figure 4.5
Figure 4.5a and Figure 4.5b are produced following the steps below.
1. Running Model 2 5() in the R source file Model 2.R, which outputs a folder named
Model 2 5 containing two .csv files named 1 owners.csv and 2 challengers.csv.
2. Running the Matlab source file SurfacePlot3.m in the same directory as 1 owners.csv
and 2 challengers.csv. This program reads the two .csv files and produces the
plots. The plots are output in the same directory as two files named owners sf plot.pdf
and challengers sf plot.pdf.
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